Lifestyles and carbon footprints A SCENARIO ANALYSIS OF LIFESTYLES IN FRANCE IN 2050 AND CARBON FOOTPRINTS 21 Les cahiers du Club d'Ingénierie Prospective Énergie et Environnement by Emelianoff, Cyria et al.
HAL Id: hal-01693815
https://hal-enpc.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01693815
Submitted on 26 Jan 2018
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Lifestyles and carbon footprints- A scenario analysis of
lifestyles in France in 2050 and carbon footprints - Les
Cahiers du Club Ingénierie Prospective Energie et
Environnement, n°21, Décembre 2012
Cyria Emelianoff, Elsa Mor, Michelle Dobré, Carine Barbier, Nathalie Blanc,
Christine Castelain-Meunier, Damien Joliton, Nicolas Leroy, Prabodh
Pourouchottamin, Pierre Radanne, et al.
To cite this version:
Cyria Emelianoff, Elsa Mor, Michelle Dobré, Carine Barbier, Nathalie Blanc, et al.. Lifestyles and
carbon footprints- A scenario analysis of lifestyles in France in 2050 and carbon footprints - Les Cahiers
du Club Ingénierie Prospective Energie et Environnement, n°21, Décembre 2012. [Research Report]
IDDRI. 2012, pp.127. ￿hal-01693815￿
C
L
IP
Lifestyles and  
carbon footprints
A SCENARIO ANALYSIS OF LIFESTYLES IN FRANCE  
IN 2050 AND CARBON FOOTPRINTS
21n°
september 2013
Abridged version of the f inal report
Cyria EMELIANOFF 
Elsa MOR 
Michelle DOBRE 
Maxime CORDELLIER 
Carine BARBIER 
Nathalie BLANC 
Agnès SANDER 
Christine CASTELAIN MEUNIER 
Damien JOLITON 
Nicolas LEROY 
Prabodh POUROUCHOTTAMIN 
Pierre RADANNE
Les cahiers du Club d’Ingénierie 
Prospective Énergie et Environnement
ADEME  
Agence de l’Environnement et de la 
Maîtrise de l’Énergie
BRGM  
Bureau de Recherches Géologiques 
et Minières 
CIRAD  
Centre de Coopération 
Internationale en Recherche 
Agronomique pour le 
Développement 
CNRS  
Centre National de la Recherche 
Scientifique 
CSTB  
Centre Scientifique et Technique du 
Bâtiment 
CITEPA  
Centre Interprofessionnel 
Technique d’Études de la Pollution 
Atmosphérique 
CEA  
Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique
EDF  
Électricité de France 
GDF SUEZ  
Gaz de France, Suez Environnement
GIE R.E. PSA RENAULT
IFP  
Institut Français du Pétrole
INERIS  
Institut National de l’Environnement 
Industriel et des Risques
INRA  
Institut National de la Recherche 
Agronomique
INRETS  
Institut National de la Recherche sur 
les Transports et leur Sécurité 
ONF  
Office National des Forêts
SNCF  
Société Nationale des Chemins de 
Fer Français 
SNET  
Société Nationale d’Électricité et de 
Thermique 
Head officers from the ministries 
of Environment, Industry, Research, 
Planification, and Housing belong 
to the Club’s scientific advisory and 
coordination board.
Le Club d’Ingénierie
Prospective  Énergie et Environnement
IDDRI coordinates CLIP activities 
and the publication of Cahiers du CLIP
Members:
Introduction 5
Description of five visions of lifestyles in 2050
Methodology for building 2050 visions 8
The Green Consumer Society 10
The Enhanced Human Society 16
The Dual Society and Multiple Frugal Lifestyles 23
The Environmental-Citizenship Society 30
The Knowledge Age Society 36
Initial assessment of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions based on the 
five alternative lifestyles projected for 2050
Segmentation of the French population and household carbon footprint 
assessment method 44
GHG emissions in the reference year 46
Carbon footprint for a selection of households in 2050, based on their uses  54
Impact on the results of a change in energy sources  72
Conclusion 77
In support of an open public debate over lifestyles 
Bibliography 84
Previous issues 87
Lifestyles and  
carbon footprints 
A SCENARIO ANALYSIS OF LIFESTYLES IN FRANCE IN 2050 
AND CARBON FOOTPRINTS
Iddri - 27, rue Saint-Guillaume - 75337 Paris Cedex 07
C
L
IP
Director of publications: Michel COLOMBIER
Editor: Pierre BARTHÉLEMY 
Translation: Anna KIFF and Leah BRUMER
Layout: Ivan PHARABOD - phiLabs
Contact: Pierre BARTHÉLEMY T/+33 (0)1 45 49 76 66  - pierre.bar thelemy@iddri.org
ABRIDGED VERSION OF THE FINAL REPORT 
(published in French in December 2012)
Les cahiers du Club d’Ingénierie Prospective Énergie et Environnement
Issue 21 - English version - September 2013
Authors
Cyria EMELIANOFF and Elsa MOR, UMR 6590, Université du Maine,
Michelle DOBRE and Maxime CORDELLIER, UMR 8097, MRSH Université de Caen,
Carine BARBIER, CIRED, UMR CNRS 8568,
Nathalie BLANC, LADYSS, UMR 7533, and Agnès SANDER, Université Paris X, 
Christine CASTELAIN MEUNIER, Centre d’Analyse et d’Intervention sociologiques, EHESS,
Damien JOLITON and Nicolas LEROY, Bureau d’études Energie Demain,
Prabodh POUROUCHOTTAMIN, EDF R&D,
Pierre RADANNE, Bureau d’études Futur Facteur 4.
With the contribution of
Jean-Yves AUTHIER, Groupe de recherche sur la socialisation, UMR 5040, Université Lyon 2,
Véronique BEILLAN, EDF R&D,
Jacques CHEVALIER and Aurélien TABURET, ESO-Le Mans, UMR 6590, Université du Maine,
Nathalie ETAHIRI, Mission prospective du MEDDE,
Pascal GIRAULT, EDF R&D Eifer,
Emmanuelle RENAUD-HELLIER, ESO-Rennes, UMR 6590,
Jacques THEYS, Mission prospective du MEDDE,
Jean-Pierre TRAISNEL, Laboratoire Théorie des Mutations Urbaines, UMR 7136,
Eric VIDALENC, Ademe.
The authors would like to express their upmost gratitude to Agnès SANDER for her contribution. Agnès 
passed away during the summer of 2012, this publication is dedicated to her memory.
The “Rethinking cities in a post carbon society” programme
The research programme “Foresight analysis of lifestyles in France in 2050 and carbon footprints”  
belongs to the programme “Rethinking cities in a post carbon society”, launched in 2008 by the Foresight 
Unit of the Ministry of Sustainable Development and the French Environment and Energy Management 
Agency (ADEME). The program framework was based on f ive activities :
-  a 25-member foresight group, drived by Futuribles then Mana,
- on-site research projects in 6 areas
- about 20 other research projects
- thematic seminars drived by Université du Maine
- a website : www.villepostcarbone.fr
The f inal report will be available at the end of 2013.
Financial support
The research programme “Foresight analysis of lifestyles in 2050” received f inancial support from 
the CNRS’ “Programme interdisciplinaire énergie“, the French Ministry of Environment’s “Mission 
Prospective“, and ADEME.
Lifestyles and carbon footprints I Les Cahiers du Clip n° 21 I 4
Introduction
Sustainable lifestyles and consumption pat-
terns have become a central aspect of re-
search on urban sustainabil i ty, which has 
been the subject of numerous publications in 
recent years (Her twich et al., 2005) (Char-
ter et al., 2006) (Geerken et al., 2008). It is 
diff icult to imagine a sustainable city in 2050 
unless lifestyles are dramatically changed. In-
deed, energy savings made thanks to cer tain 
infrastructure or technologies are more than 
offset by the overall increase in consumption. 
Conversely, promoting sustainable lifestyles 
seems contradic tor y when infras tructure 
encourages an ever greater consumption 
of resources (Souther ton et al., 2004). The 
question of the adaptability of cities in physi-
cal terms is therefore increasingly coupled 
with that of changing lifestyles, which are as 
much the result of technical knowledge as of 
the prevailing social, ethical and multicultural 
values.
Research conducted at the international scale 
on the environmental impacts of lifestyles 
and consumption patterns has par ticular ly 
analysed the role of urban morphology and 
the impor tance of individual ’s environmen-
tal values. These studies reveal the complex 
interactions between variables. Although ur-
ban morphology has a considerable impact 
on direct energy consumption (fuel, heating, 
electricity), indirect energy consumption in-
creases with household income in a non-linear 
manner (Moll et al. , 2006). People living in 
cities spend more time on shopping and cul-
tural activities, and a type of “compensatory 
mobility” may be observed (Perrels, 2005). 
In addition to infrastructure, free time use 
seems to be a decisive factor in people’s eco-
logical footprints. There does not appear to 
be a positive correlation between individual’s 
pro-environmental values and a reduction in 
energy consumption.
Social change theories are challenged by the 
complexity of the interacting factors. Wheth-
er they focus on the determinants (social , 
technical or ecological) or, on the contrary, on 
individual freedom of choice, or even on the 
“interplay” between stakeholders involved in 
action, they generally lack a forward-looking 
dimension (establishing a model for change). 
The goal of our research is par ticular ly to 
propose structured syntheses of complex 
data of dif ferent kinds (ecological, econom-
ic, geographical , socio-anthropological and 
historical).
On a more political level, lifestyles today raise 
the question of environmental justice and 
the sharing of resources at the global scale, 
building on the debates on eco-development. 
Research studies on “ethical consumption” 
(Crocker and Linden, 1998), “responsible 
consumption” (State of the World, 2004) or 
“sustainable consumption” ( Jackson, 2006) at-
tempt to rear ticulate environmental and so-
cial issues at the North-South scale. Although 
Western lifestyles are responsible for two-
thirds of global environmental impacts, while 
only concerning a sixth of the world popula-
tion (SCORE, 2008), a high social and cultural 
variability of ecological footprints is observed. 
Given comparable living standards, the mate-
rial intensity of consumption varies from one 
to four depending on the country (State of 
the World, 2004). There is thus considerable 
room for improvement.
This work is original in the f ield of research on 
lifestyles in that it takes a resolutely forward-
looking approach. Thus, the aim was f irst to 
identify the key variables of lifestyle changes 
in France and their impacts on CO2 emis-
sions, whether weak signals revealing new 
behaviours (co-housing, diet, the local food 
movement, new mobility practices, voluntary 
simplicity, etc.) or, more generally, changes in 
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social representations and in ways of living, 
working and consuming that are not motivat-
ed by environmental concerns but may have 
signif icant positive or negative effects on en-
ergy consumption.
Climate change corresponds to a profound 
change in civ i l isat ion through the radical 
transformation it requires in the relationship 
between people and their planet . As with 
every shift of this kind, we see not only eco-
nomic and technological changes, but also a 
dramatic modif ication of lifestyles and cultural 
expressions, along with political institutions 
and governance practices.
Unfor tunately, these periods of civilisation 
change are also characterised by a considera-
ble increase in tension: interpersonal conf licts, 
political and religious opposition and of ten 
clashes between countries. This conf lictual 
situation will only abate when a vision of the 
future emerges for the collective project and 
for personal fulf ilment. The issue of the devel-
opment of “successful 21st century life stories” 
will be at the hear t of for thcoming changes.
The first stage of this research was the produc-
tion of a state of the ar t on lifestyle changes, 
with the identification of key variables inducing 
behaviours that generate greenhouse gases 
(GHGs). The temporal context of this state of 
the art led us first to explore the past, through 
a retrospective of the major socio-economic 
lifestyle trends from 1960 to the present day. 
A dense retrospective analysis of lifestyles was 
conducted, focusing on several areas: demog-
raphy, income, consumption, housing, mobility, 
residential choices, education, relationships to 
work, relationships to time, values, social ties, 
and, finally, leisure and cultural practices. This 
research enabled us to understand the key 
trends at work over the last few decades. Next, 
the research looked at the present, analysing a 
range of weak ecological signals and the ground 
from which they emerge, and thereby examin-
ing the emergence of new social movements. 
Analysis of lifestyles linked to ecology or sus-
tainability (voluntary simplicity, slow life, etc.) 
was given preference. Other alternatives to the 
dominant social norms are developed where 
they are relevant to the Factor 4 issue, but the 
list is not exhaustive due to the breadth of the 
subject. After a cer tain number of readings, 
these weak signals were grouped according to 
three major expressions: resistance to forms of 
dependence on certain consumer goods (cars, 
televisions, etc) and, more generally, resistance 
to consumerism; the rapid development of new 
ways of living in urban areas; and the search for 
modes of existence that substitute “being” for 
“having”, social relationships for property rela-
tions and a “connection-based” economy for a 
“goods-based” one.. Since the 1970s we have 
seen a wider dissemination and diversification 
of practices linked to these critical positions and 
an assertion of the urban dimension. In addition 
to identifying, characterising and analysing these 
different practices, we will examine the capacity 
of these scattered movements to form a social 
movement. Are weak signals symptoms of cul-
tural change, elements of political subversion or 
simply pressure relief valves? Are we observing 
weak signals or new social movements?
 • The research went on to look at the near 
future by detecting, amid the boom of in-
formation and communication technologies, 
nanotechnologies and biotechnologies, the 
prospects as well as the health and ethical 
risks. The ethical dimensions par ticularly con-
cern the possible convergence of these tech-
nologies in the coming decades. Indeed, over 
the last thir ty years, the extraordinary pace 
of scientif ic progress and innovation has pro-
foundly changed our lifestyles. This is why it is 
important to analyse these changes in order 
to create possible future scenarios, even if it 
is diff icult to predict their medium- and long-
term carbon footprints.
Finally, dealing with the imaginary in this way 
blurs the boundaries in the structure of this 
state of the ar t. Following on, it stepped into 
science-f iction by examining lifestyles and the 
role of nature in the future.
 • The second stage of the research involved 
the implementation of a collective exercise to 
build visions of the future and of lifestyles in 
2050, from a multi-disciplinary, multi-stake-
holder approach, with the group being mainly 
composed of sociologists, geographers and 
energy economists (f irst par t).
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 • A quantitative evaluation of greenhouse gas 
emissions from households according to their 
socio-demographic characteristics was then 
conducted for the households emblematic of 
the visions established for 2050 (second part).
 • The f indings are discussed and interpreted 
in the conclusion in order to draw lessons for 
research and action.
This exercise, a f irst in France, is an explora-
tory study aimed at proposing avenues for 
research in the complex f ield of lifestyles, 
the determinants of their evolution and their 
environmental impacts . Cross-disciplinar y 
dialogue, which is essential to this type of ap-
proach, is never easy and is in itself a long and 
demanding process.
Four of the f ive visions of the future voluntar-
ily take a radical depar ture from the existing 
situation, and are somewhat stereotyped in 
order to push each of the approaches de-
scribed to its limits. In this sense, 2050 is not 
intended to be seen as a specif ic point in time; 
instead, it evokes a relatively distant perspec-
tive, leaving time for radical changes to take 
place. Finally, we have not attempted to paint 
a supposedly ideal picture. Each of the visions 
described has a specif ic driver, which is not 
necessarily linked to an environmental objec-
tive, and neither is more desirable than anoth-
er. Our goal is to present life stories that are 
specif ic to each of these contrasting visions, 
which may inspire later work.
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Description of five 
visions of lifestyles 
in 2050
Methodology for building 2050 visions
Given the uncer tainty they involve, lifestyles 
could have long been the subject of special 
at tention in future studies . Indeed, uncer-
tainty regarding the direction of change is 
one of the key cr i ter ia of future s tudies . 
Only directions that are subject to uncer-
tainty can produce highly contrasting visions 
of the future, which is the main objective of 
this exercise. However, the future studies 
literature does not in fact include scenarios 
in which the dr iv ing force is the intr insic 
change t ak ing p lace in l i fes t y les .  There 
are several reasons for this . It is clear that 
there is considerable dif f iculty in def ining 
the semantics of “lifestyles”. The complex-
ity of the factors that come into play even 
when attempting to describe lifestyles and 
their changes, before even thinking about 
producing scenarios, may prove dissuasive.
It is very dif f icult to reach an agreement on 
the def inition of lifestyles, whether between 
the dif ferent branches of sociology, or be-
tween the dif ferent disciplines. The dynam-
ics of change, according to the theory or 
discipline followed, do not involve the same 
aspects of l i festyles in the representation 
of the future. Depending on whether we 
focus on the role of policy action, that of 
consumption, of forms of sociability, or even 
of technologies , the reasoning behind the 
development of the scenar ios wil l be dif-
ferent. Most of ten, and by default , lifestyle 
changes are descr ibed exogenously, as a 
consequence of action taken elsewhere, in 
polit ical , technological , economic or envi-
ronmental f ields. In our approach, popula-
tion change (plot ted by INSEE), the envi-
ronmental crisis and the economy are par t 
of the context, the backdrop against which 
we have varied the dif ferent dimensions in 
order to produce the scenarios.
The process to build the visions presented 
hereafter was long and complex. It is impos-
sible here to go back over the two years that 
led the working group from the initial discus-
sions to the crucial moment of the f inal stabi-
lisation of scenarios. But we will outline the 
key elements.
In terms of methodology, the cross-disci-
pl inar y work ing group, composed of ge-
ographers, sociologists , political scientists , 
engineers and economists , among others , 
worked on two parallel and simultaneous 
levels: the backdrop (theoretical , concep-
tual and analy tical) fuelled by seminars with 
par t icipants invi ted according to specif ic 
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topics, as well as discussions; and the actual 
production workshops for these imaginary 
situations, where discussions and proposals 
gradually led to the def inition of guidelines 
for the development of the dif ferent ver-
sions of lifestyle change scenarios.
The main character is t ic of this def ini t ion 
process was openness: f irst, epistemological 
openness, through the interaction between 
the different disciplines and f ields involved in 
the discussions; then methodological open-
ness, once several established methodologi-
cal principles had been reiterated1 in an initial 
memorandum. Without prioritising the areas 
chosen, considered in various capacities to 
structure lifestyles, we deferred the issue of 
the decisive role of each dimension for the 
second phase of the def inition of 2050 visions.
The def inition of the content and structure 
of the conceptual f ield of “urban lifestyles” 
was established during seminars with exter-
nal par ticipants, followed by discussions, and 
with the bibliographical suppor t of the state 
of the ar t. The series of seminars focused on 
the dif ferent terms of the def inition of the 
lifestyles and f ields concerned, without any 
decision on the hierarchical positions of the 
various f ields: the socio-demographic distri-
bution of wealth and inequalities (R . Bigot, 
B. Filippi), consumption and ways of life (S. 
Juan), values (B . Hérault , C . Tarot), space 
( J . Levy), social temporalities (H. Rosa), and 
urban areas and sociabil i ty ( J -Y. Authier). 
At the same time, scenar io building work-
shops were launched based on a ser ies of 
“var iables” identif ied in the most relevant 
f ields that structure lifestyles. The concept 
of “explorator y f ie lds” was prefer red to 
that of “var iables”, being more open and 
less tied to the idea of a quantif ication that 
would be premature at this s tage. In this 
exercise, the meaning of the “dimension” 
is more abstrac t than the thematic area , 
but broader than the limited variable. The 
dimension is a “structuring” characteristic, 
but is also “dividing”, and therefore binary, 
in the same way as “equality”, for example, 
which can cut r ight through a society : i t 
ranges from high inequality to high equal-
i ty, and is an area that can be compared 
with one or two others . The subjects se-
lec ted were: demography, consumpt ion , 
daily life, culture and values, polit ics , state 
of the environment , urban li fe, economics , 
and technology. Within these subjects, the 
potential “dividing” or non-dividing nature 
of the dimension in question was discussed. 
Thus, for example, within culture and values, 
the individual /community relationship was 
considered as a dividing factor. For the f ive 
f inal scenarios, this factor remained as one 
of the areas determining the future evolu-
tion of lifestyles.
Throughout the process, cer tain areas stood 
out, giving rise to a wide range of proposals 
for contrasting visions. Thus, the area focusing 
on the future of individuals and their ar ticula-
tion with the collective entity was combined 
with a meta-relat ionship with resources , 
considered as an economic (materialistic) or 
cultural relationship (based on motives other 
than the economic motive, such as person-
al fulf ilment, control over one’s lifestyle, or 
performance, etc.). Within the f ive scenarios 
f inally selected, we f ind all of the subjects 
present in the “exploratory f ield” since they 
are, in different ways for each of the visions, 
the mainsprings that structure the descrip-
tion of lifestyles in 2050. Thus, in scenario 2 
(Enhanced Human Society), the technological 
dimension is of far greater impor tance than 
in scenario 3 (Dual Society and Multiple Fru-
gal Lifestyles) or scenario 4 (Environmental 
Citizenship). But with more collective social 
directions, we may f ind the same importance 
of the technological dimension in scenario 5 
(Age of Knowledge), which is consistent with 
the operation of information technology, 
which cannot be removed from the social 
context in which it is deployed.
1 GODET M., 2007. Manuel de prospective stratégique, two volumes, CNAM, Dunod ; DATAR, 1975. La méth-
ode des scénarios. Une réflexion sur la démarche et la théorie de la prospective, DATAR, La Documentation 
française, Coll. Travaux et recherches de prospective, n° 59.
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The Green Consumer Society
The spirit of this vision
The green consumer society is situated in a 
business-as-usual scenario with regard to life-
styles in Europe; technological innovation cer-
tainly provides new goods and services, but 
with no major change. The driver of change 
is adaptation to the globalisation of the econ-
omy, based on individualism. Consumerism is 
still at the basis of trade relations and of their 
materiality. However, the continuation of this 
trend in a context of constraints on material 
resources (and high costs linked to the conse-
quences of climate change and to the adapta-
tion of infrastructure) requires a reduction in 
the ecological impact of the consumer soci-
ety, including GHG emissions. The greening 
of consumption attempts to respond to this 
need to reduce the carbon impact, while f irst 
satisfying the desire for comfor t and mate-
rial well-being of the dominant groups of this 
social model.
During the f irst half of the 21st century, the 
OECD experienced low economic growth. 
Economic globalisation has continued, but has 
been marked by repeated economic and f i-
nancial crises. The main centres of innovation 
have moved to the Asian countries, fuelled 
by their booming domestic demand, which 
enabled them to attain high economic growth 
over the period. Some African countries are 
following suit . Despite the stabil isation of 
energy consumption in Western countries, 
global demand for energy continues to grow, 
increasing pressure on fossil energy resourc-
es. Consequently, the use of non-conven-
tional energy (both primary energy, such as 
oil shale and shale gas, and f inal energy, such 
as liquef ied gas and coal) has grown signif i-
cantly, helping to keep the price of oil below 
$150 per barrel.
Climate change is growing steadily worse. 
The average global temperature rose by 1°C 
during the f irst half of the 21st century, and 
by 2°C in France. Rainfall is decreasing every 
year, especially in spring and summer, with 
high inter-annual variability. In spite of some 
severe f looding, the land has dried out. The 
long periods of drought have accelerated the 
abandonment of agricultural land.
The demographic trends observed at the 
beginning of the century have persisted. The 
population of mainland France (63.1 million 
people in 2011) reached 72.3 million people 
in 20502. The natural increase declined over 
the period, falling from 283 000 in 2011 to 
32 000 in 2050, and the migratory balance 
increased slightly. It stood at +75 000 people 
in 2011 and is estimated at +100 000 per year 
over the whole period. Migration at the inter-
national level has diversif ied in the direction 
of countries where economic growth is rela-
tively high (the Middle East, Asia, and Latin 
America). Immigration towards the OECD 
countries has remained at the same level as at 
the beginning of the century. The reasons for 
this migration are environmental and climatic 
rather than economic.
The population has continued to age. The 
number of people over 60 years of age has 
risen by more than 10 million: in 2050, one 
in three people are thus over 60 and 16% are 
over 75, compared to 9% today. Female life 
expectancy at bir th was 84.5 years in 2011; 
it stands at 90 years in 2050. Male life expec-
tancy was 77.8 years in 2011, and is 84.6 in 
2050. The fer tility rate is almost unchanged, 
at 1.95 children per woman.
Political organisation
Economic tension at the international level 
has made it impossible to establish a suf f i-
ciently ambitious international climate regime. 
The European Union crisis has given States 
2 Source: Insee’s central scenario.
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new room for manoeuvre. Proactive national 
policies have been implemented to of fset 
the damage caused by climate change and to 
overcome the growing problems of access to 
fossil fuels for Europe. The goal is to develop 
a so-called “green” economy and to thereby 
open up new markets. Lacking the means to 
guarantee a “Green New Deal”, the State in-
tervenes both downstream, to suppor t the 
worst hit sectors, and upstream, through a set 
of incentive, f inancial and f iscal measures fo-
cusing on adaptation to environmental change 
and the deployment of a green economy. The 
decarbonisation of the energy system and ad-
aptation to climate change are the core fea-
tures of environmental public policies.
Carbon offset mechanisms have been widely 
developed for both individuals and businesses, 
f inancing reforestation projects and renew-
able energy installations in developing coun-
tries. The regional authorities are trying to 
achieve carbon neutrality through the use of 
these mechanisms. Nevertheless, the offshor-
ing of industry and services to the develop-
ing countries has continued, and with it that 
of CO2 emissions through imports ( Jackson, 
2011). Since the new carbon accounting meth-
ods include the carbon balance of foreign 
trade, the European governments suppor t 
“clean” development programmes in par tner-
ship with the exporting countries.
In spite of the offensive marketing strategies 
that the regional authorities are implement-
ing in order to maintain jobs, the situation is 
rather precarious. The overall level of social 
inequalities has continued to grow, exacerbat-
ed by environmental vulnerabilities. The con-
strained par t of household budgets has be-
come very high, par ticularly due to increasing 
prices of insurance policies and to a relatively 
non-redistributive eco-tax system. Social ten-
sion therefore runs high and is managed by the 
public authorities in a rigid, defensive manner. 
Local riots, demonstrations against the loss of 
purchasing power, and hunger strikes to pre-
vent offshoring or to protest against public 
sector job losses all accompany the increas-
ing insecurity of par t of the population and 
the decline of the public sector. Conf licts over 
the control of information, especially via the 
Internet, are recurrent. Communication net-
works and information f lows are monopolised 
and strategically controlled by several large 
groups, in cooperation with the Ministr ies 
of the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence, 
which have set up a heavily subsidised joint 
depar tment to monitor communication net-
works. But this has not brought hackers and 
“Net neutrality” movements under control.
Production systems
Production systems have remained central-
ised and capitalistic, with the predominance of 
international f irms, while incorporating coop-
eration and resource sharing strategies. We 
thus see the emergence of industrial parks de-
signed according to the principles of industrial 
ecology. Design systems for products focus 
on life cycle assessments, with a view to op-
timising resources, the means of production 
and recycling solutions. Recycling has been 
extensively developed in all industr ial pro-
cesses. However, consumerist attitudes and 
the continued high demand for energy lead to 
high levels of risk-taking in terms of health and 
environment. Pollution is increasingly ubiqui-
tous (chemical components, genes from GM 
crops, nanopar ticles, etc.), and spreads to all 
environments.
Reducing France’s energy dependence is a 
pressing concern. However, energy demand-
side management is still seen as secondary to 
supply policies. The dif f iculty of inf luencing 
numerous actors remains an obstacle that 
the State lacks the means to overcome. The 
periods of economic recession, the erratic 
evolution of oil prices, the growing insecurity 
of an increasing number of households and 
their vulnerability to rising energy prices have 
fostered acceptance of the exploitation of 
shale gas in France and the rest of Europe. 
The maintenance of nuclear plants at 2010 
levels with the replacement of end-of-l ife 
power stations accounts for 50% of electricity 
production.
Following on from the European “20-20-20” 
policy, the State is also placing the emphasis 
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on the development of renewable energy, 
mainly through economic and f iscal instru-
ments. The carbon tax is in place at last, at 
about 100 €/tonne, or around 30 centimes 
per litre of petrol, an amount that is too low 
to change behaviour. However, personal car-
bon footprints are beginning to be commonly 
used by individuals as a means of managing 
their budget. These measures are offset by 
the general increase in consumption, espe-
cially due to the obsolescence of products, 
which explains why energy demand in France 
remains at 2010 levels.
The carbon content of food products is also 
controlled. The agri-food industry and dis-
tr ibutors are subject to str ict regulations. 
Displaying the carbon content of food is now 
common practice, and is becoming a criterion 
for choice and for determining value for mon-
ey. We see a general increase in prices and a 
growing differentiation in the quality of food. 
Two types of agriculture coexist: f irst, a com-
petitive, low-quality agriculture par tly aimed 
at export (intensif ication, but with a relative 
decrease in the level of inputs due to the op-
timisation of their use, biofuels); and second, 
a multifunctional agriculture (extensive live-
stock farming, organic farming, polyculture-
livestock farming), which provides environ-
mental services for payment. Its development 
is linked to the proximity of outlets for short 
supply chains, close to urban areas, and to the 
existence of a natural, landscape and cultural 
heritage to be promoted. In the other areas, 
agriculture is still highly specialised with high 
output.
The consumption of organic products in food 
has signif icantly increased. These products 
come from both the international market 
(especially Eastern Europe and North Africa), 
which has access to cheap labour and is dis-
tr ibuted by supermarkets, and from French 
production, which is better quality but more 
expensive. Agricultural production is not di-
rectly supported by the public authorities. Aid 
is limited to crisis management and payments 
for environmental services. People are eat-
ing less meat, following the trend observed at 
the beginning of the century, mainly for public 
health reasons. The consumption of plant pro-
teins is encouraged.
The decarbonisation of food thus stems from 
a global diet that contains less animal protein, 
but also from the increasing use of renewable 
energy (including biofuels and biogas), from 
tools to optimise inputs in the agr icultural 
sector and from loss reduction at every stage 
of the process. The agri-food sector has also 
benef ited from the par tial decarbonisation 
of the global energy system. The transpor t 
of goods has barely changed. The share of 
impor ted animal products has risen sharply, 
along with that of imported animal feed, since 
priority is given to crops and to biofuel pro-
duction. This results in the “outsourcing” of 
GHG emissions linked to the consumption of 
animal products, even if there has been a shift 
towards the consumption of poultry and pork.
Technological innovation
The development of renewable energy (RE) 
helps to maintain low-carbon energy produc-
tion, even though demand continues to grow. 
But RE is struggling to meet requirements 
for heating and mobility, which remain very 
high, due to a lack of impetus from the public 
authorities and to insuf f icient funding. De-
spite the energy shocks, energy production 
and supply networks remain centralised, with 
economic benef its prevailing over energy re-
silience. Wind power has expanded, and some 
major offshore wind farms have been built off 
the Atlantic and northern coasts. Several car-
bon capture and storage facilities have been 
created, fed by vast sites including coal-f ired 
power stations and energy-intensive indus-
tr ies. Technological progress has enabled a 
gradual increase in the output from the solar 
photovoltaic panels that have equipped most 
new buildings since 2030, which nevertheless 
make up a small propor tion of the building 
stock in 2050. Photovoltaic systems are being 
installed on large roof areas, derelict urban 
sites and wasteland. The European electricity 
transmission grid has grown substantially and 
can merge the wind systems from all over Eu-
rope with Scandinavian hydroelectric power 
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and Southern solar power. The DESERTEC 
project has been a success.
Second generation biofuels have matured 
and gradually entered the market in 2030. 
They are the result of a rationalisation of log-
ging, the utilisation of ligno-cellulosic waste, 
and the development of plantations for this 
purpose. New generations of GM seeds are 
primarily aimed at energy production. These 
sectors are highly prof itable, but conf licts 
over land use with food and materials sectors 
limit their development, while algae fuel sec-
tors are still poorly understood and remain 
marginal. They are supplemented by agricul-
tural methanation, which has developed in 
some major cattle farms.
Intensive agricultural production has result-
ed in reduced soil fer tility. It is never theless 
subject to the rising costs of chemical fer tilis-
ers due to the depletion of oil resources, but 
also to weather variations, seed diseases and 
the proliferation of crop pests due to global 
warming. All of this has led to the develop-
ment of new soil-free systems in ever more 
ar tif icial environments, “ver tical farms” that 
secure the most fragile, high nutritional value 
agricultural products. These systems are also 
used for the cultivation of plants useful to the 
pharmaceutical industry. These ver tical farms 
(Despommier, 2011) are being developed 
in urban buildings with hydroponic systems. 
They use compost from the recycling of the 
fermentable fraction of household waste, 
thereby limiting the use of chemical inputs, 
and run on renewable energy (solar, geother-
mal, biogas). They may also be used as eco-
logical services for the recycling of grey water 
into drinking water and may thus become an 
integral par t of a wider urban ecosystem and 
of a heat regulation system (artif icial air condi-
tioning based on natural processes).
Another f ield of innovation is of course that 
of new information and communication tech-
nologies (NICTs). Their continued develop-
ment has led to the creation of intelligent 
and reactive environments at all scales, from 
smar t grids to smar t cities, and from intelli-
gent buildings to interactive districts. Infor-
mation systems have facil i tated the use of 
alternatives to private vehicles. Anyone may 
at any time use their mobile phone to f ind 
out the cheapest , lowest carbon means of 
transpor t between their point of depar ture 
and their destination, with the journey time 
indicated along with any changeovers. Smart 
cities are equipped with sensors, beacons, 
computers and emitters, as if covered by a 
layer of beams and invisible information f lows. 
These have become essential to everyday life, 
but are also a powerful means of controlling 
the lives of individuals, and are the subject of 
recurrent conf licts within society.
Smart rooms detect, adapt and communicate 
with the individuals present. Companies are 
competing to design sensitive, communicat-
ing objects that contain information systems, 
and can be used to control the vir tual world 
by manipulating physical objects (Rheingold, 
2005). The “box computer” has disappeared, 
leaving just a touch screen without wires or 
keyboard. Microchips blend into the environ-
ment and biometric devices enable identif ica-
tion. Computers are becoming “pervasive” 
and connection is permanent. Small, low-cost 
network processing systems are integrated 
and distributed throughout all aspects of daily 
life. For example, refr igerators are “aware” 
of their labelled content and propose a vari-
ety of menus with the foods present, and also 
warn consumers if food is past its use-by date 
or has gone off. Individual biometric sensors 
sewn into clothing adjust lighting and heating 
in an occupied room, imperceptibly and with 
no interruption.
All communications, whether in the private 
sphere or the public sphere, now systemati-
cally associate image with sound. In profes-
sional environments, webinars (online confer-
ences), which are a more f lexible and rapid 
way of bringing together a large number of 
par ticipants, have become the norm, made 
possible by the power ful systems installed 
by the major companies, public institutions 
and universities, etc. A variety of communi-
cation systems with image is available for all 
budgets. Thus, video calls between family and 
friends involving multiple callers have become 
commonplace.
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Many nanotechnology-based products have 
entered the market , having proved their 
worth in a variety of f ields (materials, equip-
ment , energy sys tems , etc .). Society has 
chosen to adopt these nanotechnologies en 
masse, but research on their impact on health 
is still insuff icient and largely overlooked. In 
spite of the many associations that are at-
tempting to mobilise public opinion, for exam-
ple in view of the rise in cases of lung cancer 
that smoking alone cannot explain, no global 
health surveillance has been put in place. En-
vironmental health remains the subject of 
conf lict.
Socio-spatial organisation and 
mobility
Population growth largely concerns urban 
areas. The urbanisation rate has stabilised 
at around 80%. Urban areas are surrounded 
by leisure zones and agr iculture in an at-
tempt to limit the need to travel , but the 
urban sprawl has not been controlled. The 
peri-urban population continues to grow, to 
the detriment of city centres. Social polari-
sation has increased. Segregation is leading 
to a rise in the number of gated, monitored 
neighbourhoods. Some of these neighbour-
hoods are designed according to environ-
mental cr i ter ia , and are accessible to the 
middle and upper classes.
The renovation of exis t ing buildings has 
reached a rate of 30% in 2050, while many 
others are deteriorating. Being often left to 
private initiative, energy savings are not al-
ways up to expectations, especially as the 
surge in air conditioning to cope with heat 
waves limits the savings made. The imbalance 
between the wealthier and poorer classes 
in terms of the way they protect themselves 
against the effects of pollution is f lagrant. For 
around 10 years, off ice and residential build-
ings , and new luxury hotels and shopping 
centres have been equipped with air f iltration 
systems, making them impervious to atmos-
pheric pollution.
Since the greater par t of population growth 
is situated in peri-urban areas, mobility has 
continued to rise, with an increase in the av-
erage distance travelled. But for low incomes, 
the use of private cars is often limited by the 
cost of fuel. These households turn instead to 
two-wheeled vehicles or to new small , light 
vehicles that meet demand for constrained 
low-cost mobility. Average household vehicle 
ownership has continued to grow, especially 
as environmental constraints and urban con-
gestion have led those who can afford it to 
acquire a wider range of vehicles: a car for 
long distances, one or two small urban cars, 
and a scooter or electric bicycles.
The modal share of public transpor t has in-
creased for two reasons. Under the impetus of 
local authorities seeking to reduce the trans-
port budget of the poorer households, peri-
urban areas have nevertheless become more 
dense. This has also enabled the development 
of diversif ied, complementary transport net-
works, combining cycling, walking, personal 
transpor ters3 and small automated shuttles, 
which converge towards public transport lines 
(trams or underground trains). However, the 
level of investment in transport by municipali-
ties largely depends on their budget, and the 
least well endowed municipalities remain on 
the periphery of this evolution. Their inhabit-
ants see their transport options deteriorating.
Mobility is also highly differentiated for non-
essential travel, especially for leisure reasons. 
For wealthy households, “leisure” travel and 
“visits” continue to increase, to the detriment 
of professional and educational tr ips . The 
number of second homes is rising, as is dual 
residency. While this increases long-distance 
mobil i ty, rentals of two-, three- or four-
wheeled vehicles from railway stations and 
luggage transport services are facilitated. This 
type of transpor t thus helps to reduce car 
use, even for long distances, but this remains 
a luxury for the majority of the population.
European rail l inks have considerably im-
proved in terms of speed and comfor t , 
rega in ing mar ket share for th is t ype of 
3 A one-seater electric vehicle, featuring two-wheeled platform on which the user stands.
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journey. Despite the unpredictable impacts 
of cl imate change on air travel , more in-
ternational f l ights are taken than before, 
and are primarily motivated by professional 
mobil i t y, and vis i t s to fr iends and family. 
Indeed, moving abroad is more common 
than several decades ago, especially due to 
the fact that almost all under 65s can speak 
English. Since the language barrier has been 
removed, going to live in a different country 
has become common practice.
Sociability and values
The work ethic is central to social identity and 
recognition. Those who fail to obtain paid em-
ployment of any kind, especially young people, 
are at a par ticular disadvantage. Competition 
for access to jobs has increased. Flexibility and 
new ways of organising work have also led 
to the individualisation of working hours and 
professional constraints, making it diff icult to 
ar ticulate them with other activities (family, 
social, leisure, etc.). The desynchronisation of 
social time, which began several decades ago, 
has continued to increase, even within the 
family, and is weakening family ties. Commu-
nication between family members or friends is 
mainly by Internet and on 3D screens, in addi-
tion to occasional visits. Online relationships 
are increasing to the detriment of face to face 
relationships.
The changes that marked the 1960 -2010 
period (a threefold increase in the number 
of single people, a doubling of the share of 
single-parent families , and a 10% increase 
in childless couples) have intensif ied. The 
percentage of s ingle people is thus 25% 
in 2050 (15% in 2010), and the share of 
single-parent families is 17% (9% in 2010). 
With the ageing populat ion, the number 
of people developing long-term il lnesses 
has increased (cancer, s troke, Alzheimer’s 
disease , etc .). The number of dependent 
elder ly people has thus doubled, reaching 
2 million in 20504. Thanks to the develop-
ment of home help networks, 9 out of 10 
people over the age of 75 live at home in 
2050, as was the case in 2010.
In terms of the typology of values, the domi-
nant group is that of the conformists . The 
value system to which they subscr ibe was 
formed in reaction to globalisation and under 
the pressure of the recurrent theme of secu-
rity: it is based on the triptych of tradition, 
conformity and security (including ecologi-
cal security). The need for security and con-
formity dominates the need for tradition, and 
xenophobic sentiment has been building. The 
handful of cosmopolitan elites that are very 
open to the rest of the world have failed to 
convince people of the value of multicultural-
ism, migration or forms of global governance. 
Insubordinate groups (ar t is ts , ecologis ts , 
hackers, etc.) are marginalised when they fail 
to move into potentially lucrative niche mar-
kets. Environmental awareness has grown on 
the whole, but in a somewhat defensive man-
ner. There is considerable concern about the 
degradation of resources, natural areas and 
landscapes. The French Chasse, Pêche, Nature 
et Tradit ion par ty (Hunting, f ishing, nature 
and tradition) has gained many followers and 
is not against alliances with an extreme-right 
that can garner as much as 30% of votes.
Lifestyles and consumption patterns
For those who work , t ime is cont inual ly 
acceler at ing and becoming more dense . 
Salar ies that are par tly linked to individual 
productivity have become the norm in most 
jobs . The development of telecommuting 
has re inforced th is pressure seven days 
a week , and contr ibuted to blur r ing the 
boundar ies between work and free t ime. 
Asynchronous communicat ion and s tor-
age tools (email , answering machines, etc.) 
contribute to multitasking and increase the 
density of time. For those who are able, go-
ing away at the weekend and disconnecting 
is the only way of having a break.
This has led to the ex tension of daily and 
weekly consumption periods and to activities 
4 Based on the pessimistic scenario of the Charpin group.
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being conducted until later at night. The 24-
hour stores and deliveries enable this f lex-
ibility. Consumer goods are “green” and low-
carbon, in order to maintain consumption 
volumes. Waste sor ting has progressed con-
siderably: the tax on household waste is sys-
tematically adjusted according to weight. Bulk 
buying in local stores has become a habit once 
more, and personal carbon footpr ints and 
carbon offsetting have grown substantially.
Access to consumer goods still varies greatly 
according to household income. High-tech 
products are stil l a social marker and new 
products are constantly being put on the 
market with no apparent saturation point for 
households that can afford them. The mini-
mum electronic equipment of a household, 
including low-income households, is one com-
puter per person (multifunctional tablets) and 
two widescreens in the home. In high-income 
households, all rooms are equipped to access 
the Internet, programmes or correspondents. 
Mass dissemination and the rapid obsoles-
cence of products characterise consumption 
patterns. People aspire to use “services”, es-
pecially to save time, which in fact translate as 
“goods”. At the same time, measures taken 
to label products with their carbon content 
have generated new purchasing habits that 
are gradually spreading through all segments 
of the population. The rebound effects limit 
the environmental benef its of the measures 
implemented.
While two-thirds of households took holidays 
in the 2000s, now only 50% do so. The cost of 
transpor t remains a considerable constraint 
for a large propor tion of households, what-
ever the means of transport. The preference 
for shor t tr ips has reversed, returning to a 
smaller number of trips per year, for a longer 
period for those who can afford it. For many, 
the escalation of precarious work, temping, 
and working hours that are increasingly f lex-
ible, erratic and uncertain make it diff icult to 
plan any leisure activities, even shor t ones. 
Finally, many elderly people prefer to stay at 
home. The more frequent heat waves, the 
uncertainties about weather conditions at all 
times of the year, and the recurrent f ires in 
the south of France have led many holiday-
makers to turn to breaks in leisure parks, 
where everything is planned so that many dif-
ferent activities can be enjoyed, whatever the 
weather. A wide range of spor ting, cultural 
and leisure activities are available in protected 
places, with air conditioning if necessary. Nat-
ural habitats with f lora and fauna, and “exotic” 
environments are ar tif icially developed, pro-
viding a complete change of scenery just a few 
hundred kilometres from home. These parks 
provide services to suit the purses of differ-
ent segments of the population and are more 
accessible than air travel. In addition, the last 
pandemic that occurred in 2046 is still on eve-
ryone’s mind and has reduced international 
travel. Drastic measures to limit and control 
international trade had to be imposed for six 
months. A new virus that was initially carried 
by mosquitoes mutated and became transmis-
sible between individuals.
The Enhanced Human Society
The spirit of this vision
The enhanced individual, with its sights set on 
the cyborg5, translates a desire to be freed 
from the unhappy human condition, and from 
a humanism that has shown its l imitations 
(war, genocide, ecocide, colonialism, pov-
er ty, exclusion, environmental degradation, 
etc.). Through a hybridisation with ar tif icial 
5 The chiemgauer is a local “melting currency,” created in a region of Bavaria in 2003. Its value declines over 
time, encouraging consumption and investment over hoarding.
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intelligence and mechanical prostheses, the 
cyborg could succeed in overcoming the fail-
ings of the human race: illness, ageing, death, 
domination and conf lict. Technical progress 
has, perhaps involuntarily (mutations, ICTs, 
GMOs and genetic engineering, etc.), opened 
up new possibilities for responding to ancient 
dreams and myths about surpassing humanity 
(Besnier, 2009). In the Anthropocene age, a 
new step in our evolution could be taken.
Progress in medicine (genetics , t issue re-
generation, implants, prostheses, chemistry, 
etc.) has resulted in a signif icant increase in 
life expectancy. The promise is that of a much 
longer, healthier life, at the price of a grow-
ing hybridisation with ar tefacts . “Natural” 
demographic trends have been modif ied by 
voluntary manipulation of procreation, bir th 
control and rejuvenation, etc. As the number 
of children per woman has decreased, the 
population in 2050 remains the same as in the 
business-as-usual scenario, at 72 million peo-
ple. Very old age is however only possible for 
the most eff icient: it is one of the drivers of 
the race for greater competitiveness.
The quest for per formance, whether at the 
individual or the systemic level, is central to 
this scenario. The market has become the uni-
versal model of social organisation, and is ca-
pable of giving access to eternity, admittedly 
at an as yet undetermined and controversial 
timescale. Individuals seek to increase their 
adaptive capacity and their chances of success. 
In order to adapt to the faster pace of life and 
to increase their per formance, they have no 
qualms about incorporating more and more 
prostheses. But the latter are not available to 
all people with the same degree of sophistica-
tion. Hyper-performance gives a transnational 
elite access to the prestigious positions and 
the most enviable life choices, through heavy 
dependence on technical devices. This elec-
tive heteronomy is seen as positive, since im-
proving their physical and cognitive capacities 
gives people a sense of greater (prosthetic-
assisted) individual autonomy.
This scenario leads to an ecological and social 
dualisation: a conf ined urban living environ-
ment is created ar tif icially for the enhanced 
humans, while the outside world contends 
with climate change, pollution, and the maxi-
mum exploitation of natural resources in a 
context of scarcity (biodiversity, diminishing 
oil reserves, raw materials) through increas-
ingly powerful technologies. Human life is dif-
f icult without the support of prostheses and 
protective environments, while living organ-
isms are modif ied and evolve in response to 
chemical, genetic and nanotechnological pol-
lution. Not everyone is able to take shelter 
in safe environments. As in the work of f ic-
tion Globalia (Ruff in, 2004), the “enhanced” 
world, which is “adapted” to the ecological 
crisis and kept under a dome, where an ar ti-
f icial nature is recreated for the needs of the 
integrated workers (the “pluses”), coexists 
with a bordering world that is far more uncer-
tain and uncontrollable This world is inhabited 
by the least eff icient people (the “minuses”), 
who are also enhanced, but who, by way of 
compensation, are living second lives, in multi-
ple vir tual realities, where they are reduced to 
realistically simulating what the “plus cyborgs” 
accomplish in reality. The boundary between 
reality and f iction is blurred.
In a context of unlimited per formance, the 
goal of enhancement tends to get fur ther 
away the closer one gets to it. Frustration on 
the par t of not only the “pluses”, but also the 
“minuses”, may result in resistance, hacking 
and forms of cyber violence where clashes re-
sult in a redistribution of power to control en-
hancement resources. In the 2030s, the right 
to an enhanced mind and body was laid down 
in the constitution.
Political organisation
The coalition between political and economic 
powers could not be closer. Techno-science 
and the industrial production system are po-
litically supported and protected. The search 
for prof it and power serve the purpose of sur-
passing human limitations, or perhaps it is the 
other way round. Competitiveness has been 
elevated to the rank of natural law (enabling 
the shif t from human to cyborg), but does 
not make the empowerment of individuals 
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possible, especially on the political level. The 
enhancement of human beings increases not 
only their capacities, but also collective con-
trol over them. Prostheses are a powerful in-
strument for surpassing ordinary experiences, 
and also for control. They result in functional 
specialisations that restrict personal choice, 
especially as robots enable individuals to of-
f load daily chores and activities in order to 
concentrate on their areas of excellence. 
Through prostheses, bodies are networked, 
which heralds the planetary and hybrid sym-
biote, combining ar tif icial intelligence and the 
mobilisation of brain and body (De Rosnay).
Political institutions are globalised. Global 
governance also functions at the regional 
and local levels through deconcentrated 
networks that are managed by the “plus-
es”. The “minuses”, on the other hand, are 
losing interest in politics. Highly specialised 
public institutions and territorial-level man-
agement bodies work in close collaboration 
with companies specialising in technological 
innovation (information technology, nano-
technology and biotechnology). States as 
such no longer exist, nor is there any yearn-
ing for national identity: the German cyborg 
is no more desirable than the Chinese cy-
borg, and this geographical distinction is no 
longer relevant. The evolution of societies 
is terrestrial and integrated. However, some 
cities and regions are more productive than 
others, since they have obtained better ac-
cess to resources or have ensured a greater 
redistr ibution of prostheses, which has in-
creased the overall level of per formance. 
The geography of terr i tor ial competit ion 
remains unchanged.
The political world is focusing primarily on the 
democratisation of prostheses, as this is the 
driving force behind growth and social cohe-
sion. The right to prostheses is an unfaltering 
social demand. However, citizens are losing 
interest in politics, seen as a stage on which a 
few “celebrities” per form. The government, 
which is both global and local , is personal-
ised and charismatic, playing the card of the 
inventive neo-human, par t god, par t beast. Its 
legitimacy is based on the promise of future 
prostheses for the masses, or for the greater 
good of the economy. The goal is of course to 
reduce the cyborg divide, which persists due 
to the shor tening of innovation cycles. Eve-
ryone has the right and the obligation to en-
hance themselves, but not everyone succeeds 
in doing so at the same pace. The right to en-
hancement, irrespective of individual f inancial 
resources, mainly concerns repair prostheses.
Nevertheless, the gaps are widening between 
the people heading the movement and those 
who are unable to follow; between the poor-
er and wealthier households; between the ins 
and the outs; and between those we see eve-
rywhere (especially government off icials, who 
are the most visible), and who we admire, and 
the “invisibles” (the “minuses” are far less visi-
ble, except in the vir tual worlds). Survival ben-
ef its are provided by the public authorities, 
par ticularly for connection devices and basic 
prostheses. The diff icult living conditions are 
made bearable by vir tual worlds.
Production system
The economy operates at the global scale 
thanks to a f inancialised but regulated form of 
capitalism. The global currency has been de-
materialised. Work is becoming more intense 
and all connected workers are competing in a 
single job market.
The new economy is based on a gradual con-
vergence of information technologies, nano-
technologies and biotechnologies. Robotics 
has undergone spectacular growth. Numer-
ous individual or collective services are now 
accomplished by robots and have thus mul-
tiplied (24-hour assistance, cleaning, main-
tenance, reconstruction, companion robots, 
deliveries, etc.). Robots populate living, work-
ing and leisure areas, as well as public spaces. 
The transformation and commoditisation of 
bodies is the other major area of market ex-
pansion. The monitoring and orientation of 
the ways individuals spend their time through 
prosthetic devices is the focus of intense com-
petition and economic battles. 
The society is hyper-industrial , and the use 
of ICTs, robotics and ar tif icial environments 
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has expanded, invading the social space. The 
majority of material consumption is due to 
envelopes, inter faces and cohor ts of robots 
and prostheses. Far fewer actual objects are 
used in daily life. They are multifunctional , 
programmable and compact. Ar tefacts are 
no longer in objects, but in bodies and in the 
environment.
Agr icultural production systems are now 
entirely ar tif icial . Highly intensive and ef-
f icient, they almost exclusively produce raw 
materials needed to make food products and 
pharmaceuticals. This production is comput-
erised and optimised using high-technology 
tools. Satellite monitoring is increasingly used 
to manage crops, to measure their biophysi-
cal parameters and to optimise nitrogen ap-
plication, etc. A good deal of agriculture is 
soil-free. GMOs are in widespread use for 
energy and food production. Functional foods 
are booming, and meet str ict physiological 
requirements.
More general ly, the planning of al l types 
of produc t ion has become widespread , 
thanks to the power ful calculation, coor-
dination and miniaturised storage of infor-
mation. Production and consumption can 
be matched in a very precise and f lexible 
manner, and changes are made in real time. 
Waste is considerably reduced and product 
shelf life has been lengthened: the renewal 
of consumption depends on the emergence 
of new environmental products and func-
t ions , rather than on the replacement of 
existing products. Old prostheses and ro-
bots are recycled af ter a long life.
Technological innovation
Social innovation is giving way to technologi-
cal innovation, which is rapidly evolving. The 
technologies presented here are not par-
ticularly futuristic, given that history has un-
dergone a remarkable acceleration: we have 
gained 80 years in 40 years.
The merging of intel l igent environments 
and wearable computing technologies has 
broadened the scope of possibilities. Enve-
lopes (second skins, clothing, habitats, inner 
s treets , etc.) have integrated information 
systems. Intelligent rooms have visual, audio 
and “haptic” (tactile) interfaces, while clothes 
incorporate wearable  computers that enable 
them to adapt to users and their environment. 
Mural displays are intended to stimulate citi-
zens’ performances, or to provide rest and a 
sense of wellbeing. Thus, the four seasons, the 
starry night sky or the Milky Way are regu-
larly displayed on walls in order to rest the 
imagination.
Human beings in turn integrate physical and 
digital prostheses that connect to one an-
other in intelligent environments, thanks to 
human-machine interfaces. Individual perfor-
mances are greatly enhanced by the develop-
ment of molecular nanotechnology and nano-
chips, which are likely to one day surpass the 
capacities of the human brain. Genetic and tis-
sue engineering also make it possible to repair 
bodies, to slow down the ageing process and 
to improve individual physical performances.
Information technologies have of course per-
meated the world of objects. All consumer 
goods can be monitored and tracked using 
wireless RFID chips (the object’s identity and 
circulation card). It is now possible to see 
how these objects are moved, to optimise 
their design, to automate the production and 
logistic f lows, and to develop better sor ting 
and recycling systems. RFID chips also make it 
possible to identify the everyday practices of 
individuals and to direct their choices through 
dif ferent types of adver tising. For example, 
the internal and external envelopes of build-
ings show adverts, which helps to pay for in-
telligent rooms.
More generally, we are seeing the rapid dis-
semination of nanotechnologies developed 
par ticular ly for biotechnological purposes. 
Nanotechnology has fostered the miniaturi-
sation of products and has helped to produce 
more resis tant , l ighter mater ials , thereby 
helping to reduce energy consumption.
In the energy production sector, solar sen-
sors are integrated into the envelopes of 
new buildings and use diffuse light conditions. 
Smar t grids have been widely implemented, 
along with small heating systems, and coexist 
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with centralised systems. These energy sav-
ings are offset by the computerisation of eve-
ryday life. ICTs and robotics use a substantial 
amount of energy for activities that were pre-
viously done using metabolic energy (human 
work). Nuclear power generation is keeping 
pace with demand for electricity, which has 
considerably expanded into the passenger 
transport sector. Conventional and non-con-
ventional fossil fuels still account for a signif i-
cant proportion of energy supply.
At the same time, research on nuclear fusion 
is pr ioritised, as this energy would make it 
possible to explore outer space. High-speed 
urban public transport is electrif ied, as are in-
dividual vehicles, thanks to the miniaturisation 
of storage and to energy eff iciency improve-
ments. Some vehicles also run on biofuels and 
biogas. The ar ticulation of nanotechnological 
and biotechnological innovations has also led 
to the emergence of production plants for al-
gae fuel and ar tif icial biofuels.
Socio-spatial organisation and 
mobility
Urbanisation is gaining momentum, and now 
stands at 95%. Cities are interconnected met-
ropolitan areas, surrounded by agricultural 
zones and industry. People have withdrawn 
from physical space. Only the intensity of 
the vir tual experience counts, except in the 
case of a few elites, who leave their bubbles 
more often. The ar tif icial reconstruction of 
environments and sensory spaces to provide 
new experiences reduces the need to explore 
and discover new places. The economic and 
commercial centres of cities, which have been 
par tly renovated, are futuristic and decon-
textualised, which encourages experiential 
journeys.
Housing is very dense, and new buildings are 
collective, intelligent, and adapted to suit sin-
gle households. Living area per person has 
decreased: fewer objects , multifunctional 
rooms, and a very high price per square metre 
for urban housing. All devices are connected 
and can communicate with each other: pros-
theses, envelopes, objects. The vir tual and 
real worlds are hybridising. A considerable 
amount of time is spent in hospitals, clinics 
and residences for the very elderly, where ex-
perimental research is conducted (many are 
attempting to prolong life). Leisure areas have 
been developed indoors: at home, in spor ts 
halls and places of collective relaxation, or in 
natural areas recreated under domes, pre-
senting a range of ecosystems.
This degree of sophistication is not available 
to all , however. Just outside the dense cities 
lies the disorganised and threatening world of 
the “minuses”, which is connected and impro-
vised, and survives any way it can by entering 
vir tual realities, which have become the opi-
um of the people. The “minuses” live in 20th 
century housing, which has had barely any im-
provement. This peri-urban landscape is full of 
data cables, wastelands, ruins, and landf ill sites 
that have become major recovery centres, but 
also workshops, market gardens and pastures. 
Inside the ring roads, the dense cities are now 
covered in gated communities and other se-
curity, monitoring and surveillance systems, as 
the hypnotised world of the “minuses” could 
one day awaken. Cohorts of dissuasive robots 
keep the peace.
Some major industrial and intensive agricul-
ture and aquaculture zones are developing 
not far from the large cities, and are linked 
by high-speed rail and motorway transpor t. 
Beyond, rural areas are largely deser ted. 
They are dotted with abandoned small and 
medium-sized towns, which serve as quarries 
for materials. Agricultural land is being aban-
doned, and forests are growing in size. Small 
par ts of the countryside have been made 
into sanctuaries for the leisure pursuits of the 
elites, in picturesque villages and landscapes. 
But people get bored there if they stay more 
than a few days. Long-distance mobility only 
concerns this type of travel, along with metro-
politan business tourism. The “plus cyborgs” 
often use door-to-door air transpor t thanks 
to rooftop heliports.
Interaction within cyberspace and the in-
crease in te lecommuting for whi te col-
lar workers have largely reduced the need 
for mobility. Levels of mobility are str ictly 
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dependent on social category. The “minuses” 
are the most conf ined, and are highly sed-
entary. The elites tour the world, mainly to 
f ind the most eff icient par tners or verify the 
accuracy of their par tners’ online identity, as 
vir tual reality can be manipulated. The oth-
ers mainly move within the cities, using small 
vehicles (such as personal transporters). New 
types of “transitory nomadism” are develop-
ing there, linked to professional practices and 
to leisure. Citizens are glued to their comput-
er screens, even when travelling.
Sociability and values
Vir tual contacts and exchanges have greatly 
increased, but lasting social relationships are 
rare. Friendship groups are smaller, based on 
aff inities, and vary according to identity, age 
and functional specialisation. The family in its 
nuclear or extended form has disappeared; 
family associations are freer, although many 
people live alone. However, robots are en-
tering homes and populating daily lives. Peo-
ple may become attached to these robots, 
especially as they are programmed to show 
emotion, to communicate and to help. The 
permanent interaction with sensitive, respon-
sive machines (AI) is even producing new 
beliefs and forms of techno-animism attrib-
uting subjective qualities to technologies and 
to ar tif icial environments. The syncretism of 
beliefs, including religious ones, and the re-
versal of human/machine relationships are 
commonplace.
Parent to child knowledge transfer no longer 
works, as technologies have made the experi-
ence of older people obsolete. Parenthood is 
hazy and is limited to emotional relationships; 
sometimes empathy has to be stimulated us-
ing chemicals. The desire for intergeneration-
al transmission has disappeared, as the prom-
ises of enhanced humans have made this type 
of legacy irrelevant. The desire for children is 
therefore f lagging. Instead, the way forward 
is the advent of cyborgs and of radically new 
potentialities. “Natural” reproduction by cou-
ples is declining, and seen as outdated, but is 
more common among the “minuses” due to a 
lack of means. Cloning and ar tif icial procrea-
tion are gradually replacing it, making it pos-
sible to improve the performances of children, 
in a blatant example of eugenics. 
Having children is in any case discouraged by 
public policy: diff iculties f inding childcare and 
a lack of “nanny” robots, except for the elites, 
who pay high prices for them. Public f inance is 
reserved for the f ight against mortality, from 
scientif ic research to infrastructure facilitating 
life for the very elderly. The number of chil-
dren authorised per women is limited (two, 
to take into account changes of par tner); and 
abortion is compulsory after one child for the 
“minuses”, who are not suff iciently selective 
and tend to reproduce indiscriminately.
The quest for performance is reinforcing the 
trend towards individualism and solipsism. 
Forms of voluntary isolation are developing 
within self-suff icient bubbles, which explains 
the political disinvestment and the lack of con-
f lict in this world (except for hacking and the 
diversion of resources). Success and the desire 
for power are longstanding values, which now 
govern most individual choices. The scope of 
these choices has expanded, except for bare 
minimum enhancement, which is imposed at 
the outset by social norms and the regula-
tory demands of public health management. 
This enhancement results in forms of remote 
control, which relieve the moral imperative 
(deciding for oneself what is right and wrong) 
and par tly conf igure action.
The commoditisation of time and experience 
has followed on from the appropriation of ar-
eas and of material goods. Real estate can no 
longer be passed on to family. Proper ty no 
longer has any value, and the only thing that 
counts is ability. Success is measured in terms 
of the accumulation of prostheses and power 
upgrades. One means of power consists in ac-
quiring the capacity for time dilation, through 
the dif ferentiated lengthening of life or the 
intensity of experiences. It is now necessary 
to relate one’s experiences, to make them 
public and to exhibit them using tools such 
as Facebook.
Access is the essence of the new social hier-
archy. Invisible barriers (electronic, chemical, 
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and many others) are being recreated, and are 
the cause of binary in/out situations, with no 
intermediate states. Likewise, an individual 
may or may not be able to accomplish an ac-
tion; he may or may not have the access code. 
In a certain sense, he is himself a walking code, 
which provides access to different realities or 
vir tualities, determining and def ining his place 
in society. All places fall within a hierarchy, de-
pending on professions and f ields (aesthetic, 
recreational, cerebral, sensitive, etc.).
This results in a high level of specialisation and 
functional diversity between individuals. Soci-
ety is highly unequal, with a growing range of 
inequalities that now tends to inf inity. But the 
permanent confrontation with screens and 
“new forms of reality” may produce protean 
personalities. People now juggle several lives 
and personalities, which are developed in dif-
ferent contexts: public, professional, private 
and vir tual lives. Integrated prostheses may be 
made invisible; this is then a type of resistance 
to functional specialisation. The “neo-human”, 
with a lack of attachment to the outside world 
and to others, always requires an “audience” 
to confound with his ar tif ices, which maybe 
either carefully hidden or exhibited.
Lifestyles and consumption patterns
The boundaries between work and daily ac-
tivities are becoming blurred, with the grow-
ing interconnection and the increase in tele-
commuting, which saves time and energy, and 
increases productivity. Everyone can be seen 
as a star t-up, which occasionally does well 
through an innovation, a patent or a perfor-
mance. Vir tual socialisation is accompanied by 
a high level of physical inactivity. This is offset 
for some categories (the “pluses”) by higher 
personal mobility and by sporting activities.
The pace of life has accelerated and intensi-
f ied, with strategies for letting off steam and 
playing for time in cyberspace. Attempts to 
adapt to the pace imposed by technological 
innovation and the quest for performance re-
sult in specif ic pathologies that are treated as 
required, without undermining the social pace 
that accompanies the human enhancement 
project. For the “minuses”, escaping to cyber-
space bubbles is less prestigious than real time 
dilation through the enhancement of experi-
ences, or even the multiplication of the differ-
ent lives one may lead (through cloning, dual 
personalities, or other devices). On a material 
level, the “minuses” also depend on the “sec-
ond life” of objects. The consumption struc-
ture is clearly highly unequal, but the reduc-
tion of investment cycles and the acceleration 
of innovation provide rapid access to goods. 
Objects and prostheses are sent into a second 
life cycle, repaired and reused.
On the face of it, a higher level of individual 
autonomy seems to be developing. But in re-
ality, there is high technical, energy and food 
dependence. Experience requires technical 
devices, and cannot be achieved simply by 
meeting other people or visiting places: those 
types of experience are ruled out. Fields of 
self-production have considerably diminished 
and social norms leave lit tle room for dissi-
dence; or rather, dissidence involves unusual 
prostheses that have been modif ied and may 
even be counter-productive. But this lit tle 
game is generally short-lived (adolescent cri-
ses, rites of passage, etc.), as it leads to exclu-
sion and to the forfeiture of social rights: in a 
word, it is suicidal.
On a daily basis, material life is made easier 
by the high level of robotisation of domestic 
chores, the collective planning of work and 
leisure, and the lack of objects, while social 
life is par ticular ly standardised. Health and 
the lengthening of l ife are unquestionable 
objectives. Eff iciency is of prime importance. 
Mealtimes are reduced to a minimum, and are 
only seen as a time of conviviality on special 
occasions, such as holidays or celebrations. 
Culinary ar t has become a leisure activity, re-
served for enthusiasts. A specif ic, high qual-
ity agricultural sector is dedicated to these 
activities and to high-income households. It is 
marginal in the overall food production sec-
tor. Food contains a high propor tion of nu-
tr itional supplements, functional foods and 
other products guaranteeing ever greater 
physical and intellectual per formances. This 
food is more concentrated and has a lower 
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water content, which helps to promote e-
commerce and local shops. The concept of 
fresh produce no longer applies, which means 
that the transport and storage of goods is less 
constrained by time.
Most public health problems are managed 
in an authoritarian manner using integrated 
markers that record the state of health and 
detect any anomalies. Health rules (physical 
exercise, diet , etc.) have become obsolete 
to some extent, since numerous services en-
sure health: muscle stimulation while working 
on the computer, functional foods, ar tif icial 
sleep regulation, etc. But in other respects, 
they have become compulsory: performance 
spor ts from childhood, a ban on smoking in 
all public and private places, etc. People can 
always smoke or get drunk on Second Life, 
or simulate a trip with cerebral evasion pros-
theses. Neo-humans spend long periods in 
hospital for tuning, transplants, adjustments, 
revisions and repairs. The clinic is a second 
home, and hospital stays are felt to be invigor-
ating and hear tening, especially as permanent 
medical surveillance of individuals makes it 
possible to treat problems at the source, and 
has removed the negative burden formerly 
attached to medical intervention. However, 
since the funding of health care beyond the 
mandatory minimum is pr ivate, not every-
one has the possibility of regularly visiting the 
most prestigious places for enhancement.
The Dual Society and Multiple Frugal 
Lifestyles
The spirit of this vision
Social change is driven by an economy that is 
suffering a chronic crisis. The recurrent cri-
ses occurring at regular intervals are putting 
paid to the quest for comfor t and material 
achievement, in the same way as barbarian 
invasions or epidemics in the olden days. The 
permanent threat of collapse in a system of 
this kind, based on instability, and its failure 
to integrate humanity as a whole into its pro-
ject, is causing a profound identity crisis. In the 
f irst decades of the 21st century, xenophobia 
has grown, but urban guerrillas and unaccep-
table outbreaks of violence are leading the 
various political par ties and intellectuals from 
all backgrounds to strive to educate the peo-
ple and to condemn en masse the far-r ight 
movements. Their followers are forced into 
hiding and society is looking for other ways 
out. A large propor tion of the population is 
thus turning away from the dominant eco-
nomic system, following in the footsteps of 
the cultural creatives and degrowthists who 
paved the way at the beginning of the century. 
People are stepping back and sheltering, in 
search of meaning and values such as security, 
shared interests, or solidarity. In 2050, 60% 
of society continues to fuel the traditional 
economic system, predominantly in the large 
cities, while the other 40% have opted out 
and created new forms of social organisation 
inspired by community life, and are reviving 
rural areas and small towns.
The supremacy of a dominant social model has 
faded. Weakened by an economy in recession 
and by mass unemployment, the State is no 
longer able to oppose this System D and the 
growing number of alternatives. The plural-
ity of organisational structures and lifestyles 
becomes a condition for the survival of the 
system and, consequently, a value that is toler-
ated or even encouraged by the authorities 
holding the financial and political power. This 
results in a high level of social differentiation, 
based on the possible coexistence of different 
worlds, where the most common social form, 
an alternative to the dominant social model, 
is the network linking cells of communities on 
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the Internet. The closest model we have is that 
of the extended family, but this time based on 
affinity. We can also take the example of the 
Amish. They have their own economic and 
educational system, pay no tax, live totally 
juxtaposed to the American society, and are 
tolerated there. Imagine tens or hundreds of 
communities like those of the Amish, with 
varying degrees of ideology and coherence.
This scenario is built around the rapid devel-
opment of alternatives, with the idea that it is 
necessary to self-organise in order to adapt to 
resource shor tages, since policy makers are 
unable to respond to this problem, are becom-
ing weaker and must give way to the commu-
nities and delegate more power to them. Ini-
tially, those dropping out of the system were 
the “cultural creatives” (Ray and Anderson, 
2001), then their world visions spread (they 
actively disseminated them) to a large segment 
of the population, seen as being environmen-
tally responsible. The communities have ties 
with other alternative systems around the 
world, and they support one another in their 
experiments and their convictions. Two types 
of adherence to the alternative model coex-
ist. The first is voluntary, with environmentally 
aware people deciding to take a different so-
cial path, and to take things in hand in order 
to immediately change their way of life. The 
second is a matter of necessity, and charac-
terises individuals who have been left behind 
by economic development and its recurrent 
crises. In this case the path change is seen as 
a means of survival and is encouraged as such 
by the political authorities, which are capable, 
thanks to the development of systemic man-
agement tools, of giving a panoptic indication 
of the gaps where people can settle away from 
the large cities and the globalised economy.
Political organisation
The geopolitical situation is structurally the 
same as in 2012, but the hegemonic countries 
are China allied to Brazil , and several other 
new emerging countries. The United States 
and Europe owe allegiance to the new f inan-
cial powers that possess rare raw materials 
and resources, including land to be occupied 
by climate refugees, and their economies have 
been weakened. The international institutions 
responsible for coordinating sustainable de-
velopment policies at the global level have 
not emerged. The polit ical author ities no 
longer intervene in the economy, and action 
is left either to companies in the conventional 
economy, or to the relatively autonomous 
communities, which are proliferating in many 
countries in response to the crisis. The people 
who have not opted out are integrated into 
world trade.
National pol icies manage the regulator y 
framework and the crisis situations, and en-
sure basic facilities for all communities. The 
French State works primarily to ensure the 
regions remain interconnected: health in-
frastructure, transpor t and communication 
networks, energy re-routing, if necessary, 
etc. Adaptation measures have also been 
taken at different levels, in order to provide 
emergency response to the effects of climate 
change. The State and the communities func-
tion in juxtaposition, but with cer tain minimal 
forms of complementarity. The communities 
are chief ly responsible for ecological and land-
scape management in non-urbanised areas, 
and for the maintenance of biodiversity and 
ecosystem services, which are delegated to 
them. Additionally, they contr ibute to na-
tional food production (market gardening and 
small-scale livestock production). In return, 
the State provides the minimum infrastruc-
ture in terms of communication, information 
and health. Health facilities are naturally bet-
ter in cities, but everyone has access to them 
through universal health care in case of seri-
ous illness.
This burden sharing between taxpayers and 
the communities, which only pay taxes “in 
kind”, is a source of friction, but guarantees a 
cer tain level of social peace; indeed pluralism 
has become a key value of society. The “defec-
tors” exclude themselves from competition 
and leave the f ield open to the “high-achiev-
ers”. The “high-achievers” make use of the 
“defectors” for a healthier food supply and to 
take care of the rural environment. But these 
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worlds are not entirely self-contained: within 
families or friendship groups, individuals make 
different choices. Citizens who are par t of the 
liberal economy sometimes go to the com-
munity territories for recreational purposes. 
The dominant economy thus tolerates the 
alternatives as long as they are useful to the 
country and have no intention of attempting 
to gain more power. The communities have 
no military defences in case of conf lict (and 
are monitored on this point), and depend on 
non-violent means of persuasion to renew 
their numbers. They are also fully aware that 
this type of almost self-suff icient, extensive 
development cannot be extended as such to 
the whole population, due to a lack of space, 
which limits their expansionist designs.
Ultimately, there is stil l l i t tle coordination 
between national and local policies. The two 
social models communicate in their economic 
exchanges, but not really on the political level. 
The alternatives are no longer interested in 
ordinary political life, based on representation. 
Depending on their specificities, they have de-
veloped different means of social organisation, 
which are nevertheless guided by democratic 
par ticipation as a rule. There are, however, 
several more autocratic voluntary communi-
ties (such as Scientology or the Amish).
Production systems
The plural economy depends at both ends of 
the scale on the global market and on shor t 
supply chains, self-production and reciprocity; 
between these, a small redistributive econo-
my continues to exist. The market is relocated 
for goods that the alternatives see as meeting 
their needs, as well as for a large proportion 
of agricultural production. The communities 
are content with very lit tle, and are fuelled 
by an ideal of frugality and by the intensity of 
social ties. The alternatives develop trade in 
goods and services within the framework of a 
par tially demonetised framework, since local 
currencies have proliferated. Self-production 
of food, furniture and clothing, and self-con-
struction and self-renovation (of buildings but 
also of water and energy networks) cover a 
large par t of material needs, with exchang-
es at the regional level or even beyond. In-
deed, craf ts and local products are popular 
with metropolitans who yearn for nature and 
“ fresh” produce. These l imited monetar y 
resources enable the communities to equip 
themselves with computers, to travel from 
time to time, or to pay for costly therapeutic 
treatments when necessary.
For around 60% of consumers, the economy 
remains globalised and continues to produce 
consumer goods and equipment at least cost, 
in a context of recession. Although market 
share is reduced by the autonomy of cer tain 
territories in terms of consumer staples, it re-
mains critical for large-scale collective devel-
opments: transpor t, NICTs, urban planning, 
health and research. Educational systems are 
diversif ied and autonomous.
The agricultural and food sector is undoubt-
edly the one that has become the most hy-
br id, between the practices of the market 
economy and those of the communities. In 
response to the health crises and to the slow-
down in international trade, as well as to the 
dramatic increase in oil prices that has badly 
affected many farms, food sovereignty has be-
come an issue. National intervention in the 
agricultural sector has been replaced by aid at 
the regional level, which is granted in order to 
maintain jobs and to improve food self-suff i-
ciency. In exchange, local short supply chains 
must be developed. Production for export is 
declining in favour of meeting local needs: the 
diversif ication and relocation of agricultural 
production, extensif ication, fewer inputs, or-
ganic crops, and non-food crops for cer tain 
construction materials. This regionalisation of 
agriculture is aimed at increasing food security 
and responding to environmental, health and 
social concerns. Consequently, agr icultural 
prices are high and food accounts for a higher 
proportion of household budgets.
Multifunctional agr iculture based on local 
and communi t y sec tor s has grown con-
s ider ably. L ives tock produc t ion has be-
come more extensive, especially as factory 
farming (pigs and chickens) has diminished 
because of high feed pr ices . Due to this 
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extensif ication, competition for land makes 
the development of biofuels impossible . 
However, methanation and the use of wood 
energy have signif icantly developed.
Technological and social innovation
Within the communities, social innovation is 
in full swing. Social innovation in the broad 
sense is motivated by the need to create alter-
natives to the historic social forms that have 
dominated Western societies. Group housing, 
for example, enables people to pool areas and 
goods, as well as to ensure effective care for 
elderly people and a lower level of depend-
ence. Mutual suppor t makes it possible to 
accompany vulnerable people at the end of 
their lives by keeping most of them at home. 
Education on conf lict management, environ-
mental and social psychology, non-violent 
communication, and consensus building within 
a framework of direct democracy are some 
of the conceptual tools of many communities: 
moving beyond ideals, it has been necessary 
to learn specif ically to live together, to share, 
and to pool effor ts, by mobilising alternative 
educational methods. Strong disagreements 
result in a change of community.
In this community-based wor ld , we have 
also seen the proliferation of small technical 
innovations enabling the decentralised man-
agement of water, energy and resources. In 
par ticular, there is a wide variety of forms 
of energy production and a thousand ways 
of saving energy. Energy saving innovations 
abound, and are more or less acceptable 
depending on the individuals or communi-
ties . Some have become resistant to cold, 
while others choose to have animals living 
on the ground f loor of their homes while 
they live upstairs, and many have meals to-
gether in order to share cook ing energy 
and to foster sociability. In addition to these 
age-old solutions, considerable use is made 
of passive solar energy, materials with high 
thermal iner tia, metabolic, wind and micro-
hydro energy, heat exchange between the 
ground and buildings, and any other form of 
territorial or biotic pooling that contributes 
to energy autonomy. The communities arbi-
trate at dif ferent levels (regional, local , vil-
lage, community) between production and 
consumption.
Some communities are completely discon-
nected, like Robinson Crusoe dreaming of 
self-suff iciency. But the majority make con-
siderable use of the Internet as a tool for the 
free exchange of a wide range of instructions 
on self-production, maintenance and repairs. 
Indeed, the communities recover many obso-
lete objects from the market economy in or-
der to give them a “second life”, a new, crea-
tive purpose, or to use the raw materials they 
contain. For shor t distances, animal-drawn 
transport is back in use.
Alongside and within the first world, energy 
production is being par tially decarbonised 
under heavy budget constraints; the produc-
tion of renewable energy is developing in 
fields where relatively short-term profitability 
is guaranteed. Demand for energy in the sec-
ond world has fallen sharply, and some ma-
jor production units have consequently been 
progressively shut down. One in two nuclear 
power stations is not replaced. The develop-
ment and improvement of the eff iciency of 
renewable energy through highly diversified 
systems go hand in hand with the relocation of 
production, even for metropolitan areas. Influ-
enced by community innovations and the ideal 
of frugality, the infrastructure and produc-
tion methods of the dominant economy are 
becoming more efficient. The intensive recy-
cling of raw materials (energy production and 
source of materials) has developed alongside 
alternative recovery sectors, fuelling competi-
tion and conflicts, as well as black markets for 
raw materials that have become costly.
Socio-spatial organisation and 
mobility
The most salient feature is the repopulation 
of small and medium-sized towns and of the 
countryside, where a quar ter of the French 
population now lives. Houses built using or-
ganic materials have sprung up around the 
outsk ir ts of towns. Self-renovation of old 
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housing gives landscapes a jumbled, colour-
ful appearance. Colours have returned to 
façades, and the Bâtiments de France archi-
tects have had to retreat to historic heritage 
in the strict sense. The diversity of develop-
ments makes the communities recognisable at 
f irst glance, and the territory is a patchwork 
of construction and cult ivation init iat ives 
(heir loom varieties are being grown again). 
Small and medium-sized towns are being re-
inhabited and regreened. In comparison, the 
large cities seem homogenous and somewhat 
stereotyped.
In terms of living areas, the average size of 
housing is growing in places where cohabita-
tion has developed, but is tending to decrease 
in the cities. Sharing living spaces makes it 
possible to pool energy, resources and goods. 
People make a vir tue of necessity, to a cer tain 
extent, even if cohabitation is appreciated. 
Living space per person is thus diminishing.
A whole segment of the French popula-
tion is becoming sedentary, by choice (to 
slow down the pace of life and to lay down 
terr itorial roots) and by necessity. The re-
adjustment of salar ies between the dif fer-
ent par ts of the world is a critical factor in 
this. Unless people use autonomous means 
(walking, bicycles, scooters, etc.), travel has 
become too expensive as wages have fallen 
dramatically. Co-presence and face to face 
relations are prevalent in small fr iendship 
or family groups, making physical travel less 
necessar y. Such travel has diminished not 
only for daily mobility, but also for residen-
tial and recreational mobility. Inner quests 
and roots, as well as individual and collec-
tive exper iences have par tly replaced the 
desire for mobility. The vir tual world also 
enables people to quench their thir s t for 
discovery. “Travel” never theless still exists, 
as opposed to “tourism”, and is understood 
as a long learning experience: in a sense, it 
is the return of craf t guilds . Several long 
journeys are made in a person’s l i fet ime, 
par tly by sof t modes. For groups l iving in 
communities, holidays tend to be less fre-
quent, but are still taken every year. These 
are often touring holidays using soft modes. 
Couchsur f ing has considerably developed 
(food and lodging in exchange for work). 
For city dwellers, holidays are of ten spent 
in regional leisure parks , or for the more 
daring, in the communities.
Contacts and exchanges between communi-
ties primarily involve public transport, where 
it exis ts , or car-pooling and r ide-shar ing, 
which are facilitated by ICTs. Public trans-
por t networks have been preser ved and 
maintained year after year, but have not been 
developed since the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury. The car-dependent model is challenged 
by most individuals, for whom it is in any case 
too costly. Due to a lack of investment in this 
f ield, second generation biofuels have never 
reached the industr ial production s tage. 
In rural areas, old vehicles are repaired and 
patched up to last longer, but their use is limit-
ed by the cost and/or availability of fuel. Small 
biogas or biodiesel units provide enough fuel 
for urgent requirements. In cities, bus lanes 
(using methane) have multiplied alongside 
former underground or tramway routes, es-
pecially as cars have given back some of the 
space they once took up on the roads.
Air travel mainly concerns the elites , who 
travel for professional reasons. International 
transport, which is too costly for leisure pur-
poses, is only accessible to a minority of the 
population. Because of the energy cr isis , a 
progressive relocation of the economy is be-
ing seen, as export-import sectors are smaller 
than in 2010. On the other hand, France con-
tinues to receive f lows of foreign visitors from 
the BRICs: the cost of living is lower there, 
and picturesque landscapes and good food 
are still greatly appreciated. In other words, 
France is an old world that piques the curios-
ity of wealthy tourists, or attracts alternatives 
from other countries.
Sociability and values
Competition for jobs and the quest for per-
formance are still the norm in the metropoli-
tan world. Defensive ref lexes have to some 
extent reinforced individualism and renewed 
family solidarity in order to stand f irm in the 
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face of socio-economic diff iculties. Paradoxi-
cally, the situation is undoubtedly more com-
for table for those who have opted out. In-
deed, the alternatives have developed a new 
context of pooling, sharing and providing mu-
tual assistance, by extending family solidarity 
to the community area and thereby recreating 
social safety nets. The price to pay is the low 
level, or even lack of f inancial resources. But 
advantages in kind such as the quality of the 
living environment, the slower pace of life and 
the value of social ties make up for this.
The communities that have come together 
are not necessar ily ideological or spir itual 
(though they may be), and are f irst and fore-
most communities of peers: people join to-
gether through aff inity, through attachment 
to a place or simply through chance encoun-
ters. Each community has its own way of living 
together, with its own specif ic conf licts that 
the members learn to manage. The desire for 
conviviality helps to ease the feeling of com-
munity pressure. In the same spirit, special at-
tention is given to personal, emotional and 
family life, as well as to cultural diversity. Like 
group housing communities today, people live 
their lives with shared rules, areas and times 
that are voluntarily accepted. Social function-
ing is more collective, but individuation is not 
challenged.
We never theless see cer tain homogeneity 
within the communit ies , due to the spe-
cif ic, commonly accepted rules , as well as 
a s tronger dif ferentiat ion between them. 
For example , some communit ies may be 
more normative and intolerant when they 
adopt demanding requirements in spir itual 
and ecological terms. They all coexist with 
a cer tain status quo, as their organisation 
requires l imi ted number s . They operate 
within a network , of course, through the 
Internet, but gaining more members is not 
a priority. Instead, the groups focus on en-
hancing their exper iences, which can only 
be achieved if there is a cer tain stability of 
members and of aff iliations.
The socia l group a t the or ig in of these 
changes , in other words of the d iscon-
nec t ion process , is that of the “cul tur a l 
creat ives”, who detach themselves from 
mater ial success in order to adopt other 
ways of living. They are joined by the group 
of environmentally responsible people, or 
degrowthists, who are concerned by ecol-
ogy, equi t y and g lobal jus t ice , and then 
by a range of people who are no longer 
happy with l i fe in the market society. Af-
ter repeated episodes of depression, those 
who are fai led by this society can regain 
per sonal resources by adopting the new 
systems of representations and values: the 
ethics of simple l iv ing , the ethics of care 
and ecological ethics, which are the basis of 
the alternative communities, but in varying 
propor tions. These core values provide new 
sources of satisfaction: giving greater atten-
tion to others and improving one’s ability to 
l is ten, empathise and give; seeing oneself 
evolve through social rather than mater ial 
relations; or contemplating, understanding 
and restor ing nature. However, the work 
ethic is s t i l l central , as activi t ies l inked in 
par ticular to agriculture and to social tasks 
require a good deal of time, availability, and 
physical and mental energy. Working hours 
have not decreased, but are perceived as 
being more valuable in relational terms.
Those who opt out of the dominant econ-
omy by necessity come f ir s t as observers 
to recover in the communities. This adjust-
ment process helps to build trust within the 
group, which is vital to the existence of the 
communit ies . Learning to trus t other s is 
no easy task for individuals marked by “the 
weariness of the self ”, a loss of identity and 
competit ive and aggressive ref lexes . Cul-
tural change, beyond the pioneer groups, 
is primarily a learning curve and an experi-
ence. Some people may return to “business 
as usual”, being unable to accept these new 
ways of living together.
Lifestyles and consumption patterns
Although the impor tance of work is not 
called into question, in both the metropoli-
tan world and in that of the alternatives we 
see greater over lapping of work time and 
Lifestyles and carbon footprints I Les Cahiers du Clip n° 21 I 28
daily life. In urban areas, working hours have 
lengthened as telecommuting has increased, 
in order to externalise equipment and oper-
ating costs. Working days at home are long, 
and interrupted by face to face meetings 
and videoconferences. To keep their jobs, 
people are willing to work at weekends and 
to reduce their holidays, especially as f inan-
cial resources are lacking. E-commerce has 
expanded considerably. The syndrome of 
staying indoors, for fear of going outside, 
has grown somewhat, resulting in physical 
malaise and new illnesses. The high level of 
segregation, the relative insecurity of public 
places , the deployment of NICTs and the 
lack of social ties outside the family all fuel 
this self-conf inement.
Where the “defec tor s” are concerned , 
meeting basic needs also requires consid-
erable ef for t , due to the small size of the 
communities (lack of economies of scale). 
There is however a wider range of ways 
of organising daily l i fe . Some of the t ime 
is devoted to community relationships, to 
exchanges of services and to collective de-
cision making. Meals are of ten taken com-
munally, which reduces time spent cooking 
and is more convivial. Agriculture and small-
scale l ivestock production, sometimes for 
recreational purposes, take up a good half 
of each day. These are followed by self-pro-
duction activities (clothing, furniture, etc.) 
and odd jobs . Sel f-organisat ion, doing i t 
yourself or with others, and limiting the use 
of techniques that make people heterono-
mous and dependent are fair ly widespread 
attitudes. This is the age of “doing”. Conse-
quently, there is always something to keep 
people busy. Finally, time spent on personal, 
educational , cultural and ar tistic activities, 
connecting with nature or meditating varies 
depending on the community, on individual 
priorities and also on the seasons. This so-
ciety has naturally returned to a high level 
of seasonality.
In this second world, by vir tue of the prin-
ciple of self-moderation or simplicity, con-
sumption has been radical ly reduced and 
mainly meets phys iolog ica l needs . Food 
intake has decreased, reaching on average 
3 ,000 kcal /per son/day. Diets are largely 
vegetar ian and seasonal , with a high con-
sumption of pulses , fruits , vegetables and 
cereals . Capital goods (tools, washing ma-
chines , computers , etc .) are shared. This 
frugality is motivated or legitimised either 
by growing environmental awareness, by a 
concern for equity, or by spir itual and cul-
tural reasons. Individuals and communities 
are now character ised by the diversity of 
their cul tural preferences , their hobbies 
and their existential beliefs. Differences and 
experimentation are cultivated and encour-
aged. Every thing coexists without any real 
hierarchy, raw foodism alongside halal or 
kosher diets , and Thai food alongside Ro-
man cuisine, as long as people can get the 
basic ingredients.
The market is taking advantage of this taste 
for diversity by also proposing plural and 
“frugal” consumer products. Consumption 
patterns have changed lit tle in urban areas, 
except for the fact that the share of food, 
housing and unavoidable expenditure, which 
includes NICTs, has r isen. Food products 
are fresher and more seasonal, as they are 
par tly supplied by the rural communities . 
Companies turn them into ready meals that 
are often delivered to homes. Intensive ag-
ricultural sectors and supermarkets still ex-
ist , but they are of less impor tance in the 
diets of French households.
The contrasts between conventional ci ty 
dwellers and new-rural populations are more 
obvious in terms of their physical condition 
and health. City dwellers continue to be 
over-exposed to stress and to cer tain types 
of pollution, although exhaust fumes have 
been considerably reduced. The alternatives 
have redeployed a preventive and “natural” 
medicine, which takes elements from different 
traditions. They are less subject to serious and 
degenerative diseases. Their practices have 
inf luenced urban medicine, since alternative 
medicines and natural molecules are used in 
equal proportions with chemical medication, 
which nevertheless remains widely used with 
gene therapies.
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The Environmental-Citizenship Society
The spirit of this vision
Facing limits on natural resources and farm-
land, together with a collective awareness 
of the pollution generated by our develop-
ment model , societies worldwide have re-
structured. Unfor tunately, it took periods of 
violence, international health crises, innumer-
able victims of climate change and skyrocket-
ing prices of raw materials to get there. By 
the year 2030, the boom-and-bust economy 
and migratory movements, which proved in-
creasingly diff icult to contain, led to an overall 
conclusion: the model of unlimited production 
and over-consumption was incompatible with 
the planet’s resources. 
The increasing power and network ing of 
civil societies in developing countr ies also 
contr ibuted to this widespread realization. 
Socio-environmental injustices and the ap-
propriation, by the most industr ialized na-
tions, of the global environmental space have 
been roundly criticized.  The environment is 
no longer distinct from other social problems 
- specif ically, social inequality - because the 
most disadvantaged bear the brunt of envi-
ronmental degradation. Climate disruption, 
including hurricanes, f loods, droughts and the 
salinization of coastal aquifers, af fects poor 
countries more than wealthy ones and fuel 
pover ty str ikes the most disadvantaged at 
many levels.
The sense of insecurity generated by econom-
ic hardship and environmental damage, which 
pose an increasing threat to human lives, has 
led individuals to place renewed emphasis on 
intimate realms of collective protection, in-
cluding family, friends, neighbourhood, district 
and town, as well as international solidarity. 
This scenario is characterized by an aware-
ness of the limits of anthropocentrism and 
an acknowledgement of the impor tance of 
“co-existence” in maintaining quality of life. 
Environmental and social issues are now at 
the forefront of collective action and social 
organisation. The environment is central to 
a restatement of the pr inciples of justice, 
which is transforming society and social dy-
namics. Edgar Morin’s proposals have been 
widely disseminated, thanks to large social 
movements . They call for cit izen engage-
ment and promot ion of va lues that en-
courage solidar ity, empathy and collective 
involvement. 
The notion of ecology also involves taking 
responsibi l i t y for one’s own l i fes ty le and 
the r ight to inf luence others’. The notion 
of Environmental Ci t izenship has earned 
recognition and seeks, if possible, to com-
bine connection, commitment, quality of life 
and ethics .  It reasser ts human r ights and 
solidar ity beyond per formance and prof it . 
The def ines of universal rights now involves 
environmental r ights, from the struggles of 
landless peasants opposing land expropria-
tion for palm plantations and movements 
opposing the construction of polluting fac-
tor ies , unhealthy diets , and harmful medi-
cine (although this does not necessarily pre-
clude oppor tunism, quackery and negative 
effects). The defence of individual rights and 
the redef inition of solidarity intermingle and 
clash, confronting complexity and inequality. 
An alternative vision of life is taking shape, 
centred on concern for others and human 
interdependence. Struggles against exclu-
sion, withdrawal , increasing insecurity, en-
vironmental ignorance and lack of respect 
for the biosphere have become centr a l . 
While the unifying class struggle of the 20th 
century focused on conf licts involving work 
and the industrial production of commercial 
goods, the struggles of the mid-21st century 
address the preservation of global and lo-
cal “common goods” (including climate, air, 
water and land quality, biodiversity, natural 
areas and landscape), for or against the ap-
propr iation and proper use of natural re-
sources. This has led to community actions 
and effor ts on behalf of new lifestyles, new 
rights and a new hierarchy of values. 
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An understanding of the impact of lifestyle 
on the environment has resulted in collective 
and individual changes, characterized by: Re-
duced energy use, locally-based agriculture 
and shared transportation options;
 • Pro-environmental tax policies and re-
source conservation and pricing policies and 
incentives designed to reduce the carbon 
footprint;
 • The replacement of GDP by EDP (Environ-
mental Domestic Product), which incorpo-
rates quality of life and sustainability of devel-
opment; and,
 • Ref inement of environmental capital as a 
parameter, with the emergence of new quali-
tative indicators.  
Political organisation
Ulrich Beck ’s reference to “cosmopolitanism” 
(2007), combining pr inciples of tolerance, 
democratic legitimacy and effectiveness, has 
taken hold, as has the principle of precau-
tion through prevention. The legitimacy of 
decisions is based on a democratic system in 
which citizens and civil society organisations 
play a more active role than they did under 
earlier parliamentary models. Decision-mak-
ing methods at all levels are the subject of 
on-going debates and conf licts. The French 
Ministry of the Interior has been renamed the 
Ministry of Citizenship. The national agency 
that regulates electronic and digital media, 
the Conseil supér ieur de l ’audiovisuel et du 
numérique, receives public funding to ensure 
multiple sources of information. Citizen con-
ferences, held to encourage consultation and 
discussion, are widely-used tools for develop-
ing policy choices at the local level.
Internationally, the principle of subsidiar ity 
rules. A world federation responsible for the 
governance of global public goods has been 
established within the United Nations. 
Strong measures, including laws, directives 
and f iscal policies, have been taken at the in-
ternational, national, regional and local lev-
els. The mission of political institutions is to 
create conditions that foster equality and 
equity, now seen through the perspective of 
environmental justice. Governments at vari-
ous levels are working to adapt by creating 
multi-scalar governance. A global policy has 
been implemented, though not uniformly or 
evenly. However, benchmarks do now exist, 
including, for example, the success of anti-
GMO effor ts undertaken following peasants’ 
struggles for freedom, adopted and promoted 
by ex tensive consumer and activist move-
ments in the 2030s.  
Growing numbers of economic and political 
leaders have adopted eco-citizen behaviours 
in the areas of housing, transportation, work 
and recreation. They recognize their responsi-
bility to History, given the impact of decisions 
made (or not made) on the decades that will 
follow the 2050s. The timescale of political 
action has lengthened, following a series of 
foreseeable and deadly climate and health dis-
asters. Working proactively, taking preven-
tive measures, adopting a long-term view and 
incorporating intergenerational justice have 
become basic pr inciples of political action. 
The relationship to time has changed, with an 
increased focus on the long-term. Speed is no 
longer beautiful.
Economic organisation
The business world, which previously empha-
sized prof itability, is increasingly concerned, 
directly or indirectly, by sustainable devel-
opment and Environmental Citizenship. For 
example, employers are encouraged to con-
sider job candidates’ “moral values, concern 
for others, compassion, commitment to the 
public good and concern for justice and eq-
uity” (Morin) in hiring.  Working conditions 
have also improved in other areas, such as 
employee transpor tation and individualized 
work schedules.
Reducing the costs of production to improve 
competitiveness requires recycling and reduc-
ing the consumption of materials.  Industrial 
ecology, previously considered an innova-
tion, has achieved widespread acceptance, 
together with detailed studies of material and 
energy f lows and effor ts to create synergies 
with other companies. Waste produced by 
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some companies is thus used as “inputs” by 
others. All recycling processes are involved, 
from paper to steel.  
The economic system has undergone pro-
found change and is highly regulated and su-
pervised by international bodies. The mon-
etary system no longer has the same scope, 
with the individual carbon quota constituting 
its equivalent today. Frequent government in-
tervention in the economy is legitimized by a 
strengthened democratic process. Productive 
sectors are favoured over those considered 
non-essential. Consumer associations play an 
important role in consultative processes and 
launch regular boycotts of goods and services 
considered to be unsustainable. Goods are 
designed to be sustainable.
Proper ty ownership has been reformed. 
Proper ty r ights are no longer an inviolable 
constitutional principle with precedence over 
ownership of the commons, which include en-
vironmental goods. Citizen pressure has led 
governments to reasser t their authority over 
economic and f inancial power. Strong meas-
ures have been taken to reduce social ine-
quality and improve the distribution of added 
value between capital and labour. The income 
scale has thus been sharply compressed. As-
set redistribution is to be achieved via an en-
vironmental tax to prevent capital gaps from 
widening.
The rebalancing among social groups has 
eased the impacts of resource shor tages 
(including water, energy and raw mater i-
als), allowing new innovative technologies 
to emerge that for reduced energy use and 
increased ef f iciency and resource shar ing. 
The growing power of civil society organisa-
tions in Southern countries, whose actions 
have been popularized in Northern ones, has 
helped to achieve greater control over natural 
resources and more balanced Nor th-South 
development. 
Public services play a central role in the pro-
ductive sphere. The public banking service is 
a signif icant tool for f inancing public choices. 
Military budgets have dropped sharply in fa-
vour of priority sectors, such as health, food, 
agriculture, education and communication. As 
the share of basic social goods and services 
sectors grows, those activities are relocating, 
when possible, to reduce transport’s environ-
mental footprint.
Productive work time has been reduced to 
ensure more equitable distr ibution among 
all members of society. The share of work 
time devoted to meeting social needs has in-
creased. A form of craftsmanship, combining 
work that meets production and social needs 
and that produces personal satisfaction, has 
developed with support from Internet forums. 
Energy restr ictions and objectives to limit 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have led 
to large-scale energy management programs, 
coupled with new regulations and implemen-
tation of a quota system.  Large, centralized 
forms of production are abandoned as they 
reach the end of their useful life, as they are 
inconsistent with the frugal mindset that pre-
dominates . While “energy black markets” 
did f lourish for a time alongside quota-based 
regulatory systems, these marginal initiatives 
disappeared quickly under the inf luence of 
social norms.
The electrical system is managed optimally, 
with each terr itory developing its own re-
sources and giving pr ior ity to renewables. 
Massive windmill and solar panel installations 
can thus be found in the northern regions and 
along the Atlantic and Mediterranean coast-
lines. Rural and mountainous areas can rely 
on biomass. A single public operator man-
ages the energy supply pool and develops ap-
propriate infrastructure to carry out its main 
mission: ensuring that supply meets demand 
throughout the entire country. 
Effor ts are also underway to achieve syner-
gies in agricultural production, with ecologi-
cally intensive agriculture (crop rotation, the 
widespread use of nitrogen-f ixing plants and 
direct seeding) on the great plains and mul-
tifunctional agriculture in intermediate and 
mountainous areas and around cities . Re-
gional sectors seek to meet local demand. 
Regulation determines vegetable and animal 
production, biomass-material production and 
energy production to ensure that land use is 
environmentally sound.   
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This complementarity optimizes production 
circuits, encourages co-production, reduces 
inputs and costs and thus helps to guarantee 
that a signif icant portion of the population has 
access to good-quality foods. Prof itability is 
based on reducing intermediate consumption 
and processing of agricultural products, rath-
er than maximizing yields. Residents in urban 
and peri-urban areas grow some of their own 
produce in neighbourhood common spaces. 
Shared gardens are found throughout cities. 
All these initiatives have signif icantly reduced 
the food system’s energy consumption and 
carbon footprint.
A comprehensive training program for farm-
ers in agronomy, energy and the environment 
has been established. Resources have been 
assigned to suppor t the restructuring.  Eve-
ryone is strongly encouraged to work in ag-
ricultural production for a limited period of 
time, primarily through the “woofing” system, 
which offers farm volunteers food and lodg-
ing in exchange for work.  Other players - in 
distribution, logistics and mass catering - have 
also been mobilized. Transportation and dis-
tribution chains are based on environmental 
and social criteria.
Technological and social innovation 
The new system encourages all actors to 
adopt eco-citizen behaviours:
 • managers have created a progressive rate 
structure for energy and water consump-
tion and waste management, which encour-
ages individuals to reduce resource use; 
 • exper ts are thus encouraged to develop 
new energy-saving and recycling technolo-
gies and to promote local businesses and the 
use of salvaged and reused products; and,
 • consumers have adopted environmentally-
responsible behaviours, which are prof it-
able thanks to the new technologies and 
progressive rates. 
 • With research and development focused in-
tensely on sustainable development, tech-
nological developments have been rapid:
 • many positive-energy buildings have been 
built;
 • lighter vehicles consume increasingly less 
fuel; biogas-fuelled vehicles and small elec-
tric vehicles (2-4 wheels) are used exten-
sively in urban areas; and,
 • renewable energies (wind, sun, geothermal, 
ocean and river) and their storage have di-
versif ied and expanded, as have recycling 
industr ies (including glass, paper, tex tile 
and metals). 
These changes have had major impacts on 
both consumers and professionals. Relation-
ships to technology and ownership have 
changed, as have socia l re lat ionships . A 
higher value is thus placed on empathy.  Ac-
cess to goods and services has reduced the 
impor tance of possession and ownership. 
In addition to increased par ticipation in the 
democrat ic sys tem and the s trengthen-
ing of terr itor ial levels in decision-making, 
grassroots-based non-prof it organisations 
have grown dramatically. Development of 
networks has promoted the value of services 
(activities, information, education, training, 
prevention and care of the elderly) and the 
non-prof it sector (shared housing, carpooling, 
car-sharing, locally-produced food and child 
care) has heightened this trend. 
Innovation focuses on both the social and 
technological spheres. Considerable research 
and experimentation is devoted to demo-
cratic processes and governance at all levels, 
with laboratories and university curricula fo-
cused on them. Innovation is f lourishing in this 
area, both with regard to institutional pro-
cesses and the organisation of civil society 
and checks and balances. Information and tel-
ecommunications technologies (ICTs) serve 
and support Environmental Citizenship.
Technological progress focuses on low-ener-
gy-use technologies and systems that save en-
ergy and support slow travel, while providing 
access to multiple services. 
Socio-spatial organisation and 
mobility 
Urbanization has stabilized, to the detriment 
of mega-cities and peri-urban areas. Small 
metropolitan areas are par ticularly dynamic, 
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with employment achieving a new balance 
favouring them. They offer a better quality 
of life, more af fordable prices and a larger 
housing stock , allowing sustainable neigh-
bourhoods to develop and improving city 
life, and are thus more attractive. Peri-urban 
development has slowed considerably as a re-
sult of energy prices and restrictive planning 
measures, together with land use policies and 
residential mobility assistance. Spontaneous 
trends associated with an aging population, 
whose members want to live closer to social 
services and community centres, are occur-
r ing in conjunction with effor ts to increase 
urban density in the inner suburbs.  With 
greater value placed on community life, there 
is also a greater appreciation for the conveni-
ence of urban living.   
While much of the housing stock has been en-
ergy retrof itted, fuel poverty remains a social 
policy concern. It is diff icult for the most dis-
advantaged members of society to give prior-
ity to reducing their carbon footprint when 
survival remains a challenge. Housing, heating, 
transportation, employment, food, health and 
education remain the major concerns.   
Beyond their role in food production, the sig-
nif icance of rural spaces in maintaining eco-
logical balance is also recognized. The notion 
of “working the land” has taken on new value, 
leading to a revitalization of the countryside. 
Beyond the ef for ts to tame nature, which 
were necessary to meet social needs, a move-
ment to preserve and restore natural spaces is 
underway. Active restoration of natural areas 
has been incorporated into planning policies 
to restore biodiversity and ecosystem servic-
es in natural and agricultural areas. In a word, 
planning has been “greened,” in both urban 
and rural settings.  
Investments in mobility have been redirected 
to public transport. Thanks to telecommuting 
(which has been adapted to use communal 
platforms), e-commerce and carbon of fset 
delivery programs, mobili ty requirements 
have been reduced. The desire for mobil-
ity about remains strong, because individu-
als seek to share experiences with others. 
“Time capital,” which is available to everyone, 
favours environmentally-friendly (that is, non-
nuclear- and non-fossil-fuel based) mobility 
solutions. Health considerations also support 
this “sof t” mobility. People’s willingness to 
wait, combined with greater sociability, works 
in favour of public transpor t and carpooling, 
particularly in low-density areas. Efforts to im-
prove the public transpor t experience have 
encouraged this trend, with loosened time 
and schedule constraints helping to ease con-
gestion and peak occupancy periods. 
Transpor t networks are highly planned and 
passengers on every continent can travel long 
distances by train, similar to the Trans-Sibe-
rian railway. The goal of car ownership has 
been replaced by the goal of mobility. Most 
auto manufacturers now sell mobility, not ve-
hicles. Public transpor t operators have also 
adapted by of fer ing door-to-door service. 
Rail, river and ocean freight now predominate 
over road hauling.
Air transport has declined in relative terms be-
cause of its carbon footprint. Short holidays are 
discouraged and leisure travel thus involves a 
slower pace and longer periods. These trips are 
considered more as experiences and opportu-
nities for encounters. Means of travel formerly 
thought to be outdated are fashionable, with 
dirigibles taking to the skies again.
Sociability and values
A new hierarchy of values favours “being” 
over “having”, cooperation and the develop-
ment of new systems of social protection. So-
ciety seeks justice and f inds life’s pleasures in 
contact with others and with nature. Public 
goods and equity are core values, including 
access to all essential social services and the 
preservation of natural balances. Responsibil-
ity and accountability are the rule, as people 
internalize a sense of environmental limits and 
concern for future generations ( Jonas, 1979), 
both individually and collectively. Considera-
tion of the consequences of one’s actions, 
rather than a desire for the immediate use 
of goods or services, is the individual’s prime 
motivation. Goods and services themselves 
incorporate this concern for “vir tuous use” 
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from the outset. They are more sustainable, 
easy to repair, low-energy-consuming and 
economical - the opposite of “planned obso-
lescence.” More and more people understand 
the notion of “ footprint” as applied to the 
environment, energy and water   and it con-
stitutes the framework that delimits lifestyle 
choices and decisions. On the other hand, 
marked improvements in the quality of life, 
the enjoyment of nature and a sense of daily 
solidarity - for example, between North and 
South - are sources of satisfaction. 
The conf ined parent-child family unit is no 
longer the rule. Living spaces are more open 
to other family members, blended families, 
fr iends and the children of fr iends. The re-
str icted family structure of earlier eras has 
been reordered, giving way to a life seen to 
offer greater freedom and that is organized 
around a collection of core groups with f luid 
boundaries, aff inity groups, intergenerational 
living arrangements and “tr ibes” based on 
shared activities.
This way of life is characterized by multiple re-
lationships and involves sharing certain spaces, 
which also provides a livelier, more convivial 
environment. Long-distance communications 
also play a signif icant role in maintaining social 
relationships.
The essential value of time for social life has been 
established through negotiation and political 
struggle. People seek sustainability - of relation-
ships, decisions and goods - and concerns for 
the long-term are again at the forefront. Time 
for activities is now divided in a new way, into 
four equal parts: social concerns (connections, 
solidarity and politics); the planet (volunteer ac-
tivity, virtual networks and ecological practices); 
productive work; and, oneself.
Culture and learning - “of all and for all “ - are 
encouraged, both in terms of access and con-
tribution, with the understanding that non-
material exchanges predominate. The society 
favours the wide dissemination of knowledge 
and creative production. Diverse cultural pro-
duction is encouraged, provided that it does 
not exhaust the supply of raw materials, pol-
lute or ref lect an inequitable vision of social 
relations (for example, in gender relations). 
Difference is possible, but seems to be less of 
a draw given the cost of living on the margins 
in a context of limited resources and the ex-
tensive sharing of goods and services.  
Lifestyles and consumption patterns
Consumer preferences have changed con-
siderably as a result of widely-disseminated 
information about the environmental foot-
print of goods consumed and often-stormy 
debates on this issue. Consumption is also be-
coming less commodif ied, giving way, in par t, 
to sharing and reciprocal exchange. With the 
recognition of the value of time, people now 
take pleasure in keeping an object for a long 
period. This reduces the need to constantly 
acquire new goods.   
Collective and shared housing has become 
popular again, as has a focus on neighbourhood 
life, which encourages residents to make fewer 
trips. Major production centres remain outside 
of cities, but the “new artisanry” is integrated 
into city life. Local trips have risen sharply.
Social demands now include calls to reduce 
the environmental footprint of food produc-
tion and restore equity in international agricul-
tural trade. Public debates on diet, health and 
the environment have changed agriculture and 
food processing. Younger generations take a 
public health perspective and are very aware 
of the importance of environmental conserva-
tion and well-balanced dietary practices. Public 
budgets are shifting from health care to pre-
vention, emphasizing the importance of good 
nutrition. Dietary habits and cooking practices 
have changed considerably, leading to a decline 
in meat and dairy consumption and an increase 
in the consumption of vegetable proteins, fish, 
fruits, vegetables and algae- and yeast-based 
food products.
Health care services focus, in par t, on pre-
vention, healthy lifestyles and environmental 
health. Medical services are no longer reim-
bursed based on the number of procedures 
per formed, but on those avoided.  Physical 
activity is recommended to prevent obesity 
and cardiovascular and other diseases. This 
has led to a signif icant increase in active local 
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mobility (including walking and biking). Al-
ternative medicine is favoured and the use of 
drugs is limited to patients who need it. The 
use of traditional medicine has increased, as 
has the time allowed for recovery and conva-
lescence. Life expectancy has thus increased.
The Knowledge Age Society
The spirit of this vision
This scenario assumes a profound economic 
and energy cr isis , resulting in a break with 
pat terns of consumption.  Anti-consumer 
movements and views have developed in the 
North for a variety of reasons: environmental 
and health (chemical pollution and workplace 
stress affecting health); economic (recession); 
geopolitical , with environmental justice is-
sues resonating internationally and nation-
ally (sharing of the planet’s resources); and, 
last, cultural, with ICTs playing a role place in 
daily life, disrupting the producer/consumer 
distinction. 
Consumer goods are considered the cause of 
all ills and have been devalued symbolically. 
In their place, people are drawn to acquire 
knowledge and skills and to “create the self,” 
as par t of a process of cultural globalization 
dr iven by ICTs and the emergence of the 
knowledge society, which began in the 20th 
century. This is the knowledge age in the 
truest sense of the term - the “noosphere,” 
or the sphere of human consciousness. It is 
characterized by widespread, increased ac-
cess to knowledge, lifelong learning and the 
diversif ication and de-hierarchization of forms 
of knowledge and teaching methods. Massive 
numbers of people are connected to the In-
ternet and have found new sources of expres-
sion, acknowledgement, social identity, activi-
ties and income. 
This involves overcoming knowledge inequali-
ty - the basis of all power relationships - within 
the society. The democratization of knowl-
edge is the result of struggles and effor ts to 
“liberate” knowledge. Battles and conf licts 
over the commodif ication of the Internet and 
knowledge continued until the 2030s, on the 
Web and within all knowledge-holding enti-
ties. They have become the ultimate stage on 
which trans-border and territorial conf licts 
are played out. The struggle to tear down 
borders limiting access to knowledge and cre-
ate free access to all kinds of learning is one 
of the great battles of the f irst half of the 21st 
century. The deconstruction and hybridiza-
tion of knowledge have gradually destroyed 
the barriers that were carefully constructed 
to separate scientif ic, population, esoteric, 
ar tistic and manual knowledge.  
Pr ivate and institutional resistance has, of 
course, been strong. Nonetheless, a “con-
tribution economy” is taking shape (Stiegler, 
2009), with each person becoming producer 
and consumer simultaneously and, ultimately, 
neither one nor the other. Most of the space 
on the Web is free, but access to knowledge 
remains expensive in some areas.  Many col-
lectives issue diplomas when their members 
master a cer tain body of knowledge, thus 
competing with university diplomas.  Knowl-
edge institutions (teaching, research, media 
and cultural) are undergoing an in-depth re-
structuring.  In France, dissidence within elite 
institutions of higher learning (the grandes 
écoles) has created greater openness to col-
laborative learning methods. These institu-
tions are also working with whistleblowers 
(including hackers), distributing free software 
and re-emphasizing face-to-face encounters 
in public spaces, following the example of the 
(less-selective) university system.  Street and 
neighbourhood discussions are frequently 
organized in open-air amphitheatres or halls. 
People come to listen to and par ticipate in 
debates over a range of signif icant and minor 
topics. Pr imary and secondary schools and 
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universities organize knowledge-based ac-
tivities in the public space, but spontaneous 
events (led, for example, by citizens and ad-
vocacy organisations) and fee-based cultural 
activities (theatre performances, exhibits and 
concerts) are also held there, with the latter 
heavily subsidized so that they are accessible.
The social contract includes the promise to 
provide access to learning to all . This is re-
quired to allow for individual development 
(no longer for achieving higher social status) 
and ensure social equity (equal opportunity) 
and an effective democracy based on a system 
of checks and balances. In this society, knowl-
edge is clearly the source of inequality. The 
struggle for democratized knowledge is the 
most vigorous political demand. Knowledge 
has become a vital need, like clean water and 
air. It is essential to personal development, 
one’s social existence, and the collective in-
telligence that forms most organisations, as 
the principle of representation by elites no 
longer holds sway. All f ields of knowledge are 
involved, both intellectual and manual. The 
decentralization of knowledge is the basis of 
political decentralization. 
Political organisation
The inability of the public and private sectors 
to carry out the industrial restructuring nec-
essary to address the economic and energy 
cr ises and protect health and environment 
convinced citizens that political guidance of 
the economy is cr itical and can come only 
from below, based on “demand.” Simultane-
ously, the operation of all levels of govern-
ment has been entirely restructured. It is now 
controlled by citizens and opposition civil 
society groups, who require that all political 
decisions be based on extensive information 
and a high level of transparency. A knowl-
edge-driven society is a rapidly-changing one. 
Regulation is thus critical. It is organized pri-
marily on two levels - local and global.  
At the local level, the regulatory function is 
performed by metropolitan assemblies, com-
posed of elected citizens, and neighbour-
hood assemblies. The purpose of regulation 
at this level is to organize the foundations 
of collective life, from local food supply sys-
tems to decentralized energy production, 
water and waste management, maintenance 
and development of public space, transpor t, 
construction and retrof itting of housing and 
public facilities and cultural activities through-
out the year. Neighbourhood assemblies are 
composed of groups of volunteers who are in 
charge of a sector (for example, food, green 
spaces or water), manage a budget and have 
decision-making authority.  Residents who 
do not par ticipate in neighbourhood life (be-
cause they are very involved in their work, for 
example) pay a sur tax. The time involved in 
managing community life is equivalent to an 
in-kind tax, although individuals may make a 
f inancial payment in lieu of contributing time. 
Only those issues that cannot be managed 
at the local level are handled at a higher one 
(city, region or metropolitan area or national), 
based on the principle of active subsidiarity. 
Although all taxes are collected locally, the 
national government implements a strong 
revenue-sharing policy to achieve equalization 
in cer tain regions or to reduce cer tain areas’ 
vulnerability to environmental change, under 
the inviolable principle of equal opportunity. 
That is the primary mission of the State. It is 
also responsible for inter-urban and interna-
tional passenger transport, as well as for the 
transpor t of goods, energy and information, 
major research and health facilities and law 
enforcement. Education and training budgets 
are handled regionally. 
Cer tain global decisions are made via tel-
edemocratic processes, par ticularly with re-
gard to drafting international agreements and 
laws during issue-focused global forums. Ten-
sions related to resource conf licts have been 
eased by reduced consumer consumption in 
the North and the relocation of a signif icant 
share of production based on the location of 
raw materials. Consumers control the com-
mercial economic sector. Transparency has 
been introduced into the consumer products 
sector via a search engine that carr ies out 
social and environmental assessments on all 
consumer goods. Non-prof it rating agencies 
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have proliferated, with data provided by net-
works of journalis ts , community organisa-
tions and volunteers, who research product 
manufacturing conditions, recycling and re-
use.  Businesses must transform their work 
processes and working conditions if they wish 
to maintain their customer base. Frequent 
product boycotts have caused polluting f irms 
to go out of business. 
The second major area of worldwide regula-
tion involves scientif ic progress. The poten-
tial implications of this progress are discussed 
at monthly global forums. Concern for the 
exploitation of living organisms and the ma-
nipulation and misuse of minds and bodies has 
generated carefully-monitored international 
agreements dealing with bioethical, biomedi-
cal, and psycho-ethical issues. Cyborgs, clones 
and GMOs will not be developed until the po-
tential of the human brain and the collective 
intelligence are used to their full capacity and 
bio-knowledge has been thoroughly decoded. 
This will require decades or centuries of re-
search and investigation. 
The results of all scientif ic research must be 
published on the Internet to prevent infor-
mation monopolies. Withholding knowledge 
is considered a diversion of collective invest-
ment for private use (in a parallel to the mis-
appropriation of public funds in the 2010s) 
and is severely punished.  Offenders may be 
denied Internet access throughout their en-
tire sentence and excluded from ICTs, which 
prevent them from connecting via visual or 
tactile recognition. 
Of course, conf licts are always r ife among 
specialized collectives over which research 
paths to follow and which to abandon. Ma-
jor conferences are held to seek consensus 
on whether to pursue an idea or put it aside 
for 10 years or more. Cer tain collectives 
then operate clandestinely, forming alterna-
tive societies that experiment with rejected 
or tabled ideas, on a territorial or secession-
ist basis. They join up with the “knowledge 
underground,” which helps gangs of delin-
quents to take power by providing prohibited 
prostheses or to become Internet terrorists, 
launching viral attacks or falsifying data and 
knowledge. The vir tual police, supervised by 
ethics committees, are thus extremely watch-
ful and very active in their effor ts to f lush out 
these Internet saboteurs and gangsters. The 
Web is under constant surveillance. Based on 
the risk posed by their experiments, the se-
cessionists are either quarantined (prohibited 
from leaving the area where they are per-
forming their experiments, a sort of territorial 
prison that is monitored constantly) or their 
tools are conf iscated and they are assigned to 
projects of general interest. Despite this vir-
tual and territorial police force, defence budg-
ets have shrunk, freeing up more resources 
for basic products and services (health care, 
diet, maintenance and expansion of ICTs and 
cultural facilities).
Economic organisation 
Economic exchanges are based on a contribu-
tion economy. All production is designed to 
meet social, knowledge and material needs, 
from children who make animated drawings 
to the elderly, who remain involved in com-
munity life or on the Web. The notion of own-
ership - whether intellectual or material - is 
no longer par ticularly relevant.  It continues 
to operate with regard to ownership of hous-
ing, but the land belongs to the municipality. 
A system of voluntary contributions to the 
knowledge society and the public economy, 
which has been par tially demonetized, op-
erates alongside the market economy.  Paid 
work time for adults has been reduced to two 
days per week, plus an additional two days’ 
work to meet community needs (including 
improvements, infrastructure maintenance, 
services for dependent individuals, cultural 
activities and school events). Remaining time 
is spent on activities chosen by the individual. 
Telecommuting is very widespread. 
Basic needs are met via the local economy. 
Production is closer to consumers, with lo-
cal supply systems and craft production ex-
periencing a renaissance. Several currencies 
circulate. The “glob” is an international cur-
rency that was adopted after the international 
f inancial crash of the 2030s, following massive 
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public riots that destroyed the f inancial dis-
tricts. Local currencies are set at parity with 
the glob and have been important in helping 
to relocalize production (such as the Bavar-
ian chiemgauer). Within the market economy, 
small- and medium-sized businesses and co-
operatives dominate. Large companies are 
limited to several very specif ic sectors, includ-
ing hospital equipment, railroads, and ICTs. 
The State employs a smaller workforce, which 
is responsible for national and international 
infrastructure, local equalization and law en-
forcement. The largest category of public ex-
penditure is for teachers, who are managed 
at the regional level. Students are required to 
attend classes two days per week. They have 
considerable free time, which they may de-
vote to activities that are loosely supervised 
by volunteers.
The self-production sector is very ex ten-
sive, thanks to the demonetarization of par t 
of the economy and individuals’ enhanced 
skills. People spend considerable time on the 
Internet and, as an antidote, are involved in 
manual and ar tistic production and in physical 
and spiritual activities.  Community gardens 
and workshops and resource centres in each 
neighbourhood offer training and opportuni-
ties to acquire manual, technical and ar tistic 
skills and learn about nature. These activities 
occupy a signif icant amount of individuals’ 
leisure time and are encouraged to prevent 
Internet addiction, which has become a public 
health problem. 
“Made-to-order” is back in fashion as a result 
of a high degree of individuation, self-produc-
tion and the development of the manual ar ts 
and trades, such as carpentry, tailoring and 
cooking, which are highly valued because they 
are a source of expertise. Large supermarkets 
have been replaced by local businesses.
Technological and social innovation
Technological innovations are associated pri-
marily with the environment, bionics, organic 
materials (carbon sinks) and technological de-
centralization. Bio-knowledge is recognized 
(Serres, 1994) and honoured, which has allowed 
bionics to flourish, based primarily on oceano-
graphic research and studies of living organisms 
about which little was previously known. Scien-
tific ecology has become very important. There 
is a greater understanding of all forms of life, 
which has inspired technological and agronomic 
innovations. Permaculture (including in urban 
areas), agro-forestry and eco-aquaculture have 
improved plant production by ecosystems that 
naturally promote their growth. Nanotechnol-
ogies do play a role, but require considerable 
equipment and materials. They are limited to 
those sectors where they are critical (including 
solar energy and medicine) and are discussed in 
the global forums. 
Energy conser vat ion, durabil i t y and eco-
compat ib i l i t y are key fac tor s in produc t 
design. Products are adapted to regional 
raw mater ials , except those that require 
impor ted raw materials for specif ic sectors 
(specif ically for ICTs). Organic and biode-
gradable mater ials must be used in con-
struction, plastics and many items of daily 
life, along with the development of bionics. 
Recycling is widespread and international 
law prohibits the expor t of wastes. 
The demand for energy has fallen sharply 
and most of the remaining supplies are pro-
duced on a decentralized basis from renew-
able sources. Knowledge has expanded sig-
nif icantly in this area and is directed towards 
energy production in very small units, at low 
cost, adapted to local resources, and environ-
mentally friendly (micro-cogeneration, pho-
tovoltaic skins, urban windmills and biogas 
for transpor t). Individual energy production 
units are incorporated into cer tain products 
or connected to users. Simultaneously, more 
centralized forms of energy, such as geother-
mal in sedimentar y basins , of fshore wind 
farms and marine photovoltaic power stations 
(10-50 MW) operating on biomass, comple-
ment decentralized production. Equipment 
costs represent the limiting factor of these 
large systems.
Innovation is occurring in technology and the 
social realm in connection with the processes 
for organizing the society, means of access 
to learning and dissemination of knowledge. 
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These issues involve a growing number of ser-
vice companies. Innovation is also taking place 
in the areas of education and health care. In-
structional methods have been entirely re-
designed. Given the aging of the population 
and illnesses long thought to be untreatable, 
Western and non-Western medicine have 
been combined in treatments that target all 
aspects of the individual.Treatment is directed 
to both the body and spirit. 
Socio-spatial organisation and 
mobility 
Knowledge exchange is the driving force for 
peaceful coexistence. 85% of the population 
l ive in urban set tings , pr imar ily in metro-
politan areas. Continuing social and cultural 
exchanges occur on the Internet and within 
neighbourhoods, which are the focus of re-
newed attention.  Many cultural hubs have 
developed in cities.  Peri-urban environments 
have become denser, more diversif ied and 
less sprawling by transforming themselves into 
urban areas. These sectors have been incor-
porated gradually into public transit networks 
and have experienced the greatest changes 
within metropolitan areas. Outlying business 
and commercial areas have been deurbanized 
or converted.  
As the sphere of the market has shrunk , 
purchasing power has declined and income 
equality has improved, land pressures in met-
ropolitan areas have eased. Housing has lost 
signif icant value. However, historic centres 
remain segregated. Only real estate heirs are 
able to live there. This inheritance has not 
been challenged because residents must bear 
the cost of maintaining their proper ty. City 
centres feel frozen in time, with the status of 
historic preservation district and occasional 
recreation area. People visit them periodi-
cally. Although tour ists are much less fre-
quent, these areas are destinations for vir tual 
visitors, who watch the many videos f ilmed 
there. Library and museum content has gone 
online, as have cultural events. However, ma-
jor cultural sites continue to draw visitors. 
Much of urban life has been decentralized to 
the neighbourhood, based on more horizon-
tal relationships. Public space is dedicated to 
relationships and is no longer def ined by the 
f lows that cross it. Vehicles are rare and have 
been miniaturized. There are many recrea-
tional vehicles for all ages, fuelled by human 
metabolic energy (including bicycles and all 
forms of tr icycles) or electr ically assis ted. 
Public transit has also diversif ied and now in-
cludes cable cars, tramways, hot air balloons 
and trains on tires. Utility vehicles operate 
par tially on biofuel.
Telematic exchanges reduce the need for 
physical mobility and the price of inter-urban 
transportation is high. People travel less fre-
quently and for longer periods. Young people 
often take an around-the-world trip that may 
last one or two years. These rites of passage 
are of ten repeated at impor tant moments 
in a person’s life. As these trips are long and 
slow, they require considerable savings, even 
if couch-sur f ing has expanded considerably 
(transpor tation remains expensive). Parents 
no longer pay for their children’s higher edu-
cation (people may study at any age), but con-
tribute instead to their “grand tour.” Annual 
vacations often involve “soft” modes of trans-
port and travellers tend to wander. 
Rural communities host agricultural workers, 
whose numbers have grown with more ex-
tensive methods of agriculture, and individuals 
who are seeking a (more or less) temporary 
retreat. Those who want to maximize their 
time for personal creativity (music, writing 
or another passion) can live in those areas on 
very little income. On the other hand, small 
cities are in crisis. They are rarely revitalized 
by communities pursuing a specif ic project 
(for example, to transform a city into a per-
manent f ilm site for historical documentaries 
or science f iction works).
Sociability and values
Sociability is characterized primary by an ac-
tive life via ICTs and individuals’ contributions 
to content, works or political decisions. Many 
professional and scientif ic communities form 
and disband, inspired by a desire to produce 
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new knowledge together. The family has 
transformed and opened up to the commu-
nity. While the nuclear family continues to ex-
ist, it plays a less rigid role in individuals’ daily 
lives. Family members are highly individuated 
and children are more autonomous. The age 
of majority has been reduced to 16. Co-hous-
ing has expanded, including for traditional 
households, single people, and adolescents 
who have chosen to live as a group with their 
parents’ permission. 
The division of labour is under challenge, 
which has disrupted social insurance sys-
tems. Social security is organized nationally 
by resource equalization and locally (at the 
neighbourhood level) by community service. 
Social security institutions continue to meet 
needs arising from aging and illness, at a cer-
tain threshold of dependency. International 
solidarity also exists and operates on an ad 
hoc basis in response to calls that circulate on 
the Internet during crises (specif ically, climate 
events and epidemics) or violent political up-
heavals. Civil societies occasionally suppor t 
each other. Regular international cultural ex-
changes strengthen this kind of solidarity. 
In terms of value typologies, autodidacts - 
life-long learners - connected on the Web 
predominate. Individuals continue to learn 
through their work, recreation and social rela-
tionships. This access to knowledge is accom-
panied by a marked process of individuation 
and cultural diversity. Thanks to cyberspace 
and aff inity communities, each person belongs 
to multiple spheres, which evolve over time. 
Social distinctions are no longer based on in-
come, which is insignif icant, but on the inten-
sity and methods of self-creation. The ability 
to challenge oneself is par t of the cognitive 
process. Autonomy, cooperation, de-hier-
archization, liberation, creativity, anti-institu-
tionalism and free links characterize a society 
that is both highly integrated and diverse. 
This search for knowledge is dominated by 
vir tual space. More marginal groups set them-
selves apart in radical spiritual or ar tistic com-
munities, for example, but most are willing to 
network. While the Web’s immediacy and the 
ease of access to knowledge it offers (at least 
apparently) fascinate and absorb, traditional 
and experiential forms of knowledge (collect-
ing and using plants, planting, navigating and 
climbing) have not disappeared. Rather, the 
exchange of knowledge that the Internet of-
fers has strengthened them.  
However, inequalities are being reproduced 
between those who are looking for pack-
aged, ready-made knowledge and are quite 
happy to take a little of this and a little of that, 
creating a sor t of personalized cocktail (dilet-
tantes), and those who dedicate themselves 
to the solitary, time-consuming task of strug-
gling to acquire new skills, from exercise to 
mediation, scientif ic research or literary crea-
tivity. They represent the two extremes. The 
democratization of knowledge does not oc-
cur at a steady pace, which has allowed the 
elites to preserve their status. The society 
may be as elitist as it was before, but in non-
institutionalized fashion. These elites are freer 
and more improbable. They are less likely to 
emerge from the reproduction of social class-
es; rather, they are more likely to have taken a 
zigzagging path, marked by opportunities and 
a cer tain combativeness. They are adaptable 
and cannot claim institutional prerogatives to 
maintain their position. Society has vigorously 
battled corporatism, attacking every effor t to 
close off knowledge (specif ically, by hackers). 
Those who have separated themselves have 
worked long and hard to do so. These f igure-
heads - the great thinkers, inventers, pioneers 
and vir tuosos - construct myths that lead the 
entire society toward knowledge and new 
paths to freedom or exploration.
Society has broken with the model based 
on power relat ions , dominat ion and the 
holding of knowledge and goods. As access 
to knowledge is more or less univer sa l , 
there is no reason to battle for control of 
modes of transmission and content. Collec-
tive intelligence predominates and has sped 
the pace of cultural change considerably. 
However, cooperation has not disappeared. 
People cooperate because they hope to 
make greater individual progress by doing 
so. Collective intelligence and individual skill 
feed each other.
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Lifestyles and consumption patterns
Consumption has declined sharply and con-
sumption gaps have narrowed considerably. 
An ethic of voluntary simplicity has taken hold 
in relation to material needs, offset by an en-
hanced, expanded cultural life. The world of 
“do-it-yourself ” has grown because it offers a 
path to knowledge and know-how. Artisanry 
- from handmade furniture to made-to-meas-
ure clothing - is now a form of recreation, as 
is urban agriculture. Tiny planted areas dot 
cities, including community gardens, at the 
base of buildings, on rooftops and in sidewalk 
planting strips. Most people have chosen to 
be vegetarians for reasons of both health and 
cost. The slow food movement created an en-
thusiasm for regional and traditional foods, re-
sulting in the protection of many agricultural 
products that were becoming extinct. 
Gardening and spending time in urban green 
spaces are antidotes to the “plugged-in” life, 
which occupies most of daily exper ience. 
Advances in ethology and interspecies com-
munication have enabled exchanges with the 
living world in the local area. Buildings have 
become biodiversity-positive and house mul-
tiple species. Cities are planted extensively 
and are “bio-conditioned” to adapt to climate 
change. Nature is f inally being used to serve 
health and well-being, which many consider to 
be a priority.  Preventive practices, self-care 
and alternative medical treatment have led to 
a signif icant decline in the use of traditional 
pharmaceuticals . Cutting-edge (and highly 
subsidized) medical treatment, which requires 
major equipment, is still provided for cer tain 
illnesses, such as cancer and genetic diseases. 
Housing has become safer, both for health and 
the environment. People spend more time 
at home involved in their activities and take 
great care in designing and arranging their 
space. Apar tments are the rule, while habit-
able space in peri-urban houses has increased, 
with the addition of f loors and add-ons. Each 
person has his or her own room and com-
mon space, which can function on the scale 
of an apar tment, but more frequently a f loor, 
house or building (including dining rooms, play 
rooms, laundry areas, saunas and workshops). 
This sharing of space offers greater ameni-
ties . Ex ter ior insulation has been installed 
on a large scale, thanks to collective work 
projects. Organic and inexpensive materials 
(including mud brick, straw, wood and hemp) 
are favoured for construction and retrof itting. 
However, energy systems remain expensive 
because of the high cost of metal. 
People spend much of every day in front of 
their screen and in local public space. Small 
cafeterias and local restaurants, gardens, ar t 
and DIY workshops, media libraries and per-
formance sites, all inexpensive, are popular 
and regularly visited. However, while students 
receive subsidized technology, the budget 
dedicated to ICTs is signif icant, as is the cost 
of the many trainings that people pursue over 
the course of their life. This is a source of in-
equality, beyond the common foundation of 
open access to knowledge.
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Initial assessment of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions based on the 
five alternative lifestyles 
projected for 2050
The exercise presented here is a tr ial as-
sessment of GHG emissions associated with 
the f ive lifestyle described above. First, we 
wanted to descr ibe these f ive societ ies 
through a set of households with dis tinct 
lifestyles to capture their diversity and im-
pacts on GHG emissions. We present the 
methodological choices made in building 
th is set of household t ypologies . I t was 
used to assess annual baseline household 
emissions and for the prospective analysis . 
The variables chosen (income, family struc-
ture and residential location) al low us to 
describe the changes imagined under each 
of these f ive visions. The household emis-
sions analysis based on socio-demographic 
characteristics for the baseline year (2008) 
is innovative and offers many insights. How-
ever, it was not feasible to assess all of the 
households’ emissions for this prospective 
analysis . We thus chose three emblematic 
household types for each of the l ifestyles 
envisioned. Their emissions by item will be 
presented in the second section.
Because the goal of this exercise is to high-
light the impacts of lifestyle on GHG emis-
s ions , each household wil l be quant i f ied 
twice for each scenario. We f irst sought to 
isolate the effects of reduced energy needs 
and, next, to determine the effects of tech-
nological developments and energy source 
substitution. We will conclude with the ini-
tial lessons learned from this quantif ication 
exercise.
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Segmentation of the French population 
and household carbon footprint 
assessment method
Household typologies based on 
socio-demographic characteristics
To account for the dispar ities of l ifestyles 
that exist within the French population and 
to assess the impacts on GHG emissions, we 
segmented the households according to three 
socio-demographic factors:
 • Available income
 • Family structure
 • Residential location 
While standard of living clearly determines 
household energy consumption, family com-
position (the number of people/household) 
allows us to understand the impact of one 
household’s intra-family shar ing of all uses 
(housing, mobil i ty, food and purchases of 
goods and services) on GHG emissions. Last, 
to obtain a detailed understanding of mobil-
ity needs, we used the residential location 
criterion.
Income       
We sought a dif ferentiation of households 
on the basis of available income. However, 
available statistical data rarely cross-check 
household differentiation by income fractile 
with the data needed to populate our model 
for assessing household GHG emissions. To 
come close to household income, we had to 
use the reference person’s socio-professional 
category (SPC).
By cross-check ing average household in-
come data and the reference person’s SPC, 
we created three income classes. We chose 
to build an additional category for house-
holds whose reference person is retired be-
cause retirement has a signif icant impact on 
mobility. The matches made for this study 
are explained in Table 1.  T1 
We note that segmenting the population 
by SPC creates categories in which income 
var iations are s til l large. When we tr y to 
assign the households identif ied based on 
membership in the four income catego-
r ies def ined for this s tudy to each of the 
income quintiles, it appears that the distr i-
bution chosen is not highly selective. The 
households identif ied as “income -” are in 
the last quintile and half of those identif ied 
as “income+” fall outside the last quintile. 
Table 1
Income group denitions
Income group Reference person SPC
Income -
Employees
Workers
Unemployed
Income 0
Farmers
Tradesmen, merchants,  
business owners
Technicians and associate 
professionals
Income + Managers and professionals
Retirees Retirees
Figure 1 
Distribution of income categories 
by household income quintile
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10
8
6
4
2
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
0 Income-
Income 0
Income +
Retirees
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Consequently, income disparities between low 
income (-) and high income (+) in our seg-
mentation are more limited than the income 
disparities between quintiles 1 and 5.  F1 
Numbers
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the French 
population in 2008 by the 48 groups used 
for this study, cross-referencing income level 
(based on SPC), family structure and residen-
tial location. The numbers vary considerably 
by group. Assumptions regarding changes in 
these numbers will be presented in the pro-
spective section of this document.  F2 
According to this typology, 60% of France’s 
population l ives in urban areas, 22% in peri-
urban areas and 18% in rural areas.
More than half of the population falls in the 
low-income group, 7% in the high-income 
group, and 20% are retired.
Half of the French population lives in a house-
hold composed of a couple with children. 15% of 
households are composed of single individuals 
and 9% are composed of single-parent families.
20% of the population are concentrated 
in a single group, combining the dominant 
characteristics referred to above: a low-income 
urban household composed of a couple with 
children.
Quantification methodology
To conduct a detailed assessment of the im-
pact of diversity of household lifestyles on 
GHG emissions, those emissions were evalu-
ated according to six items: housing, daily and 
long-distance mobility, food and the purchase 
of goods and services.
Housing
The “individuals” database describes housing 
based on the following determinants: 
 • Surface area (six brackets)
 • Main heating energy 
 • Period built (eight periods)
 • Building type:  private house or apar tment
 • Number of occupants
The Enerter model, developed by Énergies De-
main, describes all of France’s housing stock. It 
was used to determine the unit consumption 
per dwelling (kWh/m2/yr) by energy source, for 
heating, hot water, cooking and specific electric-
ity consumption based on the variables above.
Figure 2 
Number of individuals by population group (2008)
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National energy consumption was calcu-
lated by cross-referencing the “individuals” 
database and consumpt ion by uni t . The 
ADEME’s Bilan Carbone® emission factors 
were used to conver t the results into GHG 
emissions.
Mobility 
The French National Transpor t and Travel 
Sur vey (ENTD 2008), conducted by the 
French National Institute of Statis tics and 
Economic Studies (INSEE) and the French 
National Institute for Transpor t and Safety 
Research (INRETS), provides a detailed de-
scription of mobility within the French popu-
lation. The raw data in this survey were used 
to calculate emissions produced by daily mo-
bility and long-distance mobility.
Food
The personal carbon footprint (Bilan carbone 
personnel , ADEME) was used to calculate 
food-related emissions. It specif ies a French 
person’s annual emissions based on type of 
food. The INSEE repor t on household ex-
penses describes household spending in each 
food category based on the SPC of the house-
hold’s reference person, as well as the French 
average. To determine average spending per 
person, rather than per household, the aver-
age household size based on the SPC of the 
household’s reference person was calculated 
using the “individuals” database. 
The emissions per person for each food cat-
egory may be determined from the average 
emissions of a French person and from the 
deviation from the mean in terms of spending 
among the different SPC.
Purchase of goods and services
Ser vices . On a national level , the Ener ter 
Ter tiaire (ser vice sector) model provides 
consumpt ion by energy source and use 
for the ent ire ser v ice sec tor in the fol -
lowing seven branches: of f ices and agen-
cies; cafés/hotels/res taurants; businesses , 
educational institutions; community-based 
housing; the health/social ser vices sector ; 
and, and spor ts/recreation/cultural activi-
t ies . This energy consumpt ion , matched 
wi th that calculated by the French Cen-
tre for Economic Studies and Energy Re-
search (CEREN), is conver ted into GHG 
emissions using the ADEME Bilan carbone 
emissions factors . 
Goods .  The per sonal carbon footpr int is 
used to calculate both food and household 
emissions from the consumption of mate-
r ial goods. However, unlike In that case of 
food, the tool does not provide a national 
average. However, GHG emission ratios per 
euro spent may still be determined for sev-
eral major categories of goods.
By cross-referencing these ratios with the 
household spending survey, we can deter-
mine GHG emissions based on the SPC of 
the households’ reference person. How-
ever, the categor ies of goods included in 
the personal carbon footprint do not cover 
all households’ spending on material goods, 
par ticularly vehicle purchases.
A GHG emissions ratio was calculated for 
automobile purchases based on the 2011 
study, Preparing for a Life Cycle CO2 Meas-
ure, and applied to the budget of the vari-
ous SPC, as with the ratios from the per-
sonal carbon footprint.
GHG emissions in the reference year
By apply ing the methodology descr ibed 
above, we obtained an annual quantity of 
GHG emissions for each household type, per 
person, measured in CO2 equivalent and bro-
ken down into the six expense items.
Overall results
Average overall 2008 emissions are estimat-
ed at 7.5 tonnes of CO2 equivalent per year 
and per person. Approximately 50% of that 
amount are attributable to direct household 
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energy consumption (housing, daily mobility 
and long-distance mobility). The other half 
is associated with the consumption of goods 
and services.  F3 
Disparities based on household type
The average of 7.5 tonnes of CO2 equiva-
lent /person/year masks s ignif icant var ia-
tions among households. Table 2 shows the 
emissions of each of the 48 household types 
characterizing the French population in this 
study.  T2 
Based on household type, emissions per per-
son vary from 5.34 tonnes of CO2 equiva-
lent (for individuals living in a low-income, 
single-parent family in an urban setting) to 
14.11 tonnes of CO2 equivalent (for employed, 
high-income individuals living alone in a rural 
setting) - or by nearly a factor of three.
Personal GHG emissions by income group of 
the household reference person conf irm that 
emissions increase as resources available to 
the household rise. 
Income thus appears to be the most inf luen-
tial variable among the household segmenta-
tion criteria that we chose.  F4 
We noted in a pr ior chapter that the in-
come categor ies are fair ly crude because 
they are based on the SPC of the reference 
person in each household, not on household 
disposable income. The study of CO2 emis-
sions generated by the French economy, Les 
émissions de CO2 du circuit économique en 
France (F. Lenglar t, C. Lesieur, J .-L. Pasquier, 
Insee Références, Édition 2010), conf irms the 
strong relationship between the level of emis-
sions and of household income. Household 
CO2 emissions based on income quintile show 
considerably greater contrast than those we 
Figure 3 
Distribution of emissions by item
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Table 2
Household emissions
Family structure tCO2eq / cap / yr
Income Rural Peri-urban Urban
Adults with children
Income - 6.3 5.8
Income 0 7.8 7.5
Income + 9.0 8.5
Retirees 8.4 7.9
Adults living together
Income - 7.2 6.4
Income 0 9.3 8.8
Income + 10.9 10.0
Retirees 8.6 8.1
Single-parent family
Income - 6.0 5.3
Income 0 8.0 7.2
Income + 9.9 8.2
Retirees 8.1 7.4
Single person
Income - 8.4 6.7
Income 0 10.5 9.4
Income + 14.0 10.9
Retirees 9.3 8.6
6.3
7.4
9.3
8.0
7.1
8.7
11.0
8.3
6.3
7.7
9.5
8.1
8.2
10.7
14.1
8.9
Figure 4 
Household emissions by income group
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obtained for that exercise because income 
dif ferences are more sharply marked in the 
quintile approach. Only inter-group variations 
should be compared here because the meth-
ods used by the INSEE study and those we 
used here are not identical. In par ticular, we 
calculated the emissions of six GHG in CO2 
equivalent, while the INSEE study assessed 
only CO2 emissions. This has major impacts, 
par ticularly on the food item.  F5 
Family structure is the second inf luential pa-
rameter that appears in this exercise. Individ-
uals living alone and childless couples (several 
adults living together) do not benef it from 
the pooling effects that appear to be at work 
for families (whether they are single parent or 
not). For example, the housing item changes 
inversely to the number of people/family (2.1 
for multiple adults living together, 2.6 for sin-
gle-parent families and 3.9 for couples with 
children). This pooling effect is heightened by 
an income effect. Three-quar ters of the fami-
lies with children are low-income. Conversely, 
retired people are well-represented among 
single people and adults without children 
(approximately 45% of households in these 
two categories) and have, on average, an in-
termediate income. The average income of 
households without children is thus greater 
than that of households with children and 
contributes to a larger carbon footprint for 
the f irst two household categories. Last, the 
location criterion appears to be less inf luential 
with regard to overall emissions per person, 
considering that the available data did not al-
low us to take into account the direct location 
effect on the “food,” “services” and “goods 
consumption” items.  F6   F7 
Only those items related to mobili ty vary 
sharply based on this criterion. In addition, the 
interaction between the “daily mobility” and 
“long-distance mobility” items, already docu-
mented in the literature, has been conf irmed 
here. Urban residents’ daily mobility gener-
ates fewer emissions than those of individuals 
living in rural or peri-urban settings (-33%), 
Figure 5 
CO2 emissions by household income quintile
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Figure 6 
Household emissions by family structure
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Emissions by location
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but the spread is par tially offset by higher-
emitting long-distance mobility. The overall 
“mobility” item varies only 15% between ur-
ban and rural/peri-urban populations. 
In the following chapters, we will explain the 
basis of the variations observed according to 
typology for each of the emission items.
Housing
Housing-related CO2 emissions range from 
1.2 tonnes of CO2 equivalent to 3.73 tonnes 
of CO2 equivalent, or a ratio of more than 
1:3 between emissions/person for low-in-
come adults with children and retirees liv-
ing alone (regardless of location). The f irst 
category of households is the largest in the 
population in terms of numbers (22 million). 
The number of retirees living alone totals 
3.7 million.  T3 
The features of the average living area per 
person, based on household type (Table 4), 
are similar to those in Table 3 representing 
emissions/person. The “housing area/person” 
parameter is thus the determining factor with 
regard to emissions produced/person for the 
“housing” item.
It explains the par ticularly high level of emis-
sions for retirees living alone, regardless of 
where they live. Their average housing meas-
ures approximately 80 m2.
Emissions related to useful floor area per 
capita
The useful f loor area varies considerably, from 
22 m2 to 95 m2 per person, depending on 
household type. The largest category, repre-
senting 12 million people, is composed of low-
income urban households with children. Their 
average area is the smallest, totalling 22 m2. 
Approximately 6 million people have more 
than 60 m2 per person; these are primarily 
individuals living alone and adults with high 
income living together.   T4 
Shared housing with children present in the 
household thus limits the average area/per-
son. This also differs markedly between urban 
and rural or peri-urban areas. Income plays 
an important role, par ticularly in urban areas.
Table 3
Housing-related emissions   
by household group (2008)
Family structure tCO2eq / cap / yr
Income Rural Peri-urban Urban
Adults with children
Income - 1.14 1.12 1.09
Income 0 1.25 1.21 1.20
Income + 1.36 1.29 1.31
Retirees 1.44 1.45 1.36
Adults living together
Income - 1.70 1.66 1.45
Income 0 1.92 1.87 1.65
Income + 2.18 2.06 1.78
Retirees 2.15 2.19 2.12
Single-parent family
Income - 1.41 1.35 1.29
Income 0 1.58 1.50 1.43
Income + 1.75 1.64 1.58
Retirees 1.99 2.04 1.88
Single person
Income - 2.72 2.63 2.04
Income 0 3.05 2.86 2.24
Income + 3.34 3.07 2.28
Retirees 3.69 3.73 3.28
Table 4
Useful oor area per person
Family structure m2
Income Rural Peri-urban Urban
Adults with children
Income - 28.0 27.9 22.5
Income 0 33.0 32.9 28.0
Income + 37.4 36.8 32.1
Retirees 34.3 34.5 28.7
Adults living together
Income - 44.4 44.0 33.6
Income 0 54.4 54.1 41.8
Income + 65.3 64.1 47.3
Retirees 52.5 53.2 47.9
Single-parent family
Income - 34.1 33.8 28.3
Income 0 41.3 40.6 33.8
Income + 47.6 46.5 38.7
Retirees 45.9 46.4 39.9
Single person
Income - 71.0 70.5 51.4
Income 0 84.9 82.4 58.8
Income + 95.7 94.0 61.3
Retirees 86.4 87.3 74.7
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Mobility 
Mobility-related GHG emissions by house-
hold type vary more than they do for housing. 
They range from 0.9 tonnes of CO2 equivalent 
for an urban, low-income, single-parent family 
to more than 6.1 tonnes of CO2 equivalent for 
a high-income single person living in a peri-
urban area.  T5 
While retirees’ housing-related carbon foot-
pr int is large because of the considerable 
amount of space they occupy, their mobility-
related GHG emissions are among the lowest. 
Income is a determining factor of mobility-
related emissions. The f ive highest-emitting 
household types under the mobil i ty i tem 
are those with high incomes. The location of 
households in urban areas makes it possible 
for them to limit their daily mobility.
Figure 8 shows that the “long-distance mo-
bility” item, not the “transpor t” item over-
all, creates the disparity in households’ GHG 
emissions, based on the latter’s income.  F8 
Retirees’ GHG emissions are at tr ibutable 
to relatively low daily mobility, compared to 
other households, because they are not re-
quired to travel to and from work every day.
Emissions associated with daily mobility are 
lowest for urban households, regardless of 
income. Per i-urban and rural households 
have comparable emissions. In urban areas, 
average- and high-income households have 
similar emission levels . Emissions in urban 
areas are considerably less income-sensitive. 
Figure 8 
Transportation GHG emissions 
by income level
tCO2eq / cap / yr
Daily mobility
Long-distance mobility
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
Retirees
0 +
Income
-
Table 5
Mobility-related GHG emissions
Family structure tCO2eq / cap / yr
Income Rural Peri-urban Urban
Adults with children
Income - 2.1 2.1 1.6
Income 0 2.3 2.5 2.1
Income + 3.0 2.8 2.2
Retirees 2.2 2.6 2.1
Adults living together
Income - 2.5 2.6 2.0
Income 0 3.0 3.5 3.1
Income + 4.0 4.0 3.4
Retirees 1.9 2.0 1.7
Single-parent family
Income - 1.7 1.5 0.9
Income 0 2.1 2.3 1.6
Income + 2.7 3.2 1.6
Retirees 1.8 1.8 1.2
Single person
Income - 2.6 2.8 1.7
Income 0 3.8 3.7 3.1
Income + 6.0 6.1 3.8
Retirees 0.9 1.2 1.0
Figure 9 
Commuting emissions (home to work)
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Within each geographic area, family situa-
tion plays an impor tant role in determining 
emissions by indiv idual . A pool ing ef fec t 
appears, reducing the emissions of families 
with children compared to other families . 
Single-parent families have the lowest emis-
sions, ahead of couples with children, cou-
ples without children and, last , single per-
sons. Retirees, regardless of status, have the 
lowest emissions, while high-income house-
holds have the highest.
Urban households have lower daily mobil-
i ty-related GHG emissions , regardless of 
purpose of travel. This results from shor ter 
dis tances travelled and/or lower-emit ting 
modes of transpor t . Travel from home to 
work remains the highes t GHG-emit t ing 
t r ip for work ing households ; th is t r ave l 
purpose is par ticular ly high in per i-urban 
areas.  F9   F10 
The distr ibution of emissions due to long-
distance mobility is considerably more un-
equal than that for emissions due to daily 
mobility. Emissions vary from 0.09 to 2.35 
tonnes of CO2 equivalent/person/year, or a 
ratio of 1:25.
Cer tain population categories appear to be 
excluded from this type of mobil i ty ; that 
is , low-income, single-parent famil ies and 
ret irees l iv ing a lone , regardless of their 
geographic location.
Other population categories’ emissions due 
to long-distance mobility are much higher 
than the average, such as high-income single 
people, regardless of their geographic loca-
tion. The high-income category always gen-
erates more emissions than its equivalent 
in the same location with the same family 
composition.
Unlike daily mobility, urban households have 
higher emissions overal l than per i-urban 
households, which themselves have higher 
emissions for long-dis tance mobil i ty than 
rural households .  Thus, emissions gener-
ated by high-income couples without chil-
dren r ise by 50% when they l ive in urban 
areas, compared to their peri-urban or rural 
counterpar ts.
Food 
Because of the lack of data on food, the 
methodology chosen could not be used to 
quantify emissions that vary directly based 
on household location and structure. Only 
the SPC of the household’s reference per-
son allows for dif ferentiation of food-relat-
ed emissions here.   F11 
Figure 10 
Emissions related to long-distance mobility
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We note that the higher the income, the 
higher the food-related emissions, except 
for retirees. This is explained by the fact that 
retirees’ tend to eat out less, par ticularly for 
weekday lunches, while employed persons 
rely on institutional catering. This is why emis-
sions related to meals eaten outside the home 
were taken into account.
The dispar i t ies among the three income 
groups are based more on volumes than ex-
penditure structure. High-income households 
purchase more food. Retirees often purchase 
more expensive food at neighbourhood 
stores. 
Consumption of material goods
As in the case of food, the lack of available 
data on the consumption of material goods 
prevents us from quantifying household emis-
sions using criteria other than income.
The proportions of budgets of different cat-
egories of goods differ only slightly across in-
come categories. The difference involves pri-
marily the total volume of goods purchased, 
which explains the footprint in terms of emis-
sions. Low-income households’ emissions thus 
total 873 kg of CO2 equivalent/person/year, 
with emissions of 1,297 and 1,640 kg of CO2 
equivalent/person/year, respectively, for aver-
age- and high-income households. Retirees’ 
emissions total 1,114 kg of CO2 equivalent/
person/year. 
Emission factors per euro of audio-visual and 
computer goods are the highest, followed by 
automobiles and small consumables.
The structure of emissions by type of good is 
presented in Figure 12 for low-income house-
holds (which constitute the majority of the 
population).  F12 
Figure 11 
Food: annual emissions/product by income group
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Figure 12 
Breakdown of annual emissions by item for 
low-income households
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Services
The service sector emissions considered here 
total 27.1 MT of CO2 equivalent and are rela-
tively evenly-distributed across various types 
of services. Businesses emit 7.7 million tonnes 
of CO2 equivalent, educational institutions 
emit 5.2 million and the health sector emits 
4.6 million. Cafés/hotels/restaurants and the 
sports/recreation/culture sector emit close to 
4 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent.
Note: In f igure 13, expenditures called “busi-
nesses” are, in fact, expenditures for goods 
purchased at businesses, which explains their 
considerable weight relative to the others’. 
The underlying assumption is that the “use” 
of businesses is proportional to spending on 
goods. As with food, the dif ferences noted 
among income groups are based more on the 
overall volume of spending than on their dis-
tribution. Hotels, restaurants and the sports/
recreation/culture item increase as incomes 
rise. As might be anticipated, health expendi-
tures are higher for retirees. This refers only 
to direct health spending and does not include 
social transfers.  F13 
Conclusions 
Half of household emissions come from the 
“ food,” “goods” and “services” items, but 
the data needed for a fine disaggregation by 
household category are not available. We will 
return to this in the overall conclusions to this 
section. This produces a smoothing of the re-
sults among categories, while for the “housing” 
and “mobility” items, we note a strong varia-
tion in household carbon footprint by category.
In conclusion, Figure 14 presents emissions 
for four household types and their structure, 
which are relatively dif ferentiated. The sin-
gle-parent, urban, low-income family has the 
smallest carbon footprint of all the catego-
ries described. However, we have set aside 
the highest-emitting households (14 tonnes 
Figure 13 
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by household income level
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CO2/person/year), which are composed of 
single, high-income individuals living in rural 
or peri-urban areas and who were very few 
in number in 2008. Housing and food show 
the highest emissions among single, retired 
persons living in rural areas. The three other 
household types are urban. Household size 
and income group have a signif icant impact on 
emission levels. However, long-distance mo-
bility and its carbon impact, linked to income 
level, differentiate these three types of urban 
households most.  F14 
Carbon footprint for a selection of 
households in 2050, based on their uses 
Scenario design method
We wanted to include quantif ied compo-
nents in order to compare the di f ferent 
l i fes ty les charac ter izing the societ ies de-
scribed above from the perspective of GHG 
emissions. However, we have not quantif ied 
overall emissions for each society. That ex-
ercise would have required a level of speci-
f icity that is diff icult to achieve for visions of 
the future, which are of ten quite removed 
from the current s i tuat ion. We chose to 
quan t i f y  GHG emis s ions  p roduced by 
three types of households in each scenario, 
character ized by i ts income group, family 
structure and location. The household types 
chosen vary by scenario and symbolize the 
scenario analysed. They are not necessarily 
the most predominant in terms of numbers, 
but their numbers are most of ten growing 
by comparison to 2010. 
The compar ison of each household’s 2050 
emissions in each scenar io uses the 2010 
household from each categor y (same in-
come group, fami ly s t r uc ture and loca-
t ion), refer red to here as “2010 counter-
par t .” We note that the 2050 households 
are composed of a whole number of in-
d i v idua l s ,  wh ich i s  not the ca se of  the 
2010 counterpar ts , which are presented 
as averages for each categor y. The 2050 
“adul t s wi th ch i ldren” ca tegor y is com-
posed ei ther of two adults and one child 
(scenar ios 1, 2 and 3 in the conventional 
wor ld) or two adults and two children for 
scenar io 3 in the a l ternat ive wor ld and 
scenar io 4, and single-parent famil ies are 
composed of one adult and one child . In 
addition, as a result of the societal chang-
es incorpor a ted in the scenar ios ,  com-
par isons with a third 2010 household are 
somet imes more re levant than wi th the 
counterpar t . In that case , we make that 
additional compar ison and will specify the 
character is t ics of this third household for 
each scenar io.
Two types of successive quantifications
Because the goal of this exercise is to high-
light the impacts of lifestyle on GHG emis-
sions, each household is quantif ied twice, 
in succession, for each scenar io. We f ir s t 
sought to isolate the effects of reduced en-
ergy needs and, subsequently, the ef fects 
of technological developments and energy 
source substitution. The f irst simulation, re-
ferred to as “uses,” thus incorporates only 
changes in demand, without an in-depth 
modif ication of the energy supply system 
(the energy mix and carbon content of the 
energy sources thus ref lect 2010). The com-
ponents incorporated in this quantif ication 
process are:
 • housing and off ice retrof itting;
 • variation in specif ic electricity needs;
 • variation in distances travelled;
 • change in modal shares; and,
 • variations in consumption of food, goods 
and services (by quantity and quality).
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The second s imu l a t ion ,  r e fe r r ed to a s 
“uses + change in CO2 content ,” includes 
al l the components referred to above, as 
well as:
 • variation in the heating mix in buildings;
 • vehicle technology changes;
 • variation in the electricity production mix; and,
 • variation in the “carbon content” of goods 
purchased.
The main parameters inf luencing the f inal 
result are thus (with the parameters rel-
evant only in the second quantif ication pro-
cess noted in italics:  “uses + change in CO2 
content”): 
 •  Housing:
 - Useful f loor area per capita
 - Heat consumption for housing based on 
s useful f loor area (need)
 - Users’ heating and energy-conserving 
behaviour  
 - Consumption per person (hot water, 
cooking, specif ic electricity)
 - Variation in heating mix, hot water and 
electricity carbon content
 •  Personal mobility: 
 - Number of kilometres travelled by pur-
pose (number and distances of trips)
 - Modal share by purpose
 - Vehicle technology changes (eff iciency of 
former transport modes and emergence 
of new modes)
 •  Food consumption:
 - Quantities consumed by type of food
 - Share of consumption/organic food
 - Propensity to waste
 - Carbon efficiency of production methods
 •  Consumption of material goods:
 - Quantit ies consumed by typology of 
goods
 - Car bon e f f i c i enc y  o f  p roduc t ion 
methods
 •  Services: 
 - Changes in surface area of service busi-
nesses frequented by households
 - Off ice energy retrof itting 
 - Carbon eff iciency of off ice heating mix
The Green Consumer Society
Population changes 
The “green consumer” scenario (S1) extends 
the current trends in socio-demographic 
changes in the population, with the over-60 
population increasing by 10 million and urban 
sprawl and household break-up into smaller 
units continuing to 2050. We assume that the 
society will be slightly more polarized than in 
2010, with the proportion of middle-income 
households dropping slightly.  F15 
Given this population composition, this vi-
sion of the future characterizes the lifestyles 
Figure 15 
Population change
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of a single person, single-parent family and 
a couple with children. (The latter remains 
the largest of the various family structures.) 
These three households will be compared to 
2010 households with the same characteristics 
(their “counterpart”) and, for two of them, to 
a second household, described below, in order 
to illustrate the socio-demographic changes.
Changes in key lifestyle indicators
Housing retrof itting has been fairly limited in 
this society, resulting in a 20-40% useful en-
ergy gain compared to 2010 (Table 6). Heat-
ing control systems based on time and use of 
rooms are in widespread use.  Specif ic energy 
consumption rose by 50% between 1970 and 
2010 and, under this scenario, will continue to 
grow by more than 30% to more than 75%, 
based on household. 
The expansion of online shopping has reduced 
shopping trips. Daily mobility is thus stable 
overall, but long-distance mobility is increasing 
among households with means, particularly be-
cause it is much more common for family mem-
bers to live abroad than it was in 2010.
Needs for goods and services continue to grow. 
An increase of nearly 50% in the use of services 
(expressed in m2/person) by 2050 corresponds 
to an upward trend (Table 6, S1M1). Retrofitting 
of service sector buildings has reduced demand 
for heat by 40%, although this is more than off-
set by increased surface areas. For health rea-
sons and given rising food prices, most house-
holds have reduced the share of meat consumed 
by 50%.  This is offset by consumption of cereal, 
eggs and fish.  T6 
Adults with children, peri-urban area, average 
income (S1M1)
The lifestyle of this household (Table 6, S1M1) is 
quite similar to that of the same household type 
in 2010. As noted above, heating needs have 
Table 6
Main indicator trends
Family structure
Location
Income 
Adults with children
peri-urban area
average income
Single person
urban area
high income
Single-parent family
peri-urban area
low income
Useful oor area 2010 (m²/capita)
Useful oor area 2050 (m²/capita)
Heating 2010 (kWh/m²)
Heating 2050 (kWh/m²)
Specic electricity 2010 (kWh/capita)
Specic electricity 2050 (kWh/capita)
Daily mobility 2010/capita
 % individual vehicle
Daily mobility 2050/capita
 % individual vehicle
Long-distance mobility 2010/capita
 % airplane
 % individual vehicle
Long-distance mobility 2050/capita
 % airplane
 % individual vehicle
Food - % meat
Goods  - % ICT + household appliances
Goods - % other
Services - % needs in surface area/capita
Services - % needs in heating/m²
S1M1 S1M2 S1M3
33 61 34
33 74 25
132 139 146
92 109 94
1,251 1,059 1,173
1,877 1,854 1,525
12,243 9,691 11,894
90% 72% 78%
13,264 13,582 11,519
65% 87% 48%
6,675 15,054 1,122
29% 43% 15%
58% 30% 73%
9,942 31,200 1,500
27% 58% 0%
61% 23% 20%
-50% -25% -50%
80% 100% 20%
20% 50% 20%
47% 70% 14%
-40% -40% -40%
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decreased as a result of insulation and heating 
control systems, but specific electricity use is 
nearly 1,900 kWh/person/year.  
Dis tances travelled are identical to 2010, 
on aver age . Green modes of t r anspor t 
are used more of ten , but two-thirds of 
the k i lometres tr avel led s t i l l involve the 
use of a car. Long-distance mobility within 
this household rose from nearly 7,000 km/
year to 10,000 km/year as a result of two 
annual tr ips to visit family members living 
e l sewhere in Europe . Car s , fol lowed by 
airplanes, are the most common modes of 
travel on these long trips.
Because of continued peri-urbanization in this 
society, and to demonstrate the carbon im-
pact, this house will be compared to both its 
counterpar t and a similar household but living 
in an urban area in 2010.
Single person, urban area, high income 
(S1M2)
This individual’s income allows him or her to 
obtain spacious housing, measuring 74 m2, 
and to pay for major retrof it ting. However, 
this is offset by an increase in interior tem-
perature to 22°C in both winter and summer. 
Energy consumption to achieve thermal com-
fort thus remains at 109 kWh/m2. This person 
owns multiple pieces of electric and electron-
ic equipment, increasing specif ic energy use 
by 75% compared to 2010.
Mobility, both daily (for work and recreation) 
and long-distance, has increased sharply. As in 
the case of the household described above, this 
person has friends or relatives abroad and visits 
them several times a year. His or her executive 
status also requires frequent business trips av-
eraging 1,000 km/month. This individual almost 
always uses a car or motorbike for daily mobility 
and uses other modes of transport for only 13% 
of total kilometres travelled. The latter include 
green modes (3%) and public transit (10%). 
Long trips involve three other modes: airplane 
(for more than half of the kilometres travelled) 
and train and car (equal shares).
This person also uses cultural , recreational 
and sports services more frequently than the 
other households.
Because of the break-up of households into 
smaller units, this person will be compared to 
adults living together in 2010.
Single-parent family, peri-urban area, low 
income (S1M3)
This family’s lifestyle is severely constrained 
by limited income in a world characterized 
by increasing inequality. The family is com-
posed of one adult and one child living in 
low-energy-eff icient housing that measures 
50 m2. The main room is usually the only 
one heated in winter. However, ref lecting 
broader social trends, this family owns elec-
tr ical and electronic equipment that con-
sumes 1,525 kWh/person/year in specif ic 
electricity.
This household lives in at some distance from 
the downtown area, so daily distances trav-
elled remain high. The family does not own 
a private car and uses a two-wheeled vehi-
cle (usually electric). All other travel involves 
green modes (walking and biking, for 3% of 
travel) or public transit (10%). This household 
rarely takes vacations.
Its consumption of goods and services has 
increased, but by a much smaller proportion 
than the other two households’.
Results in GHG emissions
This simulation seeks to assess the impact of 
lifestyles in terms of energy needs with the 
CO2 content of the same energy sources as 
in 2010. However, because modal shifts have 
been taken into account, there may be related 
energy substitutions.  
Only use by single-parent families is declining, 
based on building energy eff iciency improve-
ments and the use of electric two-wheeled 
vehicles for daily mobility (as distinguished 
from the primary use of an internal combus-
tion engine vehicle in 2010). This is combined 
with a 25% decline in housing sur face area. 
Conversely, high-income single persons liv-
ing in urban areas have sharply increased 
their long-distance mobility. The carbon foot-
print for all other items (except food) is also 
larger than in 2010. The 50% decline in meat 
consumption for two of the households has 
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reduced the carbon footprint associated with 
this item by 15 to 20%.   F16 
The table of GHG emission reduction fac-
tors compares household emissions in 2050 
and those of their counterpar t in 2010. For 
the f irst household (adults with children, peri-
urban area, average income), the footprints 
per item have moved in opposite directions. 
It is slightly smaller for housing, daily mobility 
and food, but larger for long-distance mobility 
and goods and services.
The only notable change is the reduction, by a 
factor of seven, of the carbon footprint within 
the single-parent family (M3), which has shift-
ed from travel based primarily on an internal 
combustion engine vehicle to an electric two-
wheeled vehicle, which is produced on a large 
scale and thus at low cost.  T7 
The Enhanced Human Society
Population changes 
The Enhanced Human Society (S2) is char-
acterized by: a signif icant increase in urban 
dens i t y ;  cont inu ing employment among 
the elder ly despite Increasing l i fe expec-
tancy and a sharp drop in the age at which 
women have their f irst child; greater social 
polar isation; and, a marked increase in the 
break-up of households into smaller units . 
50% of the population thus made up of sin-
gle people.  F17 
The two characteristic households in this soci-
ety are composed of two single persons living 
in an urban area. One is working, although 
elderly, and earns an average income. The 
other is a manager with a high income. They 
Table 7
GHG emissions reduction factors  
2050 households compared to their 2010 counterpart
Housing
Daily mobility
Long-distance mobility
Food
Goods
Services
Total
S1M1 S1M2 S1M3
1.2
0.9
0.5
1.2
0.8
0.7
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.4
1.0
0.7
0.5
0.7
1.6
7.6
1.1
1.1
1.0
1.0
1.4
Figure 16 
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are among the Enhanced Humans. The third 
household belongs to the “minus” group. It is 
composed of a low-income couple with chil-
dren living in an urban area.
Changes in key lifestyle indicators
In this society, life in the vir tual world has rel-
egated the need for space (both interior and 
exterior) to second place. The per-person 
sur face area of housing is of ten one-third 
less than the average sur face area by 2010 
household category. Population density has 
increased in cities, reducing the distance of 
daily travel by 15%.
Residential energy retrofitting remains at the in-
dividual’s initiative. As a result, some housing has 
been partially retrofitted, resulting in a 25% gain 
in heat efficiency (among the two single-person 
households with average and high incomes). 
Other housing remains outdated because the 
households concerned cannot afford to pay for 
retrofitting (third household).
The number of shopping and recreation trips 
has been reduced, respectively, by 50% and 
75%.  The expansion of e-commerce and vir-
tual activities means that people almost no 
longer need to leave home.
Food is entirely artificial and designed solely to 
meet individuals’ needs. The 75% decline in the 
share of meat in the diet was nearly unnoticed, 
with vegetable, synthetic and insect-based 
proteins serving as substitutes. Very few fresh 
products are consumed and the notion of “sea-
son” no longer has any meaning. Consequently, 
waste has dropped sharply.
Households that belong to the Enhanced 
world have signif icantly increased their con-
sumption of high-technology goods (+400%). 
These goods include intelligent equipment 
(including chips and screens), which involve 
more energy-intense production (50% more 
than that of furniture, clothing, shoes and 
other goods). The production of prostheses 
has become an activity that uses as much ma-
terials and energy, worldwide, as automobiles 
did in 2010.
Many ser vices have been demater ial ized 
and thus occupy 25% less sur face area. The 
cafe/hotel/restaurant (CAHORE) sector has 
nearly disappeared, given the loss of interest 
in food and dining and the drastic reduction 
in tourism, which is limited to a small elite. 
On the other hand, the personal service and 
rental services sector is growing rapidly, off-
setting the sharp decline in retail surface area. 
Last , the hospital sector has grown signif i-
cantly. Households with adequate resources 
spend one month per year, on average, in the 
hospital to have prostheses implanted that are 
intended to enhance their abilities. Hospital 
facilities have thus expanded ten-fold com-
pared to 2010.  T8 
Figure 17 
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Single person, urban area, average income 
(S2M1)
This person’s consumption of specif ic elec-
tricity has risen by 150% because of the ex-
tensive presence of robots, screens, networks 
and smart household equipment intended to 
increase his or her abilities and that control 
human bodies and assist with household tasks. 
Telecommuting has thus halved the number of 
trips made for this latter purpose. However, 
travel to specialized clinics has become very 
frequent. Public transit (60% of modal share) 
and on-demand transport (including taxi-type 
transport, for 25%) dominate. They are very 
eff icient, thanks to ICTs. 
Single person, urban area, high income 
(S2M2)
This per son’s hous ing measures 46  m2 , 
which is quite spacious for this society, with 
one room dedicated to medical equipment 
and physical exercise. This pressured senior 
executive’s work keeps him or her in per-
petual motion. Work and travail are per-
formed simultaneously, thanks to embedded 
technologies. The number of business tr ips 
has thus increased four-fold, with on-de-
mand transpor t and three-wheeled electric 
vehicles used most often. To escape stress, 
this person takes shor t trips to distant plac-
es. This activity is restr icted to a very lim-
ited group, which takes one intercontinental 
tr ip by plane, four 200-k ilometre tr ips by 
hel icopter and eight 500 -k i lometre tr ips 
by car every year, on average. Long busi-
ness tr ips are also often necessary (16,000 
km; half by plane and half by train). Long-
distance mobility within this household cat-
egory has thus increased from 15,000 km to 
more than 30,000 km/year.
Table 8
Main indicator trends
Family structure
Location
Income 
Single person
urban
average income
Single person
urban
high-income
Adults with children
urban
low-income
Useful oor area 2010 (m²/capita)
Useful oor area 2050 (m²/capita)
Heating 2010 (kWh/m²)
Heating 2050 (kWh/m²)
Specic electricity 2010 (kWh/capita)
Specic electricity 2050 (kWh/capita)
Daily mobility 2010/capita
 % individual vehicle
Daily mobility 2050/capita
 % individual vehicle
Long-distance mobility 2010/capita
 % airplane
 % individual vehicle
Long-distance mobility 2050/capita
 % airplane
 % individual vehicle
Food - % meat
Goods  - % ICT + household appliances
Goods - % other
Services - % needs in surface area/capita
Services - % needs in heating/m²
S2M1 S2M2 S2M3
59 61 23
35 46 16
144 139 148
108 105 148
1,067 1,059 1,153
2,668 3,178 2,018
10,441 9,691 7,464
69% 72% 82%
12,674 25,346 7,074
40% 40% 30%
8,288 15,054 5,660
31% 43% 31%
40% 30% 56%
4,144 33,200 1,887
30% 64% 31%
30% 12% 56%
-75% -75% -100%
400% 400% 200%
50% 50% 50%
147% 161% 67%
-20% -20% -20%
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Adults with children, urban area, low income 
(S2M3)
This household has “dropped out” and can no 
longer keep up with the pace of the society. 
Its members alternate periods of work and 
unemployment, thus halving the number of 
home-work trips. However, the household’s 
members travel regularly to medical facilities 
for care covered by social security. Their long-
distance mobility is limited to rare family visits 
and a few excursions to parks and recreation 
areas developed on the city’s outskir ts. These 
trips total one-third of those taken in 2010. 
A signif icant par t of the household budget is 
spent on electronic equipment in an effor t to 
stay in tune with the society. That budget has 
thus increased by 200%.
Results in GHG emissions
Unsurpr is ing ly,  the carbon footpr int of 
goods consumed for these three house-
holds has risen sharply. The structure of the 
footpr int for these ser vices has changed, 
but has remained stable overall . The hous-
ing carbon footpr int of high-income indi-
viduals has grown. Increases in sur face area 
(and limited increases in thermal insulation) 
have been largely of fset by higher specif ic 
energy consumption. Increased urban den-
sity has resulted in extensive use of shared 
t r anspor t and smal l  low-GHG-emi t t ing 
vehicles . However, long-dis tance mobil i ty 
varies considerably by income and has risen 
sharply among executives, both for recrea-
tion and work needs.   F18   T9 
Figure 18 
Household emissions: Enhanced Human Society
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Table 9
GHG emissions reduction factors  
2050 households compared to their 2010 counterpart
Housing
Daily mobility
Long-distance mobility
Food
Goods
Services
Total
S2M1 S2M2 S2M3
1.6 1.4 1.5
2.4 1.3 4.0
2.1 0.4 2.2
1.7 1.6 2.2
0.5 0.4 0.5
0.8 0.6 0.8
1.3 0.8 1.4
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Changed lifestyles have resulted in reduced 
GHG emissions for two of the three house-
holds, from 30% to 40% (at unchanged CO2 en-
ergy supply content). These reduced emissions 
are the result of housing, modal shift in daily mo-
bility, food, and long-distance mobility among 
the most energy-conserving households.
As in present-day society, emissions var y 
drastically based on available household in-
come. This factor is the leading explanation 
of the emissions observed, with the discrep-
ancies increasing even fur ther. 
Dual Society and Multiple Frugal 
Lifestyles
Population changes 
This dual society is composed of a majority of 
the population that maintains a consumer life-
style, despite an economic system in crisis, and 
a large minority (40%) that has “dropped out” 
and adopted alternative lifestyles. One of the 
alternatives chosen is to move to a rural area, 
home to 25% of the population in 2050. This 
society is sharply divided, with 65% of house-
holds falling into the low-income category. Many 
are part of the “second world.” Family structure 
is largely unchanged from 2010. Persons over 
60 - more numerous in 2050 - are part of the 
“adults living together” category.  F19 
For this society, the composition of the popu-
lation has thus led us to characterize the life-
styles of three households: one that remains 
par t of the traditional system (couple with 
children, peri-urban area, average income) 
and two that are par t of the alternative sys-
tem (couple with children, urban, low income 
and a household composed adults living to-
gether, rural, low income). 
Changes in key lifestyle indicators
As noted above, near ly two-thirds of the 
population are par t of the conventional sys-
tem, such as the f irst household described 
below. Their l i fes tyle is similar to that of 
2010 but economic conditions have wors-
ened. The households that have abandoned 
this consumption model , by choice or ne-
cessity, have chosen to live simpler lives and 
to share cer tain goods and services within 
their community.  T10 
Adults with children, peri-urban area, average 
income (S3M1, conventional system)
Because they lack adequate income, these fami-
lies, who are part of the conventional system, 
must live in smaller spaces (-25%) than similar 
households occupied in 2010. The pressure 
and competition they face to remain par t of 
the “first world” requires them to accept jobs 
involving a longer commute (+25% increase in 
Figure 19 
Population trends
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2010 S3 2010 S3 2010 S3
Rural
Peri-urban
Urban
Retirees
Income +
Income 0
Income -
Single-parent family
Adults with children
Adults living together
Single person
Lifestyles and carbon footprints I Les Cahiers du Clip n° 21 I 62
distances travelled). Public transit is not well-
developed, so these households must use a car 
or motorized two-wheeled vehicle (50/50) to 
get to work because of the long commute dis-
tances. The car is used only for commuting to 
work. Two-wheeled vehicles and green modes 
of transpor tation are used for other travel. 
Long-distance mobility has been halved, with 
train travel most common and rare plane trips 
on low-cost carriers.  Meat consumption has 
dropped slightly. ICTs are required to stay 
connected to this society.  However, the ex-
tensive economic crisis has led to a decline 
in the consumption of other kinds of goods, 
compared to 2010.
Adults with children, urban, low income 
(S3M2, alternative system)
These households, whose income is lower 
compared to the same household category 
in 2010, have chosen to live in small towns. 
With several families sharing older housing, 
useful f loor area per person has dropped 
dramatical ly (-30%). L imited retrof i t t ing , 
which the residents per form themselves , 
somet imes us ing sa lvaged mater ia l s , to-
gether with temperatures kept low in some 
rooms and of f a l together in other s , has 
reduced heating needs by 50% (83  kWh/
m2). This “voluntary simplicity” can also be 
obser ved with regard to elec tr ici ty con-
sumption, which is 50% below that of 2010 
(577 kWh/person). Busy social and cultural 
l ives involve frequent tr avel , but subs t i -
tutes for home-work travel as paid work 
time has dropped sharply. This daily mobil-
i ty pr imar ily involves tr ips inside the city, 
using non-motorized transpor tation modes. 
Shared vehicles are used for longer tr ips or 
to move heavy loads.
Table 10
Main indicator trends
Family structure
Location
Income 
Useful oor area 2010 (m²/capita)
Useful oor area 2050 (m²/capita)
Heating 2010 (kWh/m²)
Heating 2050 (kWh/m²)
Specic electricity 2010 (kWh/capita)
Specic electricity 2050 (kWh/capita)
Daily mobility 2010/capita
 % individual vehicle
Daily mobility 2050/capita
 % individual vehicle
Long-distance mobility 2010/capita
 % airplane
 % individual vehicle
Long-distance mobility 2050/capita
 % airplane
 % individual vehicle
Food - % meat
Goods  - % ICT + household appliances
Goods - % other
Services - % needs in surface area/capita
Services - % needs in heating/m²
Adults with children
peri-urban area
average income
Adults with children
urban
low income
Adults living together
rural
low income
S3M1 S3M2 S3M3
33 23 44
25 16 33
132 148 168
112 83 63
1,251 1,153 1,219
1,564 577 609
12,243 6,233 12,390
82% 80% 95%
12,813 4,665 4,295
62% 20% 70%
6,675 5,660 1,349
29% 31% 1%
58% 56% 78%
2,800 1,000 500
15% 0% 0%
55% 20% 50%
-25% -75% -50%
50% -75% -75%
-25% -75% -75%
20% 0% 21%
0% -30% -30%
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Long-distance travel is very limited (1,000 
km/year/person). Trains are used for the 
major ity of such tr ips but carpooling is a 
travel option as well, if necessary, and some 
trips are made by bicycle.
Consumption of new goods is ex tremely 
limited; rather, people rely on used goods 
and trade and lend goods and materials.
Adults living together, rural, low income 
(S3M3, alternative system)
Thanks to DIY construction and co-living ar-
rangements with other families, these house-
holds occupy 33 m2/person of living space. 
The thermal quality of new construction is 
quite high (insulated with natural materials), 
which reduces heating needs by 50% over 
2010. Energy conservation effor ts (keeping 
rooms at a lower temperature, for example) 
further limit heating (63 kWh/m2) and specif ic 
electricity needs.
Work and social life is strongly rooted in the 
community and neighbour ing areas. Daily 
mobility is thus one-third of that among rural 
households without children in 2010. Vehicles 
(cars and utility vehicles) are shared. Given 
the shor t distances, two-wheeled vehicles 
and walking are the most common forms of 
transportation. Long-distance mobility is ex-
tremely low (500 km/year). Public transit and 
carpooling are used equally.
All foodstuf fs consumed are produced lo-
cally and most products are organic. Meat 
consumption has fallen and of ten includes 
Figure 20 
Household emissions: Duality and Plural Frugality Society
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Table 11
GHG emissions reduction factors  
2050 households compared to their 2010 counterpart
Housing
Daily mobility
Long-distance mobility
Food
Goods
Services
Total
S3M1 S3M2 S3M3
1.3 2.6 3.2
1.3 7.0 4.0
1.5 12.4 2.7
1.3 2.0 1.7
1.4 3.2 3.2
0.7 0.7 0.6
1.2 2.5 2.3
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poultry. All fruits and vegetables are seasonal.
Consumption of material goods has declined 
considerably. Where possible , goods are 
produced locally by craftspeople, small- and 
medium-sized businesses or the individuals 
themselves.
Results in GHG emissions
Emissions of households under the conven-
tional sys tem (adults with children, per i-
urban, average income) have fallen by 30%, 
due primarily to reduced income in a period 
of economic crisis. Long-distance mobility is 
the item that has declined most signif icantly. 
Emissions among households under the al-
ternative system have been reduced by a fac-
tor of 2.5. Housing and mobility represent 
less than half of GHG emissions. The drop in 
goods consumption also has a marked impact 
on household emissions.  F20   T11 
The Environmental Citizenship 
Society
Population changes 
The “collective lifestyle” is now recognized 
as the best way to maintain quality of life. 
Environmental and social issues are at the 
hear t of collective action. The income scale 
has t ightened, which explains the lack of 
high incomes. Commuter towns in the outer 
suburbs are no longer appealing and urban 
sprawl has been halted because of its exces-
sive environmental footprint. In addition, the 
family unit limited to parents and children is 
no longer the rule. Sharing housing and goods 
has become the social norm. Living spaces are 
open to other members of the family - and 
well beyond. The number of single people has 
declined and single-parent families are also 
less common.   F21 
Households emblematic of this society, and 
whose lifestyles we have chosen to charac-
terize, include two with adults living together 
in an urban area. The f irst of these is com-
posed of several average-income households 
living in shared housing and the second is 
composed of several young adults living as 
roommates , with low incomes. The third 
household includes a low-income couple with 
children living in a rural area. 
Changes in key lifestyle indicators
Residents have emphasized energy conserva-
tion, resulting in a four-fold drop in heating 
needs, both in new housing and retrof itted 
existing housing. These energy-conserving 
buildings have made it possible to maintain 
the same thermal comfor t level (19° C). 
Figure 21 
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However, areas set aside for telecommuting, 
which is quite common, require slightly higher 
temperatures, resulting in a 10% increase in 
heating needs there. 
ICTs play an impor tant role in the popula-
tion’s daily l ife , as tools for exchange and 
consultation. Manufacturers are required 
to sharply increase appliance energy ef f i-
ciency, which has enabled many households 
to reduce speci f ic energy consumpt ion 
over 2010, by approximately 600 to 900 
kWh/year. In addition, extensive sharing of 
equipment , both in the home and within 
the ne ighbourhood , has l imi ted power 
consumption, par ticularly in standby mode. 
By lengthening the l ife cycle of mater ials , 
high-tech expenditures remained constant 
compared to 2010. Reduced commodif ica-
tion, equipment-shar ing and the purchase 
of sustainable products have reduced the 
consumption of other goods by 30%.
However, daily mobility has dropped by ap-
proximately half. Thanks to telecommuting 
and e-commerce, shopping and work tr ips 
have fallen by 30%. Travel for recreation and 
other purposes is 50% higher than in 2010 to 
maintain active social and cultural lives. Dis-
tances travelled have fallen by half, with the 
growth of neighbourhood-based activities. 
In urban areas, given a transport system that 
encourages green modes, environmental and 
f inancial motivations and the short distances 
travelled, 80% of trips are made on foot, bicy-
cle or public transit. Two- and three-wheeled 
shared vehicles complement those modes. In 
general, the importance of face-to-face rela-
tionships and encounters with other cultures 
means maintaining a cer tain level of mobility, 
Table 12
Main indicator trends
Family structure
Location
Income 
Single person
urban
average income
Single person
urban
high-income
Adults with children
urban
low-income
Useful oor area 2010 (m²/capita)
Useful oor area 2050 (m²/capita)
Heating 2010 (kWh/m²)
Heating 2050 (kWh/m²)
Specic electricity 2010 (kWh/capita)
Specic electricity 2050 (kWh/capita)
Daily mobility 2010/capita
% individual vehicle
Daily mobility 2050/capita
% individual vehicle
Long-distance mobility 2010/capita
% airplane
% individual vehicle
Long-distance mobility 2050/capita
% airplane
% individual vehicle
Food - % meat
Goods  - % ICT + household appliances
Goods - % other
Services - % needs in surface area/capita
Services - % needs in heating/m²
S4M1 S4M2 S4M3
29 28 25
138 154 151
38 31 45
1,185 1,242 1,110
889 621 1,332
11,224 7,722 7,706
89% 95% 76%
5,880 6,468 4,020
20% 78% 0%
8,107 4,407 5,784
34% 0% 36%
44% 63% 41%
8,107 4,407 6,074
18% 5% 10%
22% 30% 20%
-100% -50% -100%
0% 0% 40%
80% 100% 20%
20% 50% 20%
47% 70% 14%
-40% -40% -40%
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particularly with regard to long-distance mo-
bility. The latter remains, overall, unchanged 
compared to 2010. 
80% of food production is organic and or-
ganized regional ly. Many households are 
vegetarian and consume seasonal fruits and 
vegetables, as do the urban households de-
scr ibed here. Improved diet and a healthy 
lifestyle have reduced the need for health 
care. Hospitals and clinics have thus been 
transformed into community centres. Meet-
ing places (cafés and restaurants) are very 
busy, as social life is quite active (+100%). 
This is also the case for cultural and spor ts 
facilities (+75%).  T12 
Adults living together, urban area, average 
income (S4M1)
Sharing housing among several couples or 
individuals has signif icantly reduced living 
area per person (-30%). However, common 
spaces have been set aside for telecommut-
ing and other activities. Long-distance mobil-
ity for personal purposes is identical to 2010, 
but everyone takes the time to travel. The 
share of air travel has fallen by half; 50% of 
trips are made on public transit and the rest 
are by boat or green modes of travel. Busi-
ness travel has dropped by half, with vir tual 
meetings par tially substituting. Carbon foot-
print restrictions and slowed production have 
reduced air travel and favour lower-carbon 
forms of travel (primarily by train).
Adults with children, rural, low income 
(S4M2)
Government-funded retrof it ting programs 
have improved housing insulation. Domestic 
electrical equipment has been voluntarily re-
duced to the minimum (refrigerator, computer, 
audio/video and basic household appliances) 
and is quite high-performing, which has halved 
energy consumption compared to 2010.
The organisation of rural space and changes 
in agr icultural production, involving more 
workers than previously, has brought home 
and farmland closer. Dis tances travel led 
have thus fallen by a third. Children still trav-
el f ive days/week to go to school, primarily 
via bus (80% on public transpor t). Parents 
occasionally organize to pick up groups of 
children by car af ter school (occupancy rate 
+30%). Thanks to the revival of rural com-
munities, most services can be found in sur-
rounding villages. 
Overall , modes of transpor t are unchanged 
compared to 2010. However, non-motorized 
transpor t modes (walking and bicycling) are 
increasing; each represents 5%. Small pub-
lic transit systems handle 20% of trips. Last, 
thanks to the use of motorized two-wheeled 
vehicles , which consume less energy than 
cars, the latter are used for only 60% of trips. 
Long-distance travel is increasing, both for 
personal reasons (visiting family throughout 
France) and professional ones (visits to ex-
change information on agricultural practices). 
Most travel is by train (60%). When a car is 
required, occupancy is maximized via car-
pooling platforms.
The share of meat in these households’ diets 
has been halved and they eat only seasonal 
fruits and vegetables.
Young adults living together, urban, low 
income (S4M3)
These young adults, whether workers or stu-
dents, occupy 25 m2 of habitable space per 
person. However, they are major users of 
ICTs. Despite the high energy performance of 
electrical goods, their specific electricity con-
sumption is 1,300 kWh/person/year, or slightly 
above that of an average household in 2010. 
The high-tech budget has increased 40%.
Travel for work , school and civic activities 
uses non-motorized transpor ts only. Tr ips 
are short, thanks to the local nature of social 
activities. Long-distance mobility is similar to 
2010. Trips are long but infrequent and often 
by train, boat or carpool, with a smaller car-
bon footprint. Airplane travel constitutes 10% 
of distances travelled.
Results in GHG emissions
The carbon impac t of al l uses has fal len 
sharply. Emissions produced by adults living 
together in shared housing have been cut 
by a factor of nearly 2.5 compared to their 
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2010 counterpar t , at tr ibutable to greater 
cohabitation In this society, as well as a nar-
rowed salary scale.
The emissions of rural families have barely 
increased over pr ior households’ (respec-
t ively, 4.3 and 3.9 tonnes of CO2 equiva-
lent /per son). Dai ly mobi l i t y i s s t i l l  h igh 
because of the i r  loca t ion ,  w i th 78% of 
dis tances travelled using individual motor 
vehicles.
Young adult GHG emissions are limited to 
3 tonnes of CO2 equivalent/person. This re-
sult is at tr ibutable to the very low carbon 
impact of daily mobility, a vegetar ian diet , 
energy-conser ving housing and a sur face 
area/person similar to the current average 
of low-income urban families.   F22   T13 
The Knowledge Age Society
Population changes 
This society, based on access to knowledge 
for all , operates preferably in an urban envi-
ronment where private proper ty has largely 
lost its value. Peri-urban areas have become 
denser or have been abandoned because 
they are dysfunctional . However, a signif i-
cant number of agricultural workers remain 
as a result of more ex tensive agr iculture. 
Knowledge is no longer transmitted primar-
ily within the family. The age of majority is 
16, resulting in an earlier emancipation for 
young people and their depar ture from the 
family. The number of households without 
children is thus automatically larger.  F23 
Table 13
GHG emissions reduction factors  
2050 households compared to their 2010 counterpart
Housing
Daily mobility
Long-distance mobility
Food
Goods
Services
Total
S4M1 S4M2 S4M3
2.6 2.6 3.1
6.0 1.7 28.6
1.9 1.2 1.5
2.8 1.8 2.7
1.7 1.0 1.2
0.7 0.8 0.7
2.2 1.5 2.2
Figure 22 
Eco-Citizen Society household emissions
t CO2 eq / cap / yr121086420
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To characterize the lifestyles in this society, 
we will use the following three types of house-
holds: two types of adult communities, one 
more female and the other more youth-based 
(age 16-20, all considered adult in this soci-
ety). Both communities live in urban areas and 
are low income. The third type of household 
is composed of single people living in rural ar-
eas, also low income. Monetary income is not 
the only form of income available to house-
holds in this society, where the exchange of 
services and uncompensated work is quite 
prevalent and explains  why the majority of 
the population is categorized as low income.
Changes in key lifestyle indicators
Buildings have been redesigned to create 
shared and private living spaces to meet the 
needs of communities in urban areas. This 
has reduced sur face area /person by 25% 
and up to 50% for young people occupying 
smaller bedrooms. Like most of the hous-
ing stock, buildings have been fully retrof it-
ted and externally insulated with reclaimed 
materials. In addition, plantings throughout 
the city have helped to reduce temperature 
variations.  T14  
Building quality has generated unit heating 
savings of 50 to 60% over 2010. The high cost 
of energy has encouraged extreme vigilance. 
People devise all sor ts of strategies to avoid 
unnecessar y consumption. ICTs are used 
widely and constitute a major share of the 
electr icity consumed. However, improved 
energy ef f iciency has led to a 30% drop in 
specif ic energy consumption compared to 
2010 for most households . Consumption 
among young people is slightly higher.
Long-distance business travel is quite rare, as 
ICTs are so sophisticated that such trips are 
not necessary. All households have reduced 
their long-distance mobility signif icantly be-
cause of cost, offset by the use of ICTs.
Self-care and knowledge of one’s own body lim-
it the use of health care. People visit museums 
and community centres frequently (+100%), as 
well as neighbourhood cafeterias and bistros. A 
significant part of social life outside the immedi-
ate neighbourhood occurs there (+100%).
Adults living together, urban, low income 
(S5M1)
Business travel has fallen by 50% thanks to 
telecommuting. Although people previously 
par ticipated in l i felong learning activ i t ies 
at the workplace or other facilities, online 
courses mean that these women never have 
to travel to continue their studies. Travel for 
recreation and personal visits has increased 
(+25%) due to the impor tance of social 
Figure 23 
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connections. However, shopping tr ips have 
declined (-25%).
Distances travelled for all purposes have fall-
en by 25% because most trips are within the 
neighbourhood. Vir tual contact offsets travel 
to more distant locations. Non-motorized 
transports are preferred for very shor t trips 
(20% on foot and 40% by bicycle). Public tran-
sit is used for longer trips (20%), with trips 
by car and motorized two-wheeled vehicle 
(widely shared). These women take only a few 
major trips in their lifetime and travel at a re-
laxed pace, by train (60%), carpool (20%) and 
boat (10%). Some even travel by bicycle.
Consumption of high-tech goods and com-
munications tools has increased (+30%). Con-
sumption of other goods has fallen sharply. 
They are sometimes self-produced and are 
repaired for as long as possible.
Single person, rural, low income (S5M2)
These individuals occupy rural homes that ex-
isted in 2010 and are slightly smaller (-10%). 
They have been only minimally retrof itted be-
cause of very limited incomes and indifference 
to comfor t. Extensive activities outside the 
home reduce the use of heat (-30%).
These individuals work primarily on the out-
skir ts of their municipality, which has been 
revitalized by new residents drawn by agricul-
ture.  While the volume of business travel is 
identical to that of 2010, distances are consid-
erably shorter because most trips occur with-
in a radius of 5 kilometres and fewer than 10% 
of trips are fur ther than 10 kilometres. This 
neighbourhood-based way of life generates 
daily mobility of approximately 3,000 km/year.
Meat consumption has declined compared 
to 2010 (-30%) and meat is produced locally. 
Table 14
Main indicator trends
Family structure
Location
Income 
Adults living together
urban
low income
Single person
rural
low income
Young adults living
together, urban
low income
Useful oor area 2010 (m²/capita)
Useful oor area 2050 (m²/capita)
Heating 2010 (kWh/m²)
Heating 2050 (kWh/m²)
Specic electricity 2010 (kWh/capita)
Specic electricity 2050 (kWh/capita)
Daily mobility 2010/capita
% individual vehicle
Daily mobility 2050/capita
% individual vehicle
Long-distance mobility 2010/capita
% airplane
% individual vehicle
Long-distance mobility 2050/capita
% airplane
% individual vehicle
Food - % meat
Goods  - % ICT + household appliances
Goods - % other
Services - % needs in surface area/capita
Services - % needs in heating/m²
S5M1 S5M2 S5M3
34 71 34
25 64 17
151 177 151
75 124 60
1,110 1,159 1,110
777 811 888
7,706 11,191 5,607
76% 95% 12%
4,572 2,980 2,823
20% 55% 0%
5,784 2,518 5,784
36% 0% 36%
41% 49% 41%
1,500 2,000 1,000
0% 0% 0%
20% 40% 15%
-100% -30% -30%
30% -90% -30%
-50% -90% -40%
-6% -8% -21%
-30% -30% -30%
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Consumption of seasonal fruits and vegeta-
bles, which are produced locally and organi-
cally, is quite high. These individuals do not 
consume lots of goods and produce most of 
them themselves. 
Young adults living together, urban, low 
income (S5M3)
Although the Internet is an omnipresent 
source of knowledge, young people aged 16-
18 still travel to school f ive days/week. They 
make fewer shopping tr ips, with each per-
son taking his/her turn to shop for the group 
(-40%). The living space is the community 
and these young people spend a good par t 
of their social life there, thus reducing their 
travel to visit other people (-30%).  However, 
they travel more than in 2010 for recreation, 
specif ically for spor ts (+15%). Because most 
travel is neighbourhood-based, distances have 
fallen by 24%. These young people travel al-
most only by green modes of transport (90%). 
They use public transit occasionally (10%).
They are not yet old enough to take major trips, 
but do take vacations (1,000 km/year), via car-
pool (15%), train (60%) and bicycle (25%).
Their income is low and their consumption 
of high-tech goods, similar to other goods, is 
reasonable. Sharing is a regular practice. 
Results in GHG emissions
These three households’ emiss ions have 
been halved (at cons tant energy carbon 
content). Single persons living in rural areas 
Figure 24 
Knowledge Age Society emissions
t CO2 eq / cap / yr10 1286420
Average household
Services
Goods 
Food
Long-distance mobility
Daily mobility 
Housing
Low-income urban household
Single persons
Low-income households
Adults living together
Adults with children
Adults living together
Rural, low-income
Rural, low-income
Urban, average income
Adults living together, urban
Adults living together, urban
Peri-urban
2010
2010
2010
2050
2050
2010
2010
2050
2010
2010
S5M3
S5M1
S5M2
Table 15
GHG emissions reduction factors  
2050 households compared to their 2010 counterpart
Housing
Daily mobility
Long-distance mobility
Food
Goods
Services
Total
S5M1 S5M2 S5M3
2.0 1.6 2.6
6.1 6.2 101.8
7.5 1.5 13.9
4.0 1.4 1.6
1.7 2.3 2.0
0.7 0.7 0.8
2.2 1.8 2.3
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have a large amount of living space (64 m2) 
that is not energy-ef f icient , result ing in a 
high carbon footprint. Their diet, like that of 
young people (third type of household), still 
includes a fair amount of meat (only a 30% 
drop compared to 2010), which explains the 
signif icance of this i tem compared to the 
women in the f ir s t household, who have 
chosen a vegetarian diet.
Mobility needs are low in this knowledge-
age society, where ICTs are used extensively. 
CO2 emission reduction factors range from 
6 to 100. Young adults do not use motorized 
vehicles.   F24   T15 
Impact on the results of a change in energy 
sources 
The preceding pages calculated GHG emis-
sions for dif ferent households in dif ferent 
social contex ts . However, these exercises 
were conducted assuming constant carbon 
content for the various energy carriers con-
sumed, without changing the 2010 energy 
mix. We thus wanted to present the l ife-
styles’ “raw” effects, without confusing the 
reading of the results with marked techno-
logical dif ferences.
However, technological change, changes in 
energy mix and the possible decarbonisa-
tion of energy carriers may provide leverage 
in transitioning towards a Factor 4 society. 
Thus, we must also present the results ob-
tained tak ing all this into account . That is 
the purpose of this chapter.
The primary changes concern the heat and 
hot water production systems for housing 
and off ices, the electr icity production sys-
tem and the technologies used in the pr i-
vate vehicle f leet.  We thus set out all these 
assumptions.
Last , we present the new results obtained 
af ter incorporating all these elements into 
the modelling exercise.
Heat and hot water
By 2050, existing boilers and other methods 
of producing residential heat and hot water 
could have been entirely replaced. It is thus 
Natural gas
Electricity (Joule effect)
Wood
Unconventional gas
Electricity/heat pump
Other renewables
Biogas
Fuel oil
gCO2eq / kWh
Figure 25 
Heating system structure by fuel type and average CO2 content of energy consumed (at boiler intake) 
Situation
2010
S1 S2 S3 S3 S4 S5
conv. alter.
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
250
200
150
100
50
0
Lifestyles and carbon footprints I Les Cahiers du Clip n° 21 I 72
possible to design equipment totally different 
from that currently in use. The graphs below 
present the assumptions chosen for the heat-
ing and hot water systems under each of the 
scenarios. Note that scenario S3 is divided 
in two. The duality within this vision of the 
future led  us to conclude that the systems 
characterizing the two societies existing side-
by-side societies - “conventional” and “alter-
native” - could be very different.   F25 
All the scenarios assume that fuel oil will no 
longer be used for space heating.  However, 
signif icant quantities of gas will continue to be 
used (never less than 20% for a scenario). That 
proportion of gas is a strong assumption be-
cause it is the only fossil fuel used for heating 
in 2050. Development of shale gas may even 
increase the share of gas (scenario 2).
The non-gas or fuel oil energy scenarios may 
be grouped into two categories: electricity 
scenarios (scenarios 1, 2 and 3/conventional), 
in which heat pump technologies and the Joule 
effect play a prominent role (often more than 
40%); and renewables scenarios (scenarios 3/
alternative, 4 and 5), where wood and biogas 
have a significantly larger share of the mar-
ket. These latter scenarios achieve an average 
carbon content of energy consumed that is 
lower than the first three scenarios. The drop 
as compared to the baseline may thus be sig-
nificant—that is -65% for S4 for example. The 
more proactive assumptions of market penetra-
tion of renewable energy (substituting for fossil 
gas), that would be possible under scenarios S3/
alternative, S4 and S5 (where energy demand 
has dropped sharply), would, of course, have 
a marked positive impact on households’ final 
carbon footprint in 2050.  F26 
Hot water energy sources were chosen con-
sistent with the assumptions presented for 
heating systems. Thus, there are three elec-
tricity-dominant scenarios and three renew-
ables-dominant scenarios (here, solar energy 
is favoured). The resulting levels of carbon 
content are ranked in the same way as those 
calculated for heating.
Electricity production systems
The electr icity production system charac-
ter izing the 2010 si tuation is s trongly in-
f luenced by nuclear power.  We may thus 
distinguish the scenarios based on whether 
or not they retain this character is t ic and 
we then return to the prior classif ication of 
“electricity scenarios” and “renewable sce-
narios.” The scenarios in which the thermal 
use of electr icity continues (heat and hot 
water production) are those where nuclear 
power still plays a leading role (S1, S2 and 
S3/conventional). On the other hand, the 
other scenar ios i l lus t r a te a non-nuclear 
gCO2eq / kWh
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District heating
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Unconventional gas
Heat pump
Biogas
LPG  
Fuel oil
Figure 26 
Structure of hot water production system and average CO2 content of energy consumer (at boiler intake)
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s i tua t ion ,  w i th fur ther deve lopment of 
renewable energy sources .  Scenar io S3 
is unique ,  with two dif ferent elec tr ici t y 
mixes existing simultaneously. The dual na-
ture of the scenario presents the possibility 
that the entire countr y wil l no longer be 
connected to a single interconnected grid. 
Small, autonomous systems operating at the 
community level are created. However, in 
the alternative society, cer tain buildings in 
urban areas remain connected to the main 
electrical grid. This explains the small share 
of nuclear power in the S3/alternative sce-
nario electricity mix.  F27 
Despite very dif ferent mixes, all the elec-
tr ici ty carbon content fal ls within a fair ly 
narrow range of values (between 85 and 
112). The S1 and S3/conventional mix are 
identical .  However, they generate dif fer-
ent values because 25% of the electr ici ty 
production facilities that use fossil fuels are 
assumed to be equipped with carbon se-
questration technologies under scenario S1.
Private cars
Under scenar ios S1, S2 and S3, the share 
of the heat engine fuel led by gasol ine or 
diesel fuel falls , but remains close to 50%. 
Most of the rest is provided by electr icity 
(except under S3/alternative, where inde-
pendent , unconnected electr icity gr ids do 
not a l low such use). The e lec tr ic i t y mix 
i s  t he one descr ibed in  t he pr eced ing 
paragraph. The resulting emission factors 
are one-third of those of 2010. They vary 
s l ight ly around the value of 75 gCO2eq/
km (the “A” label is currently assigned to 
every vehicle in France that emits less than 
100 gCO2eq/km).  F28 
For scenarios S4 and S5, the development of 
biogas and a high rate of electrif ication have 
reduced the share of gasoline and diesel fuel 
vehicles by a factor of four or f ive. This has 
reduced the emission factors even fur ther (to 
approximately 40 gCO2eq/km).
Modelling results 
Changes in energy sources used have a strik-
ing effect. These changes reduced emissions 
by 22% to 40% for all households tested un-
der all the scenarios. The average reduction is 
approximately 35% for households modelled 
here. Daily mobility is the item most affected 
by these technological changes.   F29 
GHG emissions per person cannot be re-
duced to levels compatible with the Factor 
4 objective only by implementing eff iciency 
or conservation measures but without chang-
ing the energy mix or modifying the energy 
sources used.
When energy conservation, reduced needs and 
changes in the mix and sources of energy used 
Unconventional gas
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Coal
Nuclear
Fuel oil
Hydro, wind, photovoltaic 
and biomass cogeneration
gCO2eq / kWh
Figure 27 
Electric mix according to scenarios and corresponding carbon footprint for electricity
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are combined, the modelling results achieve 
levels of GHG emission reductions compatible 
with Factor 4 for certain households in certain 
scenarios. As in the case of heating, the mixes 
chosen are based on certain assumptions, se-
lected from among many others, and the rela-
tive share of renewable energy compared to 
fossil fuels may sometimes be considered fairly 
conservative. A sensitivity analysis could have 
been performed, but that is not the purpose of 
this research project, which sought primarily to 
address lifestyles.
These results reveal, f irst , that only a small 
number of households in the scenarios tested 
here reduced their emissions to a level close 
to 2 tonnes of CO2 equivalent/year, consist-
ent with a Factor 4 objective in 2050. Those 
household categories are:
 • S3M2: The Dual Society and Multiple Frugal 
Lifestyles/adults with children/urban/low 
income (alternative)
 • S3M3: The Dual Society and Multiple Frugal 
Lifestyles/adults living together/rural /low 
income (alternative)
 • S4M3: Environmental Citizenship Society/
adults living together/urban/low income
 • S5M1: Knowledge Age Society/adults living 
together/urban/low income
 • S5M3: Knowledge Age Society/adults living 
together/urban/low income
The effects of technological changes and en-
ergy mixes have a par ticularly strong impact 
on mobili ty, both daily and long-distance. 
Changes in energy carriers and technologies 
achieve sharp reductions in GHG emissions 
for these emission items. When kilometres 
travelled are also reduced signif icantly and 
non-motor ized transpor t modes are also 
expanded considerably, remarkable rates of 
reduction can be achieved.
The f ive household categories noted above 
as having the smal les t carbon footpr ints 
travelled 2,800 to 4,600 km/year on an daily 
basis , compared to 6,400 km/year for em-
ployed urban households , whose mobil i ty 
was lowest in 2010. Households S4M3 and 
S5M3 are composed of urban young adults 
who do not use a car and whose emissions 
are thus ver y low. Households S3M2 and 
S5M1, composed of urban adults with or 
without chi ldren, use an indiv idual vehi-
cle for only 20% of their tr ips . Their daily 
mobil i ty emissions are, respectively, 0.04 
and 0 .06 tonnes of CO2 equivalent /year 
(compared to 1.25 tonnes of CO2 equiva-
lent /year for employed urban households, 
who travelled the least in 2010). Last , the 
S3M3 household, composed of adults living 
together in a rural area use an individual 
vehicle for 70% of distances travelled, but 
gasoline and diesel fuel represent only 55% 
of the fuel used by this household category. 
In this case, emissions total 0.2 tonnes of 
CO2 equivalent/person. 
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Figure 28 
Structure of private automobile fleet based on energy sources used and related emissions
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gCO2eq / kW
Figure 29 
Results in GHG emissions
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In terms of housing, these f ive household 
categor ies occupy 16 - 33 m2 per person; 
energy consumption for heating is 43 - 85 
kWh/m2. Their emissions for this item are 
0.27 - 0.37 tonnes of CO2 equivalent /per-
son. Las t , food-related emissions remain 
relatively high, representing approximately 
one-third of total household emissions and 
even near ly half for the S5M3 household. 
The meat share for this latter household fell 
only 40% over its 2010 counterpar t , com-
pared to 50% to 100% (S4M3) for the other 
households. These emission levels show a 
potential reduction in GHG emissions that 
is probably smaller than for the other items 
but, above all , they reveal that detailed data 
on energy consumption and CO2 emissions 
for this “farm-to-table” item is very limited. 
Consequently, it is dif f icult to propose am-
bitious assumptions.
Conclusion
The goal of this exercise was to highlight 
the lifestyle change levers that may reduce 
GHG emissions. To do that , we sought to 
dissociate the latter’s effects from the tech-
nological effects and the effects of modify-
ing the energy mix. 
Based on this research, we conclude that 
lifestyles are indeed a relevant point of en-
try for characterizing household GHG emis-
sions, even if it is very diff icult to perform the 
modelling and quantif ication. The differentia-
tions expected in the area of emissions based 
on the lifestyles adopted, and that were not 
erased by technological ef fects, thus show 
that energy-conserving lifestyles exist that 
may be compatible with a Factor 4 perspec-
tive and others that would not.
The emissions of three households in scenarios 
1 and 2 are linked to their usage, which is in-
creasing. Their carbon footprints are shrinking 
(7% to 30%, based on the case) only as a result 
of technological changes and improvements in 
the carbon content of the energy sources. For 
scenarios 3, 4 and 5, implementing only use-
related energy conservation actions (including 
retrofitting of housing and modal shift in trans-
port) can achieve emissions reductions of 48% 
to 84%, based on household, by using all the 
levers: conservation in use, changes in technolo-
gies and reduction in the carbon content of en-
ergy sources.
Lifestyles have a par ticular impact on emis-
s ions l inked to hous ing and da i l y and 
long-distance mobility, but also to food. The 
levers highlighted and that appear to be effec-
tive in climate change control effor ts include: 
 • Reducing useful f loor area per person, 
which leads us to conclude that the cur-
rent trend towards larger spaces must be 
reversed. This will involve adapting housing 
to household size throughout life (by facili-
tating residential mobility) and encouraging 
new shared living arrangements.  Retired 
households may be the f irst to be affected 
by such measures.
 • Maintaining reasonable residential temper-
ature setpoints, regardless of retrof itting 
performed, strengthening our belief that a 
building’s users must re-learn how to use it.
 • Resisting the expansion of additional elec-
trical equipment in households.
 • Sharing of uses, in general.
 • Rebuilding local community ties.
 • Reducing daily distances travelled by reduc-
ing trip distances.
 • Using non-motorized transport and public 
transit on a daily basis.
 • Drastic reduction in distances travelled for 
long-distance mobility.
 • Reducing the quantities of meat consumed.
 • Sharply reducing food waste.
These levers are compatible with the areas 
already researched in the energy/cl imate 
policies implemented by governments. How-
ever, this exercise highlights new issues that 
public authorities have not fully or properly 
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explored. Having completed this research, we 
believe it is essential to pursue the question 
of how a world where mobility is sharply re-
duced can be made attractive and to identify 
the conditions for changing cultural habits, 
such as diet and consumption practices. 
We cannot ignore any of these levers if we 
want global warning to remain below 2 °C by 
the end of the century. Governments will have 
to include lifestyle changes in the solutions 
they promote.
Fur thermore, the quality of the exercise we 
conducted depended, in large par t , on the 
data we were able to obtain. This work would 
be strengthened by adapting the statistical 
tool to the new need for knowledge and the 
ability to descr ibe French households’ life-
styles, par ticular ly in considering follow-up 
effor ts.  
The problems exper ienced fal l into two 
groups:
 • lack of statistical data needed to charac-
terize populations based on their “lifestyles;” 
and, 
 • lack of detailed, centralized and consistent 
data on indirect GHG emissions from con-
sumption of food and goods.
With regard to the characterization of popu-
lations based on lifestyles, the following in-
formation would have signif icantly improved 
this study: 
 • The INSEE “individuals” database, drawn 
from the population census, character izes 
each person based on his/her SPC. Howev-
er, information that would permit a ref ined 
characterization of these individuals’ f inancial 
resources and of their households is not avail-
able.  Incorporating data that characterizes in-
dividuals’ income in the “individuals” database 
would be a def inite improvement.
 • The mobility surveys do not allow mobil-
ity patterns to be def ined based on lifestyles. 
The samples surveyed become too small to 
be useful when the populations observed are 
characterized by two or three parameters, 
such as urban residence, age, income and fam-
ily structure.
Enlarging the sample size would add real value 
for the kind of study we have just conducted.
 • The s tat is t ical consumption data (food 
or goods) are avai lable only by analysing 
the information character izing household 
expenses by i tem. Conver t ing this mon-
etar y data into consumption volumes (for 
example, kilos of food products or number 
of televisions) and, then, into indirect GHG 
emissions leaves the result dependent on 
many assumptions . In par ticular, the qual-
ity of consumption is not fully understood in 
this kind of exercise.
I t would thus be useful to develop a s ta-
tistical system that distinguishes household 
consumpt ion based on the cr i ter ia that 
have an impac t on ind i rec t produc t ion 
of emissions . For food consumption, data 
for each population category on volumes 
consumed, dis t inguished by product type 
(including white meat, red meat, f ish, veg-
etables frui ts and dair y products) and by 
quality (including traditional fresh, organic 
fresh, canned tradit ional , canned organic 
and frozen), would provide new oppor tu-
nities to dif ferentiate the carbon impact of 
dif ferent lifestyles.
The characterization of indirect GHG emis-
sions generated by the consumption of food 
and goods poses a common limitation: the 
available databases used in this study can-
not be used to def ine the causes of the 
emissions or the relevant items. This limits 
oppor tunities to assess savings.
The different kinds of consumption (food or 
goods) are currently characterized by over-
all emissions. They include (without dif fer-
entiation) emissions generated by produc-
tion, transpor t, and distr ibution. Data that 
provide emissions dif ferentiated by phase 
for a wide range of products would provide 
a better understanding of the kinds of ac-
tions that could be taken to reduce GHG 
emissions . Recommendations concerning, 
for example, the use of organic agriculture 
or local supply systems could thus be im-
proved and strengthened.
Nonetheless, improving the statistical tool 
will not address all the dif f iculties.  An in-
depth methodological review is required to 
develop lifestyle forecast models. 
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In support of an open 
public debate over 
lifestyles 
Afterword by Pierre Radanne
This prospective analysis of lifestyles sought 
to identify the conditions under which GHG 
emissions in France could be reduced by a fac-
tor of four. 
A different kind of debate 
As a national debate begins in France over the 
energy transition, it is par ticularly timely to 
consider how French energy consumption and 
GHG emissions will evolve over the long-term 
and to do so with an open mind.
Energy consumption and changes in consump-
tion are too often presented very narrowly. 
They are:
 • broken down based on statistical categories 
that are far removed from daily behaviour 
and life choices, thus preventing citizens 
from making a connection between their 
concrete choices and the very abstract no-
tion of “energy;”
 • presented in the form of household con-
sumption averages, when such consump-
tion is very dispersed and based primarily 
on income level;  
 • focused on potential energy ef f iciency 
achievements via technological advances in 
equipment but ignore changes associated 
with improvements in the way society is or-
ganized and in consumer behaviour (house-
holds, businesses and public authorities). 
We must, however, acknowledge that this is 
based on a concern for individual freedom 
and privacy. Nonetheless, we cannot divide 
GHG emissions by a factor of four by 2050 
unless every one of us considers all of the 
collective constraints we face. If we fail to 
do so, progress towards greater eff iciency 
will be largely eroded by new consumption, 
made possible by the savings from energy 
eff iciency (rebound effect);
This latter limitation remains operative be-
cause it is incorporated into forecasting ex-
ercises based on a linear projection of past 
changes and corrected only by introducing 
energy ef f iciency measures. However, our 
society could take multiple paths, which can-
not be reduced to technical choices or differ-
ent economic management models. We must 
thus open up the range of possible choices 
by recognizing dif ferent lifestyles, individual 
preferences and daily behaviours. 
The difficulty in describing lifestyles
Increasing the average educat ional level , 
access to information and professional and 
geographic mobility all contr ibute to a di-
versif ication of lifestyles. Socio-professional 
categor ies thus group together l i fe si tua-
tions and behaviours that are increasingly 
heterogeneous.
In this research, the effor t to better under-
stand these lifestyles was based on three dis-
tinctions: income level (by grouping of SPC); 
family structure; and, geographic location.
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Thanks to bibliographic (Par t 1) and analytic 
(an assessment of current household GHG 
emissions) (Par t 3) work , this research has 
contributed to a better understanding of con-
crete actions in relation to life situations.
The quanti tat ive analysis revealed dif fer-
ences in GHG emiss ions that are deter-
mined primarily by income level . However, 
the classif ication of living standards based 
on SPC limits the dispersion observed and 
offsetting effects appear.
 • The differences linked to housing are weak 
because of offsetting factors in many cas-
es, including  the size of housing, quality of 
insulation, per formance of equipment and 
appliances, heating temperature setpoints 
and the number of residents, although be-
haviours are not homogenous within each 
social category.
 • A similar complexity exists with regard to 
daily transpor t. Low-income and better-
off families both rely signif icantly on the 
automobile as they often have a long com-
mute to and from work. Personal situations 
are simultaneously diverse and often very 
constrained.
 • Long-distance mobility is less ambiguous 
and clearly correlated with income level.
 • Consequently, lifestyles show strong com-
pensating processes among various types 
of pr ior it ies , including a preference for 
comfor t inside the home, travel , housing 
comfort, and relational mobility.
In general, the results are extremely sensitive 
to personal choices made.
In-depth research is needed
Considerable work remains to be done to ana-
lyse household energy consumption and GHG 
emissions based on differences in social and 
economic situations. In addition, such analy-
sis is complicated because it requires a broad 
analytic framework, given the globalization of 
economic exchanges. The tools available are in-
adequate because the categories developed for 
other purposes (based primarily on professional 
categories) do not correspond to lifestyle types 
(including housing and diet).
More in-depth research needs to be done, us-
ing surveys designed specif ically for this pur-
pose. Multi-year repor ts are also necessary. 
Without such a tool , behavioural changes 
cannot be followed over time.
In addition, a descriptive statistical approach 
must be based on further analysis of the psycho-
sociological factors that affecting the learning of 
individual behaviours. Otherwise, the public de-
bate lacks benchmarks and proposals for change 
will be met with considerable scepticism.
The five long-term scenarios 
studied
I t was then tempting to compare this ex-
treme complexity of the individual attitudes 
observed in 2008 in highly-contrasting long-
term scenarios. However, this could be done 
only by maintaining an equivalent disaggrega-
tion with regard to social situations.
After lengthy discussions, the research team 
agreed on the choice of f ive scenar ios, all 
based on positive values (without, however, 
constituting homogeneous societies). These 
f ive scenarios were built on consistent psy-
chological bases.
 • The Green Consumer Society posits the 
continuation of the current consumer so-
ciety, with a corrective “greening” of the 
means of production and consumption.
 • The Enhanced Human Society offers a dif-
ferent promise than our current consumer 
society - that of improved human per for-
mance and longer life expectancy. How-
ever, this promise is not available to all. The 
scenario described thus has a dual nature, 
because one par t of the population lacks 
access to it.
 • The Dual Society and Multiple Frugal Life-
styles scenario is based on the notion that 
par t of the population has “dropped out” 
of the consumer society. While some peo-
ple have adopted simpler lifestyles in the 
context of a shrinking economy and devel-
op local production, others maintain cur-
rent forms of production and consumption. 
This is thus a dual scenario that will have to 
develop over time.
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 • The Env ironmenta l -Ci t i zensh ip Socie t y 
ref lects a sharper renunciation of the cur-
rent consumer society. Its faint signals can 
already be observed, with the reaff irmation 
of broad social values that frame individual 
behaviour, optimize energy consumption 
and reduce GHG emissions.
 • The Knowledge Age Society holds out the 
promise of a new development frontier, 
focused on deeper personal exchanges. 
Knowledge and cultural expression be-
come the new areas of societal expansion, 
clearly relying on the possibilities created 
by the new communication technologies.
The forecasting exercises conducted for each 
vision highlight major dif ferences in GHG 
emissions, which extend the dif ferences in 
household situations identif ied for 2008.
Prohibitions, essentials and 
optimizations needed 
Several kinds of lessons may be drawn from 
the simulations conducted:
Prohibitions
 • Electricity production based overwhelm-
ingly on fossil fuels.
 • A transpor t sector that uses primarily pe-
troleum-based fuels.
Essentials
 • High-quality new building construction and 
retrof itting of the existing building stock.
 • Widespread adoption of energy eff iciency 
in all sectors. 
 • Expansion of shared goods and services.
 • Improvements in social organisation, par-
ticularly with regard to urban planning. 
 • Promotion of renewable energy, the only 
energy resource produced nationally and, 
thus, employment-generating and protect-
ed from international f luctuations.
 • Improvements in individual behaviour based 
on an improved understanding of the scope 
of actions.
 • Gradual shif t to electr icity-based shor t-
distance travel.
 • Raw materials recycling. 
Optimizations needed 
 • Preference for local production, particularly 
for foodstuffs.
 • Reduction of meat consumption.
 • Air travel only when no substitutes are 
available (long-distance travel).
 • Prices that more accurately ref lect costs.
Obstacles and areas of research
However, there are some obstacles that are 
diff icult to overcome at this time: 
 • Ending dependency on petroleum for long-
distance transport.
 • Electricity storage, which is critical to im-
plementing the shift to renewable energies.
 • This work has revealed the dif f iculty of 
achieving a Factor 4 scenario in a context 
of globalized industrial trade. It assumes a 
reterritorialization - a rescaling of territo-
rial organisation - of relationships against 
a backdrop of interdependent economies 
and the ability to organize major transfor-
mations without generating signif icant so-
cial imbalances. 
The political issues that remain
The conclusions of this research are not lim-
ited to a description of technological choices 
and organisational methods. They raise other 
serious questions:
Collective strategy, protection of individual 
freedom, diversity of expression and personal 
incentives.
While the research has shown that signif icant 
energy-conserving lifestyles were required 
to achieve Factor 4 under cer tain scenarios 
(3, 4 and 5), obviously not applied uniformly, 
we must still address the issue of extending 
such practices throughout the entire society 
and beyond differences in personal income. 
Achieving widespread energy-conserving be-
haviour requires not only broad social change 
guidelines, but changing individual choices as 
well. Many initiatives are underway to inf lu-
ence behaviour via education, information 
and incentives that encourage small chang-
es. However, there is no evidence that such 
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effor ts will produce behaviour change that is 
signif icant enough to counterbalance the re-
bound effect and to achieve “optimal” behav-
iour on a daily basis.
Despite frequent criticism of the prevailing in-
dividualism, we must still carefully analyse the 
clear and growing differentiation in individual 
behaviours.
This raises the following question: will injunc-
tions to standardize individual behaviour in 
the name of the collective interest restr ict 
individual freedom? 
More fundamentally, given that universal suf-
frage is the basis of government legitimacy in 
democratic societies, the majority must sup-
por t such choices. Will strong pressure to 
change behaviour thus lead to voter rejection?
Economic tools, such as tax policy, that are 
used to inf luence individual behaviour, may 
encounter the same problems; that is, lower-
income households have much less f lexibility 
than others, while energy represents a much 
larger share of their budget.
How can we influence behaviour?
This question cuts across all the scenarios. In 
all likelihood, weaker social cohesion and a 
weaker commitment among the population 
to its value system (including simple lifestyles, 
personal development, access to knowledge, 
and quality of relationships) are likely to pro-
duce more heterogeneous behaviours. This 
results in higher energy consumption that 
technical options alone cannot offset.
In addition, there is a considerable gap be-
tween stated opinions and actual actions. This 
attitude - the cognitive dissonance that exists 
between opinion and practice - is heightened 
when it involves an issue that produces un-
ease and anguish, such as facing limits (access 
to resources or the need to reduce GHG 
emissions by a factor of four).
Under these conditions, repeated injunctions 
to improve behaviour could produce the op-
posite outcome - denial, refusal or evasion.
Seven steps: from awareness to action 
The conditions that must be met to move 
from awareness to action. 
First, once an individual understands the seri-
ousness of climate change and energy issues, 
he or she must be able to conf irm that they 
are being addressed. Many people base their 
opinions on the consensus achieved within 
the society. Are the media giving these issues 
the prominence they deserve? Are political, 
administrative and economic leaders incor-
porating this new, fundamental issue into their 
choices and decisions? This is not the case to-
day, par ticularly with regard to the audio-vis-
ual media and advertising messages. Without 
that conf irmation, the message conveyed is 
that the problem is not being addressed and, 
thus, is not urgent.
The second condition is that the issue must be 
understood rationally. We cannot act with-
out understanding the processes at work and 
visualizing their impacts. The scope of the cli-
mate change issue must be examined in terms 
of its causes, extent and rapidity. Only edu-
cation can establish a link between personal 
responsibility and future climate change. To 
f ight climate change, we must both educate 
our children and work hard to educate the 
population on a continuing, permanent ba-
sis.  Local municipalities will play a critical role 
here.
The third condition involves identifying one’s 
own contribution to GHG emissions. Cutting 
the annual contr ibution of seven tonnes of 
CO2 equivalent per person by a factor of four 
can make your head spin. We must recognize 
the sources of those emissions and understand 
their effects on our personal life. Otherwise, 
we will be able to imagine only the dramatic 
collapse of our own way of life, which will cer-
tainly increase anxiety. Conversely, recogniz-
ing that one of the main sources of household 
emissions is home heating and understanding 
that it can be addressed by better insulation, a 
more eff icient heating system, use of renew-
able energies and greater attention to one’s 
daily behaviour is unlikely to trigger a personal 
crisis. This phase - noting, observing and re-
cording what needs to change in one’s life - is 
critical. 
The fourth condition is access to information 
about the many possible solutions, from the 
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technology to forms of social organisation to 
the level of individual behaviour, in all relevant 
spheres, including domestic life, food, trans-
por t of persons and merchandise and con-
sumer goods.
If we carry out these four steps - see that the 
issue is being addressed seriously, develop an 
understanding of the problem, identif y our 
responsibilit ies and anticipate the possible 
responses - then we will be able to construct 
a new sense of ourselves, our future, and our 
children’s future. Climate change will then no 
longer constitute a challenge to our way or life 
or, worse, the expression of our personality. 
Yes, life will change. But given the technical 
changes that will allow us to adopt fundamen-
tally dif ferent behaviours, we can also antici-
pate a satisfying personal life. However, if we 
are to achieve a broad-based shift to action, 
this image of our future life must be par t of 
a common scenario. We must recognize that 
many of these changes will require a dif fer-
ent form of collective organisation that involves 
distributing jobs based on where we live, high-
quality housing construction and accessible 
public transpor t. Addressing climate change 
thus involves three additional steps that re-
quire politicians to act as stage director.
The f if th condition involves creating greater 
awareness of exemplary accomplishments by 
public authorities and businesses in all areas, 
including construction, transport, agriculture 
and energy production. Local municipalities 
clearly play a large par t . A woman walking 
past a new building with her child must be 
able to explain that the building will save ener-
gy and have a minimal environmental impact 
- and that those are the kinds of buildings that 
will be built throughout the child’s lifetime. 
That awareness will be reassuring. 
Sixth, these exemplary achievements must be 
par t of an actual scenario and individual ac-
tion must be carried out within timelines set 
by law and applicable to all. It would be useful 
to develop a “Factor 4 timetable” leading up 
to 2050. We cannot expect every person to 
change his or her behaviour if those changes 
are not par t of a collective process. Political 
entities must propose a timetable and lay out 
a ser ies of steps for each sector, based on 
its specif ic characteristics. The future would 
thus be transformed from a blurry, traumatic 
unknown to a path marked by small, tangible 
milestones. Government must implement this 
transformation and the pace must be tailored 
to each sector and technology. Designing a 
scenario for the future will also highlight the 
economic and employment benef its of taking 
action. 
The f inal condition involves ensur ing that 
businesses, public authorities and citizens are 
equally committed to these changes, based 
on their responsibilities and social conditions. 
The challenge cannot be solved unless we 
take a democratic approach based on solidar-
ity. “I will, if you will, if we all will!” 
Equally likely futures
We must explore visions of the future in order 
to rank the solutions and clarify potential lee-
way. If we do not create visions of the future, 
we cannot imagine ourselves there. However, 
presenting technical solutions is clearly not 
enough. We will not be able to achieve wide-
spread optimization of our energy choices and 
behaviours in the face of climate change un-
less it is par t of a vision that allows people to 
achieve success in their individual lives and is 
par t of a democratic process. This research 
was intended to help us move forward on 
these new paths to achieving personal fulf il-
ment and democratic progress.
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